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ABSTRACT 
Individuals worldwide entertain ideas about beings with extraordinary mental 
capacities that far surpass ordinary human limits. How and when do such concepts 
develop? Two theories have been proposed to account for this development. A 
preparedness hypothesis states that young children are prepared to understand all minds 
as infallible, perhaps omniscient. A contrasting anthropomorphism hypothesis states that 
children‘s understanding of extraordinary minds builds upon their initial understanding of 
ordinary, limited minds.  I assess these hypotheses in three studies.  
 In Study 1, secularly-schooled preschoolers completed theory-of-mind tasks about 
the mental states of contrasting agents, including ordinary humans, God, and Mr. 
Smart—whom children were taught ―knows everything.‖ Consistent with an 
anthropomorphism hypothesis, 4-year-olds who were beginning to attribute mental limits 
to ordinary humans (e.g., ignorance) attributed those limits to God and to Mr. Smart. 
Only 5-year-olds differentiated between humans‘ fallible minds and extraordinary 
beings‘ less fallible minds. In Study 2, religiously-schooled preschoolers completed 
identical tasks, revealing a similar developmental pattern: 4-year-olds beginning to 
attribute certain limits to humans also attributed those limits to God. However, 
religiously-schooled 4-year-olds did not attribute those limits to Mr. Smart, whose 
powers they had just been instructed about. Across both studies, children who were more 
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knowledgeable about God attributed to extraordinary beings less fallible capacities, but 
this was true only among children who understood ordinary humans‘ mental fallibilities.  
 Using different tasks with preschoolers, elementary-school children, and adults, 
Study 3 revealed that older preschoolers grant all-knowing beings knowledge of many 
(though not all) domains, including knowledge that ordinary people cannot easily 
acquire. Understanding the depth of all-knowing beings‘ knowledge (i.e., knowledge of 
everything within a domain) was not robust until early adulthood. Older preschoolers‘ 
exposure to ideas about God predicted attributions of broader knowledge to a new all-
knowing being. Results from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that, after developing a 
representational theory-of-mind, socio-cultural input can facilitate an appreciation for 
extraordinary minds. Study 3 additionally identifies other cognitive competencies that 
support an understanding of omniscience. Collectively, these studies reveal that young 
children are clearly not prepared to understand extraordinary mental capacities, but 
instead such understanding develops progressively throughout childhood. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
Children‘s developing understanding of how others perceive, think, and behave—
their theory of mind (ToM)—has received intense empirical attention during the past 
three decades (for reviews, see Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Flavell & Miller, 1998; 
Harris, 2006; Wellman, 1990, 2011). This work has yielded a wealth of information 
about the sequence and timing of ToM development, identifying both the universal nature 
as well as cross-cultural differences in ToM development (e.g., Lillard, 1998; Sabbagh, 
Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006; Tardif, Wellman, Fung, Liu, & Fang., 2005; Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006; Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Other studies have identified a multitude of behavioral and cognitive predictors, 
outcomes, and correlates of ToM development, shedding light on factors that contribute 
to the emergence of ToM (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; 
Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Hughes et al., 2005; Wellman, Lane, LaBounty, & Olson, 2011) 
as well as the role ToM plays in children‘s everyday lives (e.g., Dunn & Cutting, 1999; 
Lalonde & Chandler, 1995; Taylor & Carlson, 1997).  
Most of the existing work on ToM development has focused on children‘s 
understanding of a particular type of mind—an ordinary human mind that is characterized 
by a specific set of constraints and failings; for example, ignorance and false beliefs. 
However, children (and adults) also entertain notions of minds that are distinctly non-
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human—for example, animals or superheroes with exceptional perceptual abilities like x-
ray vision or night vision, and religious deities with extraordinary mental abilities, like 
the ability to read minds or foretell the future. Relatively little empirical attention has 
been granted to children‘s developing understanding of these non-human, extraordinary 
minds. The studies in this dissertation address three broad research questions with regard 
to children‘s developing understanding of extraordinary minds: (1) How and when do 
children begin to understand that certain beings possess extraordinary knowledge, and 
what does this initial understanding look like? (2) What steps are involved in developing 
a full-fledged understanding of omniscience—an understanding of what it means to know 
everything about everything? (3) What role does cultural input play at different points in 
this conceptual development? 
Addressing these questions will inform the field of cognitive development in 
several respects. First, results promise to further clarify how very young children 
understand the capacities and constraints of ordinary, human minds and can provide 
further information about the role of cultural input on ToM development more generally. 
Second, because concepts of extraordinary minds are (arguably) counterintuitive—
extraordinary minds violate our intuitions about the capacities and constraints of ordinary 
human minds—results promise to inform us about the acquisition, development, and 
function of counterintuitive concepts. Third, since non-human perceptual capacities are 
found throughout the animal kingdom—for example, in bats, hawks, dogs, and sharks—
this research will help describe and explain how children develop concepts of the natural 
biological world. Finally, these studies will shed further light on the early development of 
religious concepts; particularly concepts of sentient supernatural beings. ―As H.L. 
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Mencken put it, the existence of religion illustrates humans‘ ‗stupendous capacity for 
believing the incredible‘. The study of religion thus has the potential of informing us 
about aspects of the developing mind that might not be evident from the study of other 
domains‖ (Bloom, 2007, p. 148).  
In the following sections, I discuss how adults conceptualize extraordinary minds, 
and will introduce competing views on how children develop concepts of extraordinary 
mental abilities. Attention is given to the influence of children‘s cognitive architecture 
(their intuitive theories of the world) and the influence of cultural input upon developing 
concepts of extraordinary capacities.  
Adults’ Detection and Understanding of Extraordinary Minds 
Why is it that humans create (or are at least susceptible to believing) concepts of 
invisible agents like the Judeo-Christian God in the first place? An emerging body of 
research in the cognitive science of religion has started to address this question (for 
reviews, see Barrett, 2000; Bering, 2006; Boyer, 2003). Several cognitive biases prime us 
to believe in sentient, powerful (yet unseen) beings, like the Judeo-Christian God; these 
include biases to detect agency and attribute intentionality, as well as biases towards 
artificialism and teleological reasoning. As social beings, we spend much of our time 
considering others‘ thoughts and feelings, but such mental inferences are not reserved for 
our conspecifics; indeed, we attribute mental states to things that are not even alive. For 
example, in a now classic study, after viewing a film with simple shapes (a big triangle, a 
small triangle, and a small circle) moving and interacting physically, adults described the 
shapes‘ movements in terms of their underlying mental and emotional states, including 
their motives (Heider & Simmel, 1944). Results like these point to what Guthrie (1980, 
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1993) has termed a hyperactive agent-detection device—a mechanism that biases people 
to detect agency in the environment even when agents do not really exist. Our tendency 
to over-attribute agency may have served an evolutionary function—if bushes were 
rustling, it was more adaptive for ancient humans to assume that an animal was in the 
bushes, since failing to assume there is an agent when in fact there is one (such as a 
carnivorous animal), might result in severe consequences. Such a detection device may 
be partially responsible for why humans often attribute the occurrence of natural 
phenomena—including the weather, births, deaths, and human origins—to invisible 
agents, including gods.  
Two other cognitive bias that may lead to the generation and acceptance of ideas 
about a supreme, sentient being are artificialism—a tendency to believe that things 
(including humans and animals) are the product of a creator, and teleological 
reasoning—a tendency to think that entities or events exist for a particular purpose. 
During middle childhood, children begin to understand that animals and humans do not 
live eternally—they did not always exist and they will not continue to exist indefinitely 
(Poling & Evans, 2004; Speece & Brent, 1984). This leads children to question (a) how 
humans and animals originally came into existence, and (b) why humans and animals 
came into existence (Poling & Evans, 2004). Drawing upon their understanding of how 
artifacts are formed, children develop the intuition that all things have creators, a 
tendency termed artificialism (Piaget, 1969/1929). Artificialism is prominent in 
children‘s reasoning about the natural world, and children who are initially faced with 
existential questions often rely on such an understanding to account for human origins—
someone or something must have made humans as well (Evans, 2000a; Kelemen, 2004).  
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In a series of studies, Evans (2000b, 2001) asked children closed- and open-ended 
questions about the origins of living beings and artifacts. To account for the origins of 
animals, the youngest children interviewed (5 to 7 years) generated and endorsed both 
spontaneous generation reasoning (e.g., ―it grew from the Earth‖, ―it appeared‖) and 
creationist reasoning (in which God, a human, or another creature created or placed the 
animal on Earth). Slightly older children (8 to 10 years) almost exclusively used 
creationist reasoning to account for animals‘ origins. Interestingly, 8- to 10-year-olds 
appealed to creationist ideas regardless of whether they were raised in religious or non-
religious households (Evans, 2001). In contrast, 10- to 12-year-olds typically appealed to 
the dominant views in their culture—creationism among children from fundamentalist 
families and a mixture of creationism and evolution among children from non-
fundamentalist families. Thus, the idea that humans were created typically emerges 
during middle childhood, and is common among children from both religious and non-
religious backgrounds.  
But why were humans created? Teamed with a tendency towards artificialism and 
with a bias to over-attribution intentionality, an intuitive way to answer this question, 
beginning in middle childhood, is to use teleological reasoning—humans exist because of 
God‘s (or some other agent‘s) will (Bering, 2006; Evans & Wellman, 2006). Indeed, 
around and age 7 or 8, children also begin to entertain the notion that invisible beings can 
intentionally affect the physical world (Bering & Parker, 2006). Although some adults 
may reject teleological explanations when reasoning about the existence of the Earth, 
humans, and other entities, such individuals may still use teleological explanations to 
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address the personal question ―why am I here?‖, and this reasoning may drive individuals 
to hold beliefs that they exist because of some divine entity‘s will (Bering, 2006).  
In addition to these cognitive biases, there is a strong emotional appeal to 
believing in superior sentient beings who orchestrate the world. In describing his theory 
of emotional coherence, Thagard explains that ―people adopt and maintain religious 
beliefs for a combination of evidential and emotional reasons that provide satisfaction of 
cognitive and emotional constraints‖ (2005, p. 64). According to this theory, some 
theistic religions have emotional appeal because their concept of God has a positive 
valence, attracting individuals. Other religions that espouse deities with negative valences 
(i.e., that are feared) may attract individuals by prescribing practices that can be used in 
order to appease such beings. Recent research has found that belief in an agentic God has 
a range of emotional and social benefits (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Waytz, Gray, 
Epley, & Wegner, 2010), and religiosity more generally has well-established mental-
health benefits (Miller & Thorensen, 2003). These benefits are a product, in part, of the 
sense of purpose and meaning that religious ideologies provide—reasons for why we 
exist, why the world is unjust, why we experience pain, and accounts of what happens 
after death—and, importantly, having meaning in life is one of the three ―routes to 
happiness‖ identified by positive psychologists (Peterson, Park & Seligman, 2005; 
Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005).  
Thus, several cognitive biases as well as emotional and social needs predispose 
humans to detect minds, to believe in supernatural sentient beings, and to reason that such 
beings are accountable for natural phenomena. But what kinds of minds are we 
predisposed to represent? Although religious doctrine may grant deities with radically 
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non-human, counterintuitive capacities, like omniscience, in their day-to-day thinking, 
even religious adults tend to conceptualize deities in more ordinary, human-like terms 
(Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Shtulman, 2008). For example, Barrett and Keil (1996) 
found that religious adults (who reported believing in God‘s omniscience and 
omnipotence) in their everyday thinking, often conceptualize God as possessing many 
mental and physical constraints—for example, able to perceive some people‘s prayers 
better than others, and attending to people‘s prayers sequentially rather than attending to 
all prayers simultaneously. This suggests that even religious adults intuitively think of 
gods as human-like and limited in many ways, and thus only minimally or moderately 
counterintuitive (Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 1996, 2000).  
Indeed, anthropological work demonstrates that the most successful religious 
concepts and folktales—those that are consistently transmitted across many 
generations—violate only a small set of assumptions about ordinary/intuitive physics, 
biology, or psychology (Atran, 2008). This successful transmission is a product of the 
concepts being easily represented (because they primarily contain intuitive concepts), yet 
attention-grabbing, interesting, and thus memorable because of their few counterintuitive 
elements (Boyer, 1996; Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Boyer & Walker, 2000). Recent 
psychological work lends additional support to this theory, revealing that minimally or 
moderately counterintuitive ideas are indeed more memorable than ideas that are 
completely intuitive or extremely counterintuitive (Atran, 2008; Boyer & Ramble, 2001; 
Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2006; Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992). Ideas that 
are extremely counterintuitive (like the concept of a truly omniscient, omnipotent, 
omnipresent deity) are particularly difficult to represent and remember, and are thus less 
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like to be transmitted across generations. Of note, the God depicted in the Old Testament 
and New Testament—a being who has survived cultural transmission for millennia—has 
many human-like, and thus intuitive characteristics, including jealousy, anger, poor 
judgment, ignorance, and regret (Pickover, 2001). 
Children’s Understanding of Ordinary Minds 
To understand how children come to conceptualize extraordinary minds, it is 
important to first identify what ―theory of mind‖ refers to and to identify how children 
develop an understanding of ordinary minds. Broadly construed, ―theory of mind‖ refers 
to our ability to attribute mental states to others, including intentions, desires, knowledge, 
beliefs, pretence, and so on (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Flavell & Miller, 1998; 
Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Wellman, 1990). The phrase ―theory of mind‖ became 
popularized in psychology after Premack and Woodruff (1978) wrote their article, ―Does 
the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?‖ in which they presented studies that they took as 
evidence that chimpanzees are able to infer others‘ mental states. Though the methods 
that the researchers used to gauge chimpanzees‘ theory of mind have fallen out of fashion 
(many scholars concluded that chimpanzees‘ performance on the tasks could simply be 
attributed to their use of observable behavioral cues), the terminology that Premack and 
Woodruff used remained popular, especially among developmental psychologists. The 
influence of this article on later developmental research went beyond use of the phrase 
―theory of mind.‖ In their replies to Premack and Woodruff‘s article, several philosophers 
(Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 1978; Harman, 1978) offered a study paradigm that, they felt, 
would better reveal whether an animal does actually possess a theory of mind—a 
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switched-location false-belief task, now a staple of research on children‘s theory-of-mind 
development (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
In current developmental research, the term ―theory‖ is used in the way that it is 
used in the tradition of the theory-theory (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992; 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). The underlying assumptions of the theory-
theory are that our knowledge of the world is organized in a coherent manner into 
theories about different domains—for example, theories of mind, biology, and physics. 
The development of these theories is a function of both children‘s current understanding 
of the world and new evidence that children confront. For example, a theory of mind 
develops as we observe and interact with others, but the extent to which these 
observations and interactions force conceptual change is constrained by children‘s 
existing theory of mind—thus, conceptual development is the product of a constant 
interplay between theory and evidence. These theories serve important functions: 
children (and adults) use them to interpret and make predictions about their world. In the 
case of a theory of mind, children and adults may consider multiple pieces of information 
when observing a behavior—aspects of the context, the actor‘s physical behavior, the 
actor‘s traits—and use that information to infer the actor‘s mental states. For example, if 
we see a child open a toy chest and retrieve a candy bar, we have enough data to make 
several mental inferences—the child wanted candy, knew that the candy bar was in the 
chest, and intentionally retrieved the candy bar. We can also use what we already know 
about other‘s mental states to predict people‘s future behavior, emotional and 
psychological reactions to new situations, and so on—for example, if that child runs out 
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of candy, he may ask his mother for candy, and he will be happy if his mother gives him 
a candy bar. 
The current studies examine how children come to appreciate extraordinary 
minds. Potentially, a developing ability to appreciate extraordinary mental capacities may 
be connected to a developing understanding of ordinary, human mental capacities (Evans 
& Wellman, 2006). Research conducted over the past three decades has revealed a 
general pattern of theory-of-mind (ToM) development that unfolds during the first five 
years of life. By the end of the first year, infants understand that people hold intentions 
that influence their physical behavior, and they understand that intentions vary from 
person to person (Brandone & Wellman, 2009; Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, 2009; 
for review see Woodward, 2009). Building upon this initial understanding of intention, 
by 2-years children have a rich understanding of desires—they understand that different 
people hold different desires, can predict people‘s behavior based upon their individual 
desires, and understand the emotional consequences of having desires go fulfilled or 
unfulfilled (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). 
Many later ToM developments require that children disambiguate how the world 
really is from how self and others perceive and think about the world. By 3-years of age, 
children understand that ignorance may result from a variety of circumstances, including 
agents‘ lack of perceptual access to information. For example, older 3-year-olds 
understand that only those individuals who have looked inside a container will know 
what the container holds; others will be ignorant (Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990). 
However, 3-year-olds typically only pass these tasks when they do not themselves hold 
the correct knowledge; otherwise they over-attribute their own knowledge of reality to 
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others (Birch & Bloom, 2003). This early confusion likely stems from a more 
fundamental difficulty that children have understanding the distinction between 
appearance and reality (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983; Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1986; 
Woolley & Welman, 1990; but see Hansen & Markman, 2005). Thus, when asked about 
what other people know or believe, young preschoolers often answer by simply assessing 
reality (either referring to their own knowledge of the world or by perceiving readily-
accessible information in the here-and-now) and using that information to infer others‘ 
knowledge and beliefs (Birch & Bloom, 2003; Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman & Bartsch, 
1988). This tendency has been referred to as intellectual realism (Flavell et al., 1983), a 
reality assessment strategy (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988), and a curse of knowledge (Birch 
& Bloom, 2003). In keeping with terminology used in cognitive psychology literature on 
heuristics that we commonly use to interpret our world, I will simply refer to this 
tendency as a reality bias.  
One early-emerging manifestation of children overcoming this reality bias is 
evident in older preschoolers‘ distinction between reality and belief; they start to 
understand that others, misled by inaccurate perceptual cues or outdated information, can 
hold false beliefs (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). That is, children appreciate that we do not simply possess 
some mental representations of the world and lack others; rather, some of our 
representations of the world are completely wrong. In one standard false-belief task—an 
unexpected-contents task (Perner et al., 1987)—children are shown that a familiar 
container (e.g., a cracker box) holds something atypical (e.g., rocks). The container is 
then closed and children are asked what another person, who has not seen in the 
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container, will think is inside. When faced with this task, 3-year-olds typically report that 
the other person will think the cracker box contains rocks, demonstrating a reality bias. 
Older 4-year-olds, in contrast, report that others will think the box contains crackers, 
demonstrating their ability to distinguish how the world really is from one‘s beliefs about 
the world. Four-year-olds are similarly proficient on other types of false-belief tasks, 
which contain different protagonists, objects, manipulations, and questions (for meta-
analysis, see Wellman et al., 2001).  
Several studies now demonstrate a similar sequence of ToM development—from 
understanding desires, to knowledge, to beliefs—in the US, China, Australia, and Iran 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004; Wellman et al., 2006; Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & 
Wellman, in press), and in children with developmental delays and disabilities (Peterson 
& Wellman, 2009; Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005), using cross-sectional and 
longitudinal research designs (Wellman, Fang, & Peterson, 2011). Children‘s ToM 
continues to develop well into middle childhood (Harris, 2006; Peterson, Wellman, & 
Slaughter, in press), but since the studies in this dissertation focus specifically on 
children‘s understanding of extraordinary agents‘ knowledge and beliefs, I will not 
review literature here on children‘s later ToM developments.  
Thus, early childhood is a period of rapid social-cognitive development. During 
the preschool years, children come to understand how and under what conditions 
individuals possess knowledge and beliefs, and additionally understand how some 
mechanisms (e.g., vision) yield knowledge and beliefs. But how do children develop an 
understanding of non-human or superhuman minds; the minds of beings who are never 
ignorant or who do not hold false beliefs? Examining this question is interesting in its 
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own right and also promises to shed additional light on children‘s appreciation for the 
capacities and constraints of ordinary, limited minds. One possibility, drawing upon 
Piaget‘s (1969/1929) notion that preoperational children anthropomorphize all agents, 
has been termed the anthropomorphism hypothesis (Barrett & Richert, 2003). According 
to this hypothesis, when children first understand that ordinary humans have a particular 
mental constraint (e.g., the potential to hold false beliefs), they attribute similar 
constraints to all agents. Then, after children have a firm understanding of that mental 
constraint, they can begin to differentiate between the constrained capacities of ordinary 
humans and the less constrained capacities of extraordinary beings. Thus, the sequence in 
which children come to appreciate certain ordinary mental constraints (e.g., false beliefs 
or ignorance) might parallel the sequence in which they can represent agents whose 
abilities surpass those constraints. In the following section, I discuss the 
anthropomorphism account in further detail. 
Children’s Anthropomorphism of Extraordinary Minds 
Much of the research and theorizing about conceptual development conducted 
over the last half century was motivated by or directly stemmed from Piaget‘s theories of 
cognitive development. Psychologists‘ understanding of children‘s concepts of 
extraordinary minds is no exception, and Piaget‘s stance on this matter was essentially 
taken for granted by researchers throughout the late 1900s. Piaget‘s discussion of 
children‘s understanding of God was often centered on childhood artificialism—
children‘s tendency to consider all things (natural kinds and artifacts) to be intentionally 
created; either by humans or by God (Piaget, 1969/1929). Thus, Piaget‘s reasoning on 
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children‘s understanding of God‘s omniscience was often made in passing, as part of a 
larger argument about artificialism:  
―Our results entirely support the thesis of M. Bouvet according to which the child 
spontaneously attributes to his parents the perfections and attributes which he will 
later transfer to God if his religious education gives him the opportunity. In the 
problem that concerns us now, it is, therefore, man who is thought to be 
omniscient and all-powerful, and it is he who has created all things…In short, 
God is either a man like other men, or else the child is always romancing when he 
speaks of him, in the same way that he speaks of Father Christmas and the 
fairies.‖ (1969/1929, p. 354). 
 
Here and elsewhere (e.g., Piaget, 1997/1932) Piaget explains that children 
conceptualize God as being much like their parents, and vice versa. Piaget however 
wavers on whether parents are initially thought to be God-like or if God is thought to be 
parent-like. 
―Insistence on divine perfection means setting up in God a rival to the parents, 
and M. Bouvet has quoted some very curious factors to illustrate this point. If, on 
the other hand, such insistence is not made and the child is left to his spontaneous 
conceptions he finds nothing very sacred about God. He is just a man like anyone 
else, who lives in the clouds or in the sky, but who, with this exception, is no 
different from the rest.‖ (1969/1929, p. 381) 
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―It has been said that the child ‗divinifies‘ his parents. M Bouvet retorts with 
reason that it can better be said that he ‗paternalises‘ God, at the moment when he 
ceases to regard his parents as perfect….Either God is a person or men are gods, 
or else God is the chief of men, but it is by the transference of the filial sentiment‖ 
(1969/1929, p. 382). 
 
Thus, Piaget‘s stance was that young children, during preoperational and concrete 
operational stages of cognitive development, attribute the same mental abilities to God as 
they do to their parents; not because of deep-seated psychodynamic reasons (as per 
Freud‘s reasoning; 1989/1927) but because children conceive of God as being similar to 
adults in many ways—large, older, caring. Several researchers have attempted to explain 
children‘s developing understanding of God by relating it to progression through Piaget‘s 
stages of cognitive development. According to Piaget‘s general theory, as children 
progress through concrete operations and enter formal operations, they are able to 
entertain increasingly abstract notions (Piaget, 1983). Thus, guided by this theory, one 
would expect that, not until around age 12, when children enter formal operations, can 
they begin to consider abstract ideas of the sort embedded in theological depictions of 
God—omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, and eternal life (Elkind, 1964; Elkind, 
1970). There is some empirical support for the notion that development of God concepts 
parallels progression through Piaget‘s stages, becoming more abstract with age. For 
example, when asked what God looks like, younger children (5- to 8-year-olds) more 
often respond in concrete terms (e.g., ―Brown hair, blue eyes), whereas older children (9- 
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to 16-year-olds) provide more abstract reasoning (e.g., ―No one knows, no one has ever 
seen him‖) (Nye & Carlson, 1984). 
However, now knowing that children reach certain developmental milestones 
much earlier than Piaget proposed, one may expect God concepts to emerge much earlier 
in development. It is also clear now that a single logical structure does not underlie 
conceptual development in all domains, as proposed by Piaget; rather, conceptual 
development progresses at a different rate and timing in different domains of knowledge 
(Gelman & Kalish, 2006; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & 
Gelman, 1998). Thus, one may expect that certain concepts of the extraordinary will 
emerge earlier than others—for example, an understanding of omnipotence (which 
involves children‘s understanding of biology and physics) may develop on a different 
timetable compared to an understanding of omniscience (which involves children‘s 
understanding of psychology). 
In sum, an anthropomorphism hypothesis may be a viable account of how 
children develop and understanding of extraordinary mental abilities—children may first 
think of all minds in limited, human terms, and then later in development, differentiate 
between the ordinary and extraordinary minds of different beings. This hypothesis seems 
even more plausible when considering that religious adults often think of non-human 
beings, such as the Judeo-Christian God, as constrained in human-like ways (Barrett & 
Keil, 1996; Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). If adults are prone to anthropomorphizing the 
minds of extraordinary beings, such tendencies seem all the more likely for children. 
However, some theorists have recently proposed an alternative preparedness hypothesis, 
which states that children can not only resist anthropomorphizing extraordinary beings, 
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they are actually prepared to understand extraordinary minds. A discussion of the 
preparedness hypothesis and empirical work that inspired this hypothesis follows. 
Children’s Preparedness to Understand Extraordinary Minds 
Until recently, children‘s understanding of extraordinary minds received little 
direct empirical attention. Speculation about children‘s understanding of extraordinary 
minds was often made in passing—for example, when discussing their findings of young 
children‘s over-attribution of knowledge to certain familiar adults, Wimmer, Hogrefer 
and Perner (1988) referred to an ―omniscient adult‖ phenomenon (p. 393). The first direct 
attempt to systematically examine children‘s earliest understandings of extraordinary 
minds came with the publication of studies by Barrett, Richert, and Driesenga (2001), 
which challenged the anthropomorphism perspective. These researchers asked children 
(who attended Christian preschools and camps) to reason about the knowledge and 
beliefs of humans, God, animals, and inanimate objects. In two studies, using 
unexpected-contents false-belief tasks, 3- to 7-year-olds reported what their mother, a 
tree, non-human animals, and God would think is inside a cracker box that contained 
rocks. Regardless of age or level of false-belief understanding, children typically reported 
that God would know the actual contents of the box. In another study, these researchers 
asked 3- to 8-year-olds whether a human, a monkey, God, or a cat that could see in the 
dark would know the contents of a box that had only a small slit to peer inside, and no 
internal illumination. Children typically reported that God and the cat would know the 
contents of the box, both before and after they gained an understanding (at about 5-years 
of age) that humans and monkeys would not know the contents of the box. Barrett and 
colleagues have replicated their findings with a sample of Yukatek Mayan children, 
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whose culture has adopted the Catholic God (Knight, Sousa, Barrett, & Atran, 2004). As 
well, Richert and Barrett (2005) reported data conforming to a preparedness trajectory for 
children‘s performance on a diverse set of knowledge-ignorance tasks. 
Based upon these findings, Barrett and colleagues (Barrett et al., 2001; Barrett & 
Richert, 2003) have endorsed an alternate preparedness hypothesis, which states that, 
―early-developing conceptual structures in children used to reason about God are not 
specifically for representing humans, and, in fact, actually facilitate the acquisition and 
use of many features of God concepts of the Abrahamic monotheisms‖ (Barrett & 
Richert, 2003, p. 300). Further, Barrett and colleagues (2001) proposed that, ―children 
can have a more accurate understanding of God‘s agency than that of humans‖ (p. 54). 
That is, very young children‘s tendency to not attribute false beliefs or ignorance to any 
agent reflects an early supposition of infallible mental capacities; children treat all agents 
(human and non-human) as omniscient. This hypothesis thus advances the intriguing idea 
that early cognitive biases facilitate rapid awareness of certain counterintuitive ideas, 
including ideas about the extraordinary qualities of God. Although intriguing, findings 
from Barrett and colleagues and the preparedness hypothesis itself raise several empirical 
and conceptual questions, including questions about how to integrate these findings with 
contrasting results from other research groups (e.g., Giménez-Dasí, Guerrero, & Harris, 
2005; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007), questions about the reasoning that children used 
when making their decisions (e.g., were they just referring to reality or were they really 
thinking about God‘s all-knowing mind?), and questions about the specific capacities 
children attributed to God. I address these questions with Studies 1 and 2.  
19 
 
Approaching an Understanding of Omniscience 
At whatever age children do begin to understand that a special agent will hold 
privileged knowledge in the tasks described above (i.e., when children appreciate that an 
agent will know the contents of a container without ever perceiving the contents through 
typical sensory means), this does not necessarily mark a full-fledged understanding of 
omniscience. Omniscience refers to an agent‘s ability to know everything, not just 
readily-accessible information about the here-and-now. Perhaps children‘s appreciation 
that some special agents can know contents of containers without seeing those contents 
marks the very beginning of a developing appreciation for extraordinary mental 
abilities—the first of many steps involved in achieving an appreciation for omniscience. 
However, studies have yet to address children‘s developing understanding of the expanse 
of an omniscient being‘s knowledge. Do children think that omniscient beings know 
about things that happened in the past or the future? Perhaps an all-knowing being has 
access to the contents of boxes, but what about the contents of others‘ minds? What other 
personal information do children attribute to all-knowing beings; knowledge of others‘ 
preferences, behaviors, personal events? I address children‘s understanding of the scope 
of an all-knowing being‘s knowledge with Study 3.  
The existing literature also says little about how deep children consider an 
omniscient being‘s knowledge to be. Within a given domain, do children attribute all 
knowledge to an all-knowing being (consistent with adults‘ understanding of 
omniscience), most knowledge, or just some knowledge? To address this in Study 3, I 
assess whether and when children differentiate between experts (those who know much 
but not everything about a certain domain) and an omniscient being (someone who 
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knows everything about all domains). Prior research indicates that preschoolers 
appreciate that experts hold more information than others about specific domains—for 
example, doctors know more than mechanics about health (Lutz & Keil, 2002). So far, no 
research has examined when children begin to understand that all-knowing agents know 
even more than experts about their own domains. With Study 3, I also examine what 
other cognitive capacities might underpin children‘s developing understanding of 
omniscience. 
The Force of Socio-cultural Input on Developing Concepts of Extraordinary Minds 
Though anthropological and psychological literature contains accounts of why 
adults may create gods (e.g., to account for natural phenomena), young children may not 
spontaneously generate ideas of beings with extraordinary mental or exceptional 
perceptual abilities. Indeed, young children in particular tend to invoke ordinary physical, 
psychological, and biological explanations to account for phenomena (Bering & Parker, 
2006; Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Johnson & Harris, 1994); and so young children likely 
do not spontaneously contemplate that some extraordinary agent is responsible for 
phenomena that they commonly experience. It is not until middle childhood when 
children begin to contemplate that an extraordinary agent was responsible for the origins 
of humans and animals (Evans, 2000b, 2001). Rather, young children likely initially 
acquire much of their ideas about beings with extraordinary capacities via cultural 
input—through conversations with others, religious teachings, movies, and books (Boyer, 
2001). Indeed, much of the information that young children hold—ranging from the 
ordinary to the extraordinary—is acquired via the ‗testimony‘ that others provide 
(Gelman, 2009; Harris, 2007; Harris & Koenig, 2006). This input may be provided 
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formally—for example, in religious classes—or informally, during conversation with 
friends or conversations with parents.   
In the case of ToM development, children‘s daily communicative interactions 
with others about their own and others‘ mental experiences is associated with (and is 
thought to be predictive of) children‘s developing understanding of ordinary human 
minds (for reviews, see Astington, 2005; Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). In particular, 
interactions with others who possess a more sophisticated ToM may facilitate children‘s 
own ToM development. For example, Ruffman and colleagues (1998) found that children 
with older siblings, but not those with younger siblings, performed better on false-belief 
tasks. Other research demonstrates that parents‘ use of mental-state language—references 
to their own and others‘ psychological and emotional states—predicts children reaching 
certain ToM milestones at earlier ages (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). Thus, it appears that 
social interaction facilitates an understanding of human minds. But what facilitates 
children‘s understanding or extraordinary, non-human minds? Although children do not 
have opportunities to interact directly with beings that possess extraordinary mental 
capacities, they can acquire information about these agents second-hand, via their 
parents, in school, and through various media. Thus, in the current studies, I examine 
how children‘s everyday exposure to media and activities involving extraordinary agents 
(namely God) facilitates their understanding of extraordinary minds. In particular, Studies 
1 and 2 include a comparison of children who are secularly- schooled versus those who 
are religiously-schooled, as well as data on children‘s knowledge of God. Study 3 
includes parent reports of children‘s religious participation and exposure to media about 
God.  
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However, children cannot just learn any type of information at any point in 
conceptual development; the new information must fit within their existing conceptual 
architecture or must itself spur conceptual restructuring (Gelman & Kalish, 2006; 
Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Indeed, other studies on early social-cognitive development 
demonstrate that socio-cultural input fosters conceptual change only among children at 
certain points in conceptual development or within certain age-ranges (e.g., Bamford & 
Lagattuta, 2010; Ruffman et al., 1998). Thus, in the current studies, I examine the relative 
influence of cultural input about extraordinary minds for children who are at different 
points in ToM development. 
 
Specific Research Questions 
Study 1: Children‘s Understanding of Ordinary and Extraordinary Minds 
1) Which abilities (if any) do children attribute to agents when they fail traditional 
ToM tasks about ordinary human minds? 
2) Do children initially treat all minds as human-like and fallible or as God-like and 
infallible? 
3) When do children begin to conceptualize exceptional perceptual abilities? 
4) When do children begin to conceptualize extraordinary mental abilities? 
Study 2: Socio-cultural Input and Children‘s Developing Understanding of Extraordinary 
Minds 
5) How does exposure to ideas about a being with extraordinary mental capacities 
(the Judeo-Christian God) influence children‘s initial understanding of that 
being‘s mind?  
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6) Does culturally-provided information about God‘s mind help children interpret 
the mind of a novel extraordinary agent? 
Study 3: Approaching an Understanding of Omniscience from the Preschool Years to 
Early Adulthood 
7) When and how do children understand the immense breadth of an all-knowing 
being‘s knowledge? What types of knowledge do children attribute to such beings 
at different points in development?   
8) When and how do children understand the depth of an all-knowing being‘s 
knowledge? In particular, when do children understand that an omniscient being 
holds more domain-specific knowledge than experts? 
9) Do children believe that all-knowing beings can really exist? 
10) What other cognitive competencies support developing concepts of omniscience?  
11) How and when is children‘s understanding of omniscience influenced by socio-
cultural input about omniscient beings, like the Judeo-Christian God? 
 
I address these questions in a multiple-manuscripts dissertation, including three 
studies that progressively build upon one another. Study 1 was designed to resolve prior 
discrepancies in the literature by examining the initial development of an understanding 
of extraordinary mental capacities during the preschool years. Study 1 is published as 
Lane, Wellman, and Evans (2010). Study 2 examines the influence of socio-cultural input 
on preschoolers‘ developing understanding of extraordinary minds by using the same 
methods as those from Study 1 with a sample of religiously-schooled preschoolers, 
comparing developmental trends between the two studies, and examining relations 
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between children‘s knowledge of God and their understanding of extraordinary minds 
across both samples. Study 2 has been accepted for publication as Lane, Wellman, and 
Evans (in press). Study 3 uses a different set of tasks to examine how an understanding of 
omniscience—all-knowingness—emerges from the preschool years through early 
adulthood. With Study 3, I also consider the roles of socio-cultural input and other 
cognitive competencies in supporting a developing understanding of omniscience. 
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CHAPTER II 
Study 1: Children’s Understanding of Ordinary and Extraordinary Minds1 
Children and adults worldwide come to understand persons as intentional agents 
who act in accordance with their perceptions, desires, and beliefs (Flavell & Miller, 1998; 
Wellman, 1990). Most people also come to entertain ideas about non-human or 
superhuman agents with extraordinary mental capacities (such as deities who are all-
knowing) or agents with exceptional perceptual capacities (such as animals with 
specialized senses or superheroes with x-ray vision). How and when do such concepts of 
extraordinary or exceptional agents develop? Addressing this question promises to inform 
fundamental issues in cognitive development, such as the nature of intuitive and 
counterintuitive ideas, the enculturation of thought, and the cognitive foundations of 
religion.  
Arguably, the ability to appreciate extraordinary or exceptional capacities 
originates in early childhood, and is intimately linked to the development of an 
understanding of ordinary, human capacities. Children‘s understanding of persons and 
minds—their theory of mind—undergoes substantial development during the preschool 
years (Wellman & Liu, 2004), as children increasingly appreciate the subjective nature of 
perceptions and thoughts. Such development requires that children disambiguate how the 
world really is from how self and others perceive and think about the world. Very young 
children have difficulty understanding this distinction between appearance and reality. 
                                                 
1
 Study 1 is published as Lane, Wellman, and Evans (2010). 
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When asked about what other people know or believe, very young children tend to 
answer by simply assessing reality and using that information to infer others‘ knowledge 
and beliefs (Wellman, Cross & Watson 2001). We will refer to this tendency as a reality 
bias. 
One early-emerging manifestation of children overcoming this reality bias is their 
understanding of ignorance—an understanding that agents can be unaware of certain 
facts. By 3-years of age, children understand that ignorance may result from a variety of 
circumstances, including agents‘ lack of perceptual access to certain information. For 
example, older 3-year-olds understand that only those individuals who have looked inside 
a container will know what the container holds (Pillow, 1989; Pratt & Bryant, 1990). 
Soon after children develop an appreciation for the distinction between knowledge and 
ignorance, they begin to appreciate the distinction between reality and belief; they start to 
understand that others, misled by inaccurate perceptual cues or outdated information, can 
hold false-beliefs (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). In one standard false-belief task—an 
unexpected contents task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987)—children are shown that a 
familiar container (e.g., a cracker box) holds something atypical (e.g., rocks). The 
container is then closed and children are asked what another person, who has not seen in 
the container, will think is inside. When faced with this task, 3-year-olds typically report 
that the other person will think the cracker box contains rocks, demonstrating a reality 
bias. Older 4-year-olds, in contrast, report that others will think the box contains crackers, 
demonstrating their ability to distinguish how the world really is from one‘s beliefs about 
the world.  
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Thus, in the preschool years, children evidence an emerging understanding of 
human knowledge and beliefs, including some appreciation of mechanisms that yield 
knowledge and beliefs (e.g., that seeing leads to knowing). But how does an 
understanding of the mental capacities of non-human or superhuman agents emerge? 
Studying children‘s developing understanding of extraordinary minds is interesting in its 
own right and also promises to shed light more generally on children‘s understanding of 
ordinary minds. One possibility, stemming from Piaget‘s (1969/1929) notion that 
preoperational children anthropomorphize all agents, has been termed the 
anthropomorphism hypothesis. According to this hypothesis (Boyer, 1996), when 
children first come to attribute constrained knowledge and fallible beliefs to ordinary 
humans, they attribute similar limitations to all agents. Only later, building on this initial 
platform, do children differentiate between the limited capacities of ordinary humans and 
extraordinary agents‘ less limited capacities.  
An anthropomorphism hypothesis is intuitively appealing; even adults tend to 
think of non-human beings, such as God, as human-like (Barrett & Keil, 1996; Gray, 
Gray, & Wegner, 2007). Indeed, although formal religious doctrine may attribute 
radically non-human, counterintuitive capacities to deities (e.g., total omniscience), in 
everyday judgments adults tend to think of deities in terms that are more human-like and 
limited, and thus only moderately counterintuitive (Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 1996; Boyer, 
1998). For example, Barrett and Keil (1996) found that even religious believers well-
versed in God‘s omniscience conceptualized God as attending to people‘s prayers 
sequentially, rather than attending to all prayers simultaneously, suggesting that they 
thought of God as subject to some of the same spatiotemporal constraints as humans. If 
28 
 
such anthropomorphic tendencies are true of adults, they seem all the more plausible for 
children. 
However, seminal studies by Barrett, Richert, and Driesenga (2001) challenged 
this anthropomorphism perspective. These researchers asked children (who attended 
Christian preschools) to reason about the knowledge and beliefs of humans, God, 
animals, and inanimate objects. In two studies, using unexpected-contents false-belief 
tasks, 3- to 7-year-olds reported what their mother, a tree, non-human animals, and God 
would think is inside a cracker box that contained rocks. Regardless of age or level of 
false-belief understanding, children typically reported that God would know the actual 
contents of the box. In another study, these researchers asked 3- to 8-year-olds whether a 
human, a monkey, God, or a cat that could see in the dark would know the contents of a 
box that had only a small slit to peer inside, and no internal illumination. Children 
consistently reported that God and the cat would know the contents of the box, both 
before and after they gained an understanding (at about age 5 years) that humans and 
monkeys would not know the contents of the box.  
Based upon these findings, Barrett and colleagues (Barrett et al., 2001; Barrett & 
Richert, 2003) have endorsed an alternate preparedness hypothesis, which states that, 
―early-developing conceptual structures in children used to reason about God are not 
specifically for representing humans, and, in fact, actually facilitate the acquisition and 
use of many features of God concepts of the Abrahamic monotheisms‖ (Barrett & 
Richert, 2003, p. 300). Further, Barrett and colleagues (2001) proposed that, ―children 
can have a more accurate understanding of God‘s agency than that of humans‖ (p. 54). 
That is, very young children‘s tendency to not attribute false-beliefs or ignorance to any 
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agent reflects an early supposition of infallible mental capacities; children treat all agents 
(human and non-human) as omniscient. This hypothesis thus advances the intriguing idea 
that early cognitive biases facilitate rapid awareness of certain counterintuitive ideas, 
including ideas about the extraordinary qualities of God. 
Although intriguing, these findings and the preparedness hypothesis raise several 
questions, both empirical and conceptual. First, when very young children apparently 
attribute infallible knowledge and beliefs to persons (or Gods), their answers may simply 
reflect an early reality bias—they answer by reporting the reality of the situation, without 
considering agents‘ mental abilities (Evans & Wellman, 2006; Wellman & Bartsch, 
1988). The critical question then is what children attribute to God when they first start to 
distinguish between the actual state of reality and people‘s (often inaccurate) mental 
representations of that reality; in particular, at the point when they begin to attribute 
false-beliefs or ignorance to humans. At that point, do they attribute fallible knowledge 
and beliefs to God as well, as proposed by the anthropomorphism hypothesis, or infallible 
knowledge and beliefs, as implied by the preparedness hypothesis? At a later age, when 
children have developed a more robust understanding of fallible mental capacities, 
around 5- to 6-years of age, both preparedness and anthropomorphism hypotheses might 
predict that children attribute more infallible mental capacities to God, provided they 
have been exposed to such information about God. The preparedness hypothesis predicts 
that such an understanding at age 6 would reflect a continuation of children‘s early 
default understanding of extraordinary minds. The anthropomorphism hypothesis, in 
contrast, posits that such an understanding at age 6 indicates that children are beginning 
to loosen their earlier tendencies to anthropomorphize all agents. To best test these two 
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hypotheses, it is necessary to densely sample children within the proper age range. 
Further, the data should be analyzed in a sensitive age-related fashion in order to find and 
assess the critical window when children first correctly attribute fallible mental capacities 
to humans. Barrett and colleagues (2001) simply grouped 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds in year-
long age blocks that might have masked the critical developmental window during which 
children first begin to ascribe human-like limitations to non-human agents for these 
social-cognitive tasks.  
A second empirical issue concerns the replicability of Barrett and colleagues‘ 
(2001) findings. This may well be related to the first issue of fine-grained age sampling 
and analyses, because different samples or different age-groupings may differentially 
capture the critical developmental window. On the one hand Barrett and colleagues 
(Knight, Sousa, Barrett, & Atran, 2004) have replicated their findings with a sample of 
Yukatek Mayan children whose culture has adopted the Catholic God. As well, Richert 
and Barrett (2005) reported data conforming to a preparedness trajectory for children‘s 
performance on a diverse set of knowledge-ignorance tasks. But other researchers offer 
findings that conflict with those of Barrett and colleagues, and which would be better 
explained by the anthropomorphism hypothesis (e.g., Giménez-Dasí, Guerrero, & Harris, 
2005; Makris & Pnevmaticos, 2007). For example, using a less challenging knowledge-
ignorance task, Makris and Pnevmaticos (2007) found that 3- and 4-year-olds reliably 
attributed ignorance both to a human and to God. These latter findings suggest that, at 
least for certain mental properties, there may be a developmental period during which 
young children concurrently believe that human and non-human mental capacities are 
constrained. 
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Alongside these empirical issues is an important conceptual one. When children 
attribute accurate knowledge to God in a false-belief or knowledge-ignorance task, how 
are they reasoning about such knowledge and beliefs? One interpretation, following from 
the preparedness hypothesis, is that they are attributing (and prepared to attribute) to God 
something like omniscience—the capacity to know all things without perceptual access. 
But the tasks used tell us little about children‘s appreciation for the mechanisms through 
which agents acquire their knowledge or beliefs. In past studies, it is unclear whether 
young children (even 5-year-olds) attributed to extraordinary agents privileged 
knowledge directly or via certain (ordinary or exceptional) mechanisms. For example, 
children may have assumed that God had special visual capacities (a moderate extension 
of human capacities) and thus actually saw the contents of the containers. Indeed, Richert 
and Barrett (2005) found that children as young as 4-years understood that agents with 
specialized senses (e.g., exceptional hearing or vision) can gain knowledge about certain 
stimuli that would be elusive to normal humans. Thus, one unaddressed issue concerns 
when exactly children are able to understand that an agent can possess certain 
(privileged) knowledge or beliefs without the use of perceptual mechanisms. And, this is 
related to whether and when they might attribute anything like omniscience to God.  
We addressed these empirical and conceptual issues in several ways. We 
employed fine-grained age sampling and analyses (on the order of months rather than 
years) in an effort to reveal, more precisely, the ontogenetic unfolding of concepts of 
extraordinary minds. We tested children on both a false-belief task and knowledge-
ignorance task and, because children develop an appreciation for human agents‘ 
ignorance and false-beliefs on different timetables, we analyzed the age-related 
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trajectories for these two tasks separately with appropriately different age groupings. 
Further, and crucially, we addressed the conceptual issue about children‘s understanding 
of mechanisms mediating ordinary and apparently extraordinary knowledge and beliefs. 
Our primary method was to present 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds with carefully contrasting 
agents. Specifically, we asked children to report on the mental capacities of ordinary 
humans (their mother and a young girl), and various non-human and superhuman beings, 
including God. In some cases we carefully specified, for the child, the capacities and 
mechanisms possessed by the agent. Two agents were specified as having special 
perceptual mechanisms for acquiring knowledge: a cat that can see in the dark, and a 
superhero (Heroman) who possesses x-ray vision. One other agent (Mr. Smart) was 
described as being able to ―know everything,‖ even without seeing; so Mr. Smart‘s 
knowledge or beliefs did not depend on perceptual mechanisms at all.  
Each of these ―special‖ agents was described in a brief but detailed way (see 
Appendix A). Mr. Smart‘s and Heroman‘s special powers were also elaborated through 
brief demonstrations. Note that Mr. Smart was of interest in his own right and also served 
as a control in relation to God. It is impossible to know the precise information each child 
had already received about God and surely children did not have equal exposure to 
tutelage about a sentient God or God‘s extraordinary attributes. Therefore, in contrast to 
God, about whom we provided no information, for Mr. Smart we gave all children 
exactly the same background information regarding his attributes. If, as predicted by the 
preparedness hypothesis, children are prepared to pick up on such information, given 
prior tendencies to think of agents as infallible and all-knowing, then Mr. Smart should 
be especially easy to appreciate. This set of contrasting agents allowed us to assess the 
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extent to which children appreciated different mental and perceptual capacities as well as 
the specific mechanisms agents may use to gather information. As a second method for 
generating information about children‘s reasoning about mechanisms, we asked children 
to explain their judgments. For example, if they judged that an agent knew the contents of 
a completely darkened container, we asked them how that agent knew that information. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-seven children (32 males), ranging in age from 40 to 73 months (M age = 54 
months), participated. Primarily, children were of European-American descent and lived 
in a middle- to upper-middle-class Midwestern university community. Children were 
densely sampled in a critical age range (50 to 56 months) on the hypothesis (established 
during pilot testing) that during this period children would be likely to first understand 
ordinary humans‘ limited mental and perceptual capacities. One child was excluded from 
the sample because she could not remember the actual contents of the box for the 
knowledge-ignorance task. Following the interview, when asked what they knew about 
God, more than half of these children (59%) provided specific details about God (e.g., 
―He‘s very smart‖, ―He‘s magical and powerful‖). Thirty-nine parents agreed to briefly 
report on their child‘s exposure to religious concepts. Almost half of these parents 
reported that they take their child to a place of worship; most on a weekly or monthly 
basis.  
Procedure 
Children were interviewed individually in a quiet location. They were asked about 
the beliefs and knowledge of various agents (see Appendix A) using two tasks: one a 
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contents false-belief task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), the other a knowledge-
ignorance task (similar to that used by Barrett and colleagues, 2001). Half of the children 
received the false-belief task first, the others received the knowledge-ignorance task first. 
Each of the agents was displayed on a five-by-seven-inch laminated card. Importantly, 
prior studies have shown that children perform equally well on these tasks whether the 
protagonists are drawings, puppets, or live performers (Wellman et al., 2001). Children 
were introduced to each agent (see precise language in Appendix A) upon their first 
exposure to that agent. For each task, children were presented either mom or the girl first. 
The presentation of the remaining agents was randomized (the girl or mom was presented 
as the second agent for two children, only).  
Because prior research suggests that adults who are exposed to anthropomorphic 
images of God are more prone to make anthropomorphic judgments about God (Barrett 
& VanOrman, 1996), we assessed whether the presentation of an image representing God 
would influence children‘s judgments about God‘s mental capacities. Thus, half of the 
sample was tested using a blurry nondescript image to represent God (see Appendix A), 
and the other half received no image and no language alluding to a bodily presence for 
God. 
Measures 
False-belief understanding. Children were shown a crayon box and a brown paper 
bag. The experimenter asked children what they thought was inside the crayon box, and 
then showed them that the box actually held marbles, and that the paper bag held crayons. 
Both containers were closed and, as a memory check, children were asked which 
container had marbles and which container had crayons inside (all children answered 
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correctly). Children were then asked the following for each agent with regard to the box: 
―__ has never been in the room with these things before. If we show __ this box, all 
closed up, [picture of agent approaches the crayon box] what will __ think is inside 
here?‖ To minimize anthropomorphic cues, half of the children were not shown a picture 
representing God nor told that God had ―never been in the room;‖ they were simply 
asked ―What will God think is inside here?‖ To deemphasize Mr. Smart‘s visual abilities 
and emphasize his all-knowing capacity, children were asked what Mr. Smart would 
think is in the box if he stayed across the room, facing away from the box. For each 
agent, children earned a score of 0 if they attributed a correct belief or 1 if they attributed 
a false-belief. Following each judgment, the interviewer prompted children to justify their 
answer by asking, ―Why will __ think __ are inside?‖  
Knowledge-ignorance understanding. To assess children‘s ability to distinguish 
knowledgeable versus ignorant agents, children were shown two boxes, each with a slit at 
the top allowing children to look inside. A lamp was positioned above each box. One of 
the lamps was turned on, illuminating the interior of the corresponding box and revealing 
a red plastic frog inside. The other lamp was off, and the corresponding box appeared 
completely empty. Children were first asked to look inside the lit box, and to report what 
they saw. After children reported that the lit box contained a red frog, they were asked to 
look inside the unlit box. After children reported that they could not see anything inside 
the unlit box, the experimenter turned on the corresponding lamp, revealing an identical 
red frog inside. The latter light was then turned off, and the experimenter reminded 
children, ―So, both boxes have a frog inside but you can‘t see the frog when this one is 
dark [pointing at the unlit box].‖ As a memory check, children were asked whether each 
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box, in turn, contained a frog or was empty (corrective feedback was provided for a few 
children as necessary). Children were then asked the following for each agent with regard 
to the unlit box: ―__ has never been in this room with these boxes before. If __ comes 
very close to the top of the dark box, what will __ think is inside here; a frog or nothing?‖ 
For this focal question, the experimenter held the agent‘s picture above the unlit box, 
facing the contents of the box. To minimize anthropomorphic cues for half of the sample, 
no picture representing God was presented and children were not told that God had 
―never been in this room;‖ they were simply asked ―What will God think is inside here; a 
frog or nothing?‖ while the interviewer pointed at the box. To deemphasize Mr. Smart‘s 
visual abilities, children were asked what Mr. Smart would think is in the box if he stayed 
across the room, facing away from the box. For each agent, children earned a score of 0 if 
they attributed correct knowledge or 1 if they attributed ignorance. Following each 
judgment, the interviewer prompted children to justify their choice by asking, ―Why will 
__ think a frog is inside?‖ or ―Why will __ think nothing is inside?‖  
Results 
 Before conducting the focal analyses, we determined whether the presentation of 
an image representing God (along with language alluding to God‘s physical presence) 
was related to children‘s attribution of human-like (i.e., fallible or constrained) mental 
capacities to God. For the false-belief task, 43% of those children presented the image 
and language, and 36% of those who neither saw the image nor heard the language, 
reported that God will think crayons are in the crayon box, χ2(1, N = 56) = 0.30, ns. For 
the knowledge-ignorance task, 61% of children presented the image and language, and 
64% of those not presented the image or language, reported that God will think nothing 
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is inside the unlit box, χ2(1, N = 56) = 0.08, ns. Because children who were presented the 
‗anthropomorphic‘ image and language and those not presented the image and language 
were equally likely to ascribe fallible capacities to God, they were combined in the focal 
analyses.  
False-Belief Understanding  
 To be clear in what follows, a ―correct belief‖ refers to the judgment that an agent 
knows what is actually in the box (its real albeit hidden contents—marbles). ―False-
beliefs‖ refer to judgments that an agent is mistaken (i.e., will think crayons are inside the 
crayon box). Preliminary analyses assessed whether some children concurrently 
attributed human-like, false-beliefs to normal humans and to extraordinary beings, as 
expected under an anthropomorphism hypothesis. Many children indeed attributed false-
beliefs to each of the special agents—Heroman, Mr. Smart, and God—as well as to 
normal humans (i.e., the girl and mom) at levels significantly different from chance (for 
details, see Table 1-1). Of primary interest was whether a pattern of attributing human-
like limitations to all agents would be most common when children first began to 
understand that humans may hold false-beliefs. We conducted an exploratory analysis of 
children‘s false-belief judgments to find an age-range during which children typically 
attributed ‗correct‘ beliefs to all agents, and an immediately subsequent period during 
which children attributed false-beliefs to ordinary humans. Based upon this exploratory 
analysis, we divided children into three age-groups: 24 in the young group (40.4 – 52.4 
months; M = 47.7), 17 in the middle group (52.5 – 58.9 months; M = 54.7), and 15 in the 
oldest group (59.0 – 73.4 months; M = 63.3). Figure 1-1 depicts the primary data: the 
percentage of children who attributed a false-belief to each agent, by age group. Three 
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trends are apparent in this graph: (1) with increasing age, children more often attributed 
false-beliefs to mom and the girl, (2) children in all three age-groups ascribed correct 
beliefs to Heroman, and (3) the youngest and oldest children attributed correct beliefs to 
God and Mr. Smart, whereas children in the middle age-group typically attributed false-
beliefs to God and Mr. Smart. 
 Judgments. Here, parametric statistics are presented for children‘s judgments, 
though non-parametric statistics confirm the results. An initial repeated-measures 
ANOVA for children‘s attributions of false-beliefs with Age as a between-subjects factor 
(3: young, middle, old), and Agent as a within-subjects factor (5: mom, girl, Mr. Smart, 
Heroman, God), revealed a significant effect for age (F(2, 53) = 6.98, p < .01), and agent 
(F(4, 212) = 10.60, p < .001), and a significant interaction between age and agent, F(8, 
212) = 5.13, p < .001. For the youngest group, there were no differences between the 
agents in children‘s attributions of false-beliefs, F(4, 92) = .57, ns; children reported that 
all agents would think the crayon box contains marbles. On a composite measure 
summing responses for both of the ordinary, human agents, these youngest children 
attributed ‗correct‘ beliefs at levels significantly above chance (t(23) = 2.70, p < .05)) and 
did so as well on a similar measure summing responses for both Mr. Smart and God, 
t(23) = 3.41, p < .01. Children in the middle group attributed false-beliefs to each agent 
(except Heroman) more often than did the youngest children, ts(39) > 2.70, ps < .05. In 
this group, children affirmed false-beliefs at levels above chance on a composite measure 
of judgments for both ordinary, human agents, t(16) = 2.70, p < .05. On a parallel 
measure, their attributions of false-beliefs for God and Mr. Smart were similar to their 
judgments for mom and the girl, but not significantly above chance. Note, however that 
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children in this middle group did not grant God or Mr. Smart correct beliefs—contrary to 
what would be expected by a preparedness hypothesis. Only the oldest children (those 59 
months and older) consistently reported that Mr. Smart and God would possess correct 
beliefs whereas the beliefs of mom and the girl would be false, ts(14) > 3.50, p < .01. 
Children in the middle group, as in the oldest group, affirmed correct beliefs for Heroman 
(tending to report that Heroman will know the crayon box actually contains marbles) in 
contrast to the false-beliefs of mom (t(16) > 2.06, p < .06) and the girl, t(16) > 2.40, p < 
.05. 
Justifications. Children‘s justifications help clarify the reasoning behind their 
judgments. Children‘s justifications were coded into seven categories, as outlined in 
Table 1-2, and a residual Uncodable category (e.g., ―I don‘t know‖). Twenty-percent of 
the justifications were coded by two separate coders (one blind to all hypotheses and aims 
of the study) to assess inter-rater reliability (all κs ≥ .96). We focus on three contrasting 
agents: Heroman (whose special vision was described), Mr. Smart (who was described as 
having an extraordinary mind, but no specific exceptional perceptual mechanism), and 
God (about whom we told children nothing). Table 1-3 presents data on the primary 
forms of reasoning that children used to justify these three agents‘ correct beliefs. 
Justifications for correct beliefs are particularly revealing because they address which (if 
any) extraordinary capacities children attributed to these agents. 
The youngest children generally did not appreciate these agents‘ mental capacities 
or knowledge-collecting mechanisms; rather, they evidenced a reality bias (or said 
something uninformative). Most of the youngest children said that Heroman would know 
that the box contains marbles, but fewer than a third referred to his exceptional vision 
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(e.g., ―He has super eyes‖). Rather, most of these children justified Heroman‘s correct 
beliefs by citing reality (e.g., ―There is crayons inside‖), confabulating a reason (e.g., ―He 
guessed‖), or provided an uninformative response (e.g., ―Because‖, or ―I don‘t know‖). In 
this young group, of the children who said that Mr. Smart or God would think that the 
crayon box contains marbles (correct belief) only a few provided justifications indicating 
an appreciation for Mr. Smart‘s or God‘s extraordinary mental capacities (e.g., ―He‘s 
super smart‖). Of the remaining children who attributed correct beliefs to Mr. Smart and 
God, most justified these agents‘ correct beliefs by citing reality or provided an 
uninformative response. In sum, when attributing correct beliefs to these special agents 
(as was typical for these young children, who generally attributed correct beliefs to all 
agents), only 22% of children‘s responses mentioned anything like exceptional 
perception or extraordinary mental capacities, although such special capacities were 
described to children at several points in the protocol. 
 In the middle group, most children attributed a correct belief to Heroman, and 
more than half justified their answers by specifically referring to Heroman‘s 
extraordinary vision (e.g., ―He can look through things‖). However, most children 
attributed to all other agents a false-belief. Of the 11 children who attributed a false-belief 
to Mr. Smart, 10 (91%) cited the appearance of the box (e.g., ―There‘s a picture of 
crayons on the box‖) or type of box (e.g., ―It‘s a crayon box‖). Similarly, of the 11 
children who attributed a false-belief to God, nine (82%) cited the appearance of the box 
or type of box. When attributing correct beliefs to these special agents, children in this 
middle group cited exceptional perception or extraordinary mental capacities in 55% of 
their responses.  
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 Just as in their judgments, the oldest children‘s justifications suggested an 
appreciation for Heroman‘s perceptual prowess and for Mr. Smart‘s and God‘s 
extraordinary minds. All of the children in the oldest group who attributed a correct belief 
to Heroman cited his extraordinary vision, and every child who attributed a correct belief 
to Mr. Smart cited his mental capacities (e.g., ―He‘s so smart‖). Interestingly, of the 
children who attributed a correct belief to God, about half cited extraordinary mental 
capacities (e.g., ―He knows everything‖), but several attributed to God exceptional visual 
capacities (e.g., ―He can see through anything‖). Overall, when attributing correct beliefs 
to these special agents (the typical response for the oldest children), older children 
appealed to exceptional perception or extraordinary mental capacities 94% of the time. In 
sum, when attributing correct (―infallible‖) beliefs to these agents, young children rarely 
referred to agents‘ extraordinary perceptual or mental capacities; however, this sort of 
reasoning was provided often by the middle age-group and especially by the oldest 
children. 
Knowledge-Ignorance Understanding 
 With regard to children‘s understanding of agents‘ ignorance, we again first 
determined whether some children concurrently attributed human-like, constrained 
capacities to most agents. For clarification, we use the phrase ―correct knowledge‖ when 
referring to children‘s judgments that the agent knows what is actually in the box (its real 
but hidden contents—a frog). ―Ignorance‖ refers to children‘s judgments that the agent is 
mistaken (i.e., will think the box is empty). A significant number of children attributed 
ignorance to each of the special agents—Heroman, the cat, Mr. Smart, and God—as well 
as to the ordinary humans (i.e., the girl and mom), at levels significantly different from 
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chance (see Table 1-4 for details). Again, of primary interest was whether this pattern 
would be most common among children who were just beginning to understand that 
ordinary humans‘ knowledge can be limited by perceptual access. We conducted an 
exploratory analysis of children‘s knowledge-ignorance judgments to find an age-range 
when children typically attributed ‗correct‘ knowledge to all agents, and a subsequent 
period when children attributed ignorance to ordinary humans. Based on these 
preliminary analyses, we divided children into three age-groups. Because children 
evidenced an understanding of ignorance at an average age four months younger than an 
understanding of false-beliefs, for knowledge-ignorance analyses there were 12 children 
in the young group (40.4 – 49.4 months; M = 44.2), 20 in the middle group (49.5 – 54.5 
months; M = 52.2), and 24 in the oldest group (54.6 – 73.4 months; M = 60.5). Figure 1-2 
depicts the focal data: the percentage of children who attributed ignorance to each agent, 
per age group. Three trends are noticeable in this graph: (1) with increasing age, children 
more often attributed ignorance to mom and the girl, with a later leveling-off, (2) children 
in all three age-groups attributed correct knowledge to Heroman and the cat, a tendency 
that was particularly pronounced in the oldest age-group, and (3) children in the young 
and old age-groups attributed correct knowledge to God and Mr. Smart, whereas children 
in the middle age-group attributed ignorance to God and Mr. Smart. 
 Judgments. A repeated-measures ANOVA for children‘s attributions of ignorance 
with Age as a between-subjects factor (3: young, middle, old), and Agent as a within-
subjects factor (6: mom, girl, Mr. Smart, Heroman, God, cat), revealed a significant effect 
for age (F(2, 53) = 4.73, p < .05), agent (F(5, 265) = 11.16, p < .001), and an interaction 
between age and agent, F(10, 265) = 3.58, p < .001. For the youngest children, there were 
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no differences in children‘s attribution of ignorance between the agents, F(5, 55) = .61, 
ns,  and they attributed ignorance to all agents at chance levels. Children in the middle 
group attributed ignorance to agents (except Heroman and the cat) more often than did 
the youngest children (ts(30) > 2.09, ps < .05). They did so above chance on a composite 
measure of judgments for both ordinary, human agents (t(19) = 6.66, p < .001) and 
notably were above chance on a similar composite measure for both Mr. Smart and God, 
t(19) = 3.24, p < .01. These children (along with the oldest children) distinguished 
between the correct knowledge of Heroman and the cat and the ignorance of mom and 
the girl, ts(19) > 2.99, ps < .01. Notably, in the middle age-group, only the two agents 
who were specified as possessing exceptional vision were judged to know the correct 
contents of the dark box; God and Mr. Smart were judged to be ignorant. Only the oldest 
group of children (54 months and older) consistently reported that, whereas mom and the 
girl would think the unlit box is empty, Mr. Smart and God would have correct 
knowledge that the unlit box contains a frog (all ts(23) > 2.77, ps ≤ .01, except for the 
difference between mom and God, which was marginally significant at p < .06).  
 Justifications. Children‘s justifications shed light on the reasoning behind their 
judgments. Justifications were coded into the same seven focal categories as before (see 
Table 1-2). Twenty-percent of the justifications were coded by two coders (one unaware 
of the hypotheses and aims of the study) to assess inter-rater reliability (all κs ≥ .88). We 
focus on four contrasting agents: Heroman and the cat (whose exceptional visual abilities 
were described), Mr. Smart (whose extraordinary mind was described, but who was not 
given a special perceptual mechanism), and God (about whom children were told 
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nothing). Table 1-3 presents data on the most common forms of reasoning that children 
used to justify Heroman‘s, Mr. Smart‘s, and God‘s correct knowledge. 
For the youngest children, most judged that Heroman and the cat would know that 
the box contains a frog, but only one of these children for each agent referred to special 
vision (―He can use his light sensy‖ and ―He can see in the dark‖ ). In contrast, most of 
these children justified these agents‘ correct knowledge by citing reality (e.g., ―I saw a 
frog‖) or provided an uninformative response (e.g., ―Because,‖ or ―I don‘t know‖). In this 
young group, of the many children who reported that Mr. Smart would know that the 
unlit box contains a frog, only one provided a justification that suggested he appreciated 
Mr. Smart‘s extraordinary mind (―He knows everything‖), and only one of the children 
who reported that God would know that the box contains a frog cited God‘s mental 
capacities (―He knows everything at church‖). The remaining children justified Mr. 
Smart‘s and God‘s correct knowledge by citing the real nature of the box, or provided 
uninformative responses. In summary, when attributing correct knowledge to these 
special agents (the typical response for the young children, who generally attributed 
correct knowledge to all agents), in only 21% of their responses did the youngest children 
appeal to exceptional perception or extraordinary mental capacities.  
 In the middle group, most judged Heroman and the cat to have correct knowledge. 
Almost all of these children provided justifications that specifically referred to these 
agents‘ exceptional vision (e.g., ―He can see through anything‖ and ―He can see in the 
dark‖, respectively). Most children attributed to all other agents ignorance. Of the 14 
children who attributed ignorance to Mr. Smart, four (29%) justified their responses by 
citing the appearance of the box (e.g., ―It‘s dark‖), and seven (50%) referred to Mr. 
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Smart‘s inadequate visual capacities (e.g., ―It‘s hard to see‖). Similarly, of the 17 children 
who attributed ignorance to God, three (18%) referred to the appearance of the box (e.g., 
―It‘s dark‖), and 10 (59%) justified their responses by referring to God‘s inadequate 
visual capacities (e.g., ―He can‘t see in the dark‖). When attributing correct beliefs to 
these four special agents, children referred to exceptional visual capacities or 
extraordinary mental abilities in 73% of their responses. 
 The oldest children‘s justifications suggested a greater appreciation for Mr. 
Smart‘s and God‘s extraordinary mental capacities, in addition to an appreciation for 
Heroman‘s and the cat‘s exceptional vision. Most of the oldest children judged Heroman 
and the cat to have correct knowledge, and a majority of these children justified their 
judgments by explicitly referring to these agents‘ exceptional visual capacities. Of the 
children in this group who attributed correct knowledge to Mr. Smart, more than half 
cited his extraordinary mental capacities (e.g., ―He knows everything‖), one referred to 
exceptional visual capacities (―He can see anything‖), and a third cited reality. Of the 
children who attributed correct knowledge to God, almost half cited reality, while others 
cited extraordinary mental capacities (e.g., ―He knows everything‖) or exceptional visual 
capacities. In short, when attributing correct knowledge to these four agents (the typical 
response for the oldest children), the oldest children cited exceptional perception or 
extraordinary mental abilities in 63% of their responses. 
Discussion 
 Not only do children everywhere come to understand the basic mental and 
perceptual capacities of ordinary human agents, they come to entertain ideas about agents 
with extraordinary capacities, including religious deities. Recent research on children‘s 
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understanding of extraordinary, non-human minds has been aimed at comparing and 
contrasting two opposing positions: the anthropomorphism hypothesis and the 
preparedness hypothesis. From the anthropomorphism perspective, very young children 
initially understand all intentional agents as possessing human-like capacities. Three-
year-olds fall prey to a reality bias—they do not consider agents‘ mental abilities and thus 
fail to distinguish between the state of reality and people‘s (often inaccurate) mental 
states. As children begin to appreciate that humans‘ capacities are limited and fallible, 
they initially attribute similar limitations to all agents. After developing an understanding 
of ordinary, human capacities children can appreciate that certain agents may conceivably 
have exceptional or extraordinary powers. Thus, to understand extraordinary agents‘ 
special capacities children must overcome or modify their intuitive conceptions of agents, 
and increasingly think in counterintuitive, non-anthropomorphic terms. The alternative 
preparedness perspective proposes that very young children begin life well-equipped to 
understand that certain agents possess non-human capacities (e.g., infallible beliefs) 
because they have an initial ―default assumption‖ that ―many superhuman properties are 
the norm‖ (Richert & Barrett, 2005, p. 284). Because initially all beliefs are true and all 
agents infallible, for special agents (God or others when they are explicitly told the agent 
has superhuman capacities or states) children need merely and easily continue to see 
them as superhuman.  
 A crucial developmental difference exists for these two positions. According to 
the anthropomorphism hypothesis, there should exist a developmental point, once 
children begin to attribute fallible capacities and states to humans, when they attribute 
these states to all agents, even agents adults contend are infallible (e.g., God) and children 
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have heard are infallible (perhaps God, but in these tasks explicitly Mr. Smart). For the 
preparedness hypothesis, on the other hand, because superhuman properties are the 
default ―norm,‖ children need not struggle to reason counterintuitively about such agents 
and, as a consequence, there should be no developmental point when these agents are 
attributed fallible, limited capacities or states. For both positions, an intriguing contrast 
case concerns agents with more limited extension of ordinary capacities, such as night 
vision or x-ray vision. 
 In accordance with the anthropomorphism hypothesis, we found that children 
reliably attributed ordinary, human-like capacities to special agents for both a false-belief 
task and a knowledge-ignorance task. Children did this for God, but also did so for agents 
whose extraordinary mental capacities and exceptional perceptual mechanisms were 
explicitly described and demonstrated to them. Normatively, children come to understand 
ignorance before understanding false-beliefs; this is true in precise scaling comparisons 
(e.g., Wellman & Liu, 2004) and is apparent in our own data as well. Accordingly, we 
found that the age-related developmental period during which children were especially 
likely to consider most agents‘ capacities to be human-like differed between these two 
forms of mental understanding, a sequential pattern that seems to accord more with an 
anthropomorphism position. A prepared, early understanding of infallibility should 
generally apply to knowledge and belief; overcoming an early reality bias could more 
sensibly apply first to developmentally ―easier‖ mental states (ignorance), then more 
complicated mental states (false-beliefs). Thus it is of note that my data show that these 
children came to understand the ordinary limits of one and then another mental capacity, 
and subsequently entertained the counterintuitive suspension of those limits in sequence.  
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 In apparently contradicting the results and conclusions of Barrett and colleagues, 
the current findings join two other recent studies. Using a different type of knowledge-
ignorance task with Greek Orthodox children, Makris and Pnevmatikos (2007) found that 
3- and 4-year-olds held that God and a little girl would both not know the contents of a 
closed box. Only at age 5 did participants differentiate between the girl‘s ignorance and 
God‘s correct knowledge of the box‘s true contents. Similarly, using modified 
knowledge-ignorance and false-belief tasks with a sample of Spanish children, Giménez-
Dasí and colleagues (2005) found that, compared with 3- and 5-year-olds, their 4-year-
olds more often attributed ignorance and false-beliefs to God, and this was the case for 
children who were attending religious as well as those attending non-religious preschools. 
Our data go beyond other results, however, in clarifying how the overall pattern 
of apparently contradictory findings could arise depending on the way in which children 
were sampled and grouped. That is, the finding of specific ―anthropomorphic‖ 
developmental periods (using tasks similar to those used by Barrett and colleagues, 2001) 
was a product of careful age sampling and precise age-related analyses of the data. 
Suppose instead we reexamine my data after removing participants to correct for the 
dense sampling in the middle age-range, and simply divide the remaining children into 
three arbitrary age-groups. Then only two age-graded linear trends emerge: (1) an 
increasing tendency to attribute fallible capacities to the girl and mom, and (2) a constant 
trend to attribute ―infallible‖ capacities to God, Mr. Smart and Heroman. That is, with 
less precise sampling and age-grouping, my data would mimic the trend lines shown in 
Barrett‘s work (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Knight et al., 2004). But as is clear in Figures 1-
1 and 1-2, such analyses would actually mask three different trends: (1) an increasing 
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linear trend to attribute fallible mental states to the girl and mom, (2) an apparently 
constant trend to attribute correct mental states to the cat and Heroman, and (3) a 
curvilinear trend where, with age, children first increasingly attribute fallible mental 
states to Mr. Smart and God, and only later attribute extraordinary, correct mental states 
to those superhuman agents. The latter trend thus parallels the findings of Makris and 
Pnevmatikos (2007), and also of Giménez-Dasí and colleagues (2005), and suggest that 
their data, too, may have emerged from samples and groupings that were able, like my 
own, to reveal more precise and detailed developmental trends. 
 Crucially, earlier studies provide limited information on what specific capacities 
children are attributing to extraordinary agents. The exception is Giménez-Dasí and 
colleagues' (2005) finding that, when asked, 4- and 5-year-olds often justified their 
answers that God‘s knowledge was limited by referencing God‘s limited perceptual 
capacities. In our more comprehensive assessment of children‘s reasoning, we 
distinguished children‘s appreciation for mental capacities (e.g., infallible beliefs) from 
their appreciation for perceptual capacities (e.g., night vision). Two techniques were used 
to obtain this additional, needed, information: (1) asking children about the knowledge 
and beliefs of agents with contrasting mental and perceptual capacities, and (2) asking 
children to explain their responses. These techniques jointly revealed that children in the 
middle age groups appreciated that most humans (such as the girl, mom, and Mr. Smart) 
as well as God have constrained access to certain information. However, they also 
reasoned that other agents who possess specific perceptual mechanisms to access 
information (such as the exceptional visual capacities of the cat and Heroman) may gain 
knowledge that would be elusive to most humans. It is conceivable that children 
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attributed accurate knowledge and beliefs to Heroman merely because he held 
―superhero‖ status, and thus they understood him as being all-capable within a pretend 
world. However, on the knowledge-ignorance task, children treated Heroman just as they 
treated the cat—an agent who was not presented as a ―super‖ agent. Moreover, for both 
tasks, children who attributed accurate knowledge and beliefs to Heroman justified their 
judgments by specifically referring to his visual abilities and not to his other exceptional 
abilities, such as his ability to fly fast.  
 Only the oldest children appreciated Mr. Smart‘s and God‘s extraordinary mental 
capacities, in the absence of exceptional perceptual mechanisms through which 
knowledge or beliefs could be acquired—Mr. Smart was described as being very smart 
and knowing everything, children were not told how he acquired information other than 
saying that it was not based on vision. These data thus provide converging evidence that 
contradict the preparedness hypothesis, which specifically describes superhuman 
capacities, such as infallible beliefs, as the default. According to the preparedness 
hypothesis, children should have simply continued with this default position when taught 
about Mr. Smart, but they did not. Similarly, only the oldest children understood the 
extraordinary mind of God, about whom children were provided no background 
information. Perhaps, in comparison with religiously trained children, the children in the 
current sample lacked knowledge of God‘s powers, and this is the reason why children in 
the middle age-group tended to anthropomorphize God—they simply had not learned 
about God‘s powers. Following the interview, children were asked what they know about 
God. Exploratory analyses did not indicate that there were differences in the responses of 
children based upon their knowledge of God. The children who could provide details 
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about God, for example, were evenly distributed between the three age groups for the 
knowledge-ignorance task—about a third (35%) were in the middle ‗anthropomorphic‘ 
age-group—and these children comprised about half (45%) of the children in the middle 
age-group. Moreover the same trends were found for God as for Mr. Smart, an agent 
about whom children definitely had relevant background information. However, we could 
not comprehensively examine the influence of religious exposure on children‘s 
developing concepts of extraordinary minds, as parental-reports of children‘s religious 
exposure were available for only 39 of 56 children. It is important that future research be 
conducted using similar methods to assess these developing concepts in children who are 
exposed heavily to theistic ideas. 
 Although the current results go a long way toward clarifying children‘s 
developing ideas about extraordinary minds and exceptional perceptual capacities, they 
also raise several questions that could be addressed with future research. First, although 
we found that a substantial portion of children attributed fallible capacities to the two 
agents described as having exceptional perceptual capacities—Heroman and the cat—we 
did not find a specific developmental period during which children were particularly 
likely to anthropomorphize these agents. It is possible that an even finer-grained age 
sampling and analysis might uncover earlier anthropomorphic windows for children‘s 
understanding of exceptional perceptual capacities. Second, our findings do not indicate 
that our oldest children were attributing omniscience to Mr. Smart and God, although 
some researchers have used that term when interpreting their data (e.g., Giménez-Dasí et 
al., 2005; Knight et al., 2004). Understanding omniscience requires that one appreciates 
that an agent not only knows the contents of closed containers but that an agent truly 
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knows everything—the nature of all past and future events, all scientific facts, everyone‘s 
unspoken intentions and dreams, and so on. Rather, the oldest children likely understood 
God‘s and Mr. Smart‘s powers in a much less counterintuitive manner—Mr. Smart and 
God think like humans, but they know more (about certain tangible things in the here-
and-now) than normal humans. It would certainly be interesting in future studies, to 
address how children come to entertain increasingly counterintuitive concepts of 
extraordinary mental capacities and how this might eventually lead to a sophisticated 
understanding of omniscience. 
In summary, our data lend critical support to the anthropomorphism hypothesis 
while also suggesting ways in which this hypothesis might be modified. When these 
children first began to overcome their initial reality bias and started to understand the 
limits of human mental capacities (e.g., that ordinary humans possess ignorance and false 
beliefs) they applied this same understanding to God and to an agent who was described 
as possessing extraordinary mental capacities. Meanwhile, during this ―anthropomorphic‖ 
period, children appreciated that knowledge and beliefs may be acquired via highly 
specialized, non-human perceptual capacities—such as eyes that see in the dark. This 
initial grasp of exceptional perceptual capacities may well act as a bridge to a later 
understanding of even more counterintuitive, superhuman capacities. By age five, 
children understood that agents with special mental capacities, such as the ability to know 
everything, may possess knowledge and beliefs without necessarily relying on 
specialized perceptual mechanisms for acquiring that information. Such early abilities to 
understand extraordinary capacities are indeed impressive. These abilities allow children 
to begin to grasp religious teachings that are seemingly counterintuitive, such as God's 
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omniscience. But, importantly, this early understanding of the extraordinary is built upon 
an earlier and more fundamental understanding of the ordinary. 
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CHAPTER III 
Study 2: Socio-cultural Input Facilitates Children’s Developing Understanding  
of Extraordinary Minds
2
 
 During the preschool years, children‘s understanding of the capacities and 
limitations of others‘ minds—their theory-of-mind—undergoes rapid change (Harris, 
2006; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Two-year-olds appreciate that people hold desires, and that 
different people may desire different things (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997); and 3-year-olds 
additionally understand that people have thoughts and beliefs—mental representations of 
stimuli (e.g., objects, people) even in the physical absence of those stimuli (Wellman & 
Estes, 1986). Shortly thereafter, children begin to appreciate certain limitations of the 
mind. For example, older 3-year-olds appreciate that people can be ignorant about 
something if they have not perceived it (Pratt & Bryant, 1990). Most 5-year-olds 
additionally understand that people can hold false beliefs about the world based on 
inaccurate or outdated information (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), and soon 
thereafter children begin to appreciate that individuals have limited access to others‘ 
private beliefs (Miller, 2009).  But children (and adults) are not confronted exclusively by 
ordinary human agents; people entertain beliefs about agents who possess extraordinary 
capacities that are distinctly non-human. For example, television shows and movies 
abound with characters who possess exceptional perceptual capacities (e.g., x-ray vision), 
and many of the world‘s religions espouse beings who possess extraordinary mental 
                                                 
2
 Study 2 has been accepted for publication as Lane, Wellman, and Evans (in press). 
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capacities (e.g., omniscience) (Campbell, 1993; Pickover, 2001). How do people come to 
understand the less constrained minds of these agents? In this paper we investigate the 
effects of socio-cultural input and theory-of-mind (ToM) on children‘s developing 
understanding of extraordinary minds. 
In addition to providing a framework for how other people think and behave, a 
theory-of-mind can facilitate the representation of many sorts of minds, including the 
minds of non-human and super-human beings (Boyer, 1996; Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 
2007; Evans & Wellman, 2006; Shtulman, 2008). Concepts of extraordinary perceptual 
and cognitive abilities begin to emerge during the preschool years. But there is 
disagreement as to when and how children differentiate between the minds of ordinary 
humans and the minds of extraordinary beings. Primarily, two theories have been 
proposed to account for young children‘s understanding of extraordinary minds. The first 
is an anthropomorphism hypothesis (Boyer, 1996; Piaget, 1969), which states that 
children initially attribute to all agents the same psychological limits that they attribute to 
ordinary humans, and only later come to differentiate ordinary and extraordinary minds. 
Thus, for example, when children begin to appreciate that ordinary people can be 
ignorant or can hold false beliefs, they attribute the same cognitive limitation to all 
beings, ordinary and extraordinary. Before that time, children fail to understand the 
distinction between (potentially fallible) belief states and reality, so if required to judge 
beliefs they merely report states of reality for human and non-human agents. Several 
studies lend support to this theory (e.g., Giménez-Dasí, Guerrero, & Harris, 2005). Using 
a knowledge-ignorance task, Makris and Pnevmatikos (2007) found that 3- and 4-year-
olds reported that both a girl and God would be ignorant about the contents of a closed 
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box without looking inside. Only children age five and older differentiated between the 
girl‘s ignorance and God‘s correct knowledge of the box‘s contents.  
However, other studies provide evidence that appears to counter the 
anthropomorphism hypothesis. Barrett and colleagues (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Knight, 
Sousa, Barrett, & Atran, 2004), for example, administered false-belief and knowledge-
access tasks to 3- to 7-year-olds, and found that the youngest children attributed 
‗infallible‘ mental capacities (i.e., correct knowledge and correct beliefs) to all agents 
tested, including humans and God; and older children who attributed ignorance and false 
beliefs to humans (typically those 5-years and older) continued to attribute correct mental 
capacities to God. Barrett and colleagues conclude that these results support an 
alternative preparedness hypothesis (Barrett & Richert, 2003), whereby children‘s early 
social-cognitive biases (e.g., not attributing false beliefs to agents) actually support the 
understanding of extraordinary mental abilities. That is, before children understand 
mental limitations, (e.g., ignorance, error, or false beliefs), they do not merely use reality 
to attribute agents‘ mental states (per the anthropomorphism hypothesis), rather they 
believe that agents are all-knowing. Accordingly, when children begin to attribute a 
particular mental fallibility (e.g., false beliefs) to ordinary humans, they can simply 
continue to attribute infallible mental capacities and states to God. 
 These research findings apparently conflict and are thus difficult to integrate 
theoretically. Critically, most extant studies lack data that are key to testing the opposing 
hypotheses—namely, data on the specific types of capacities children are actually 
attributing to agents. Further, the prior studies typically group children in large age-
groups that may mask nuanced developmental trajectories. To address these issues, Lane, 
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Wellman, and Evans (2010) asked children from secular schools to make judgments and 
reason about the knowledge and beliefs of agents with contrasting perceptual and mental 
abilities: ordinary humans; Heroman, who ―can see right through things‖; Mr. Smart, 
who ―knows everything‖; a cat with night vision; and a religious deity (God). Critical to 
sufficiently testing the preparedness and anthropomorphism hypotheses, they densely 
sampled children at an age when children were beginning to attribute ignorance and false 
beliefs to ordinary humans. Results indicated that the youngest children‘s (3-year-olds‘) 
attribution of correct knowledge and beliefs to all agents largely reflected a reality bias—
when justifying their decisions, 3-year-olds referred to reality (specifically the box‘s 
current contents); they rarely mentioned the agents‘ mental capacities or constraints. 
Moreover, somewhat older children (essentially 4-year-olds) who were beginning to 
understand the mental limitations of ordinary agents (ignorance and fallible beliefs), 
attributed those same limitations to the minds of Mr. Smart and God. Only the oldest 
children (5-years and older) differentiated between the fallible mental capacities (and 
resulting knowledge and beliefs) of humans and the less constrained mental capacities 
and states of God and Mr. Smart. Intriguingly, the 4-year-olds did appreciate that some 
agents‘ exceptional perceptual abilities (e.g., Heroman‘s x-ray vision) could lead to 
accurate knowledge and beliefs, but they did not appreciate extraordinary mental 
abilities. Overall, these findings present clear evidence in support of the 
anthropomorphism hypothesis, but also suggest that children come to appreciate some 
exceptional perceptual capacities (e.g., x-ray vision) before they appreciate extraordinary 
mental capacities (e.g., infallible beliefs).  
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One reason children may have an early appreciation of exceptional perceptual 
capacities is because perceptual capacities are observably more or less restricted across 
humans and animals—some people see well without glasses, others need them, dogs can 
hear silent dog whistles, bats have echolocation that allows them to navigate in the dark. 
In addition, children‘s early grasp of exceptional perceptual abilities may reflect exposure 
to ―testimony,‖ and media in which characters possess special abilities (e.g., bat‘s 
echolocation, Superman‘s x-ray vision). Indeed, children may hear not only about 
exceptional perceptual abilities but also about extraordinary mental abilities through 
various forms of informal and formal socio-cultural input (Bergstrom, Moehlmann, & 
Boyer, 2006; Harris & Koenig, 2006)—including broadly, parent-child discourse, oral 
and printed stories, movies, and  formal or informal exposure to religious doctrine. 
Importantly, socio-cultural input of these various forms can have powerful effects on 
children‘s conceptual development (Shweder et al., 2006), even if that information is not 
provided in an intentionally didactic manner (Atran & Sperber, 1991). For example, a 
large body of research demonstrates predictive relations between everyday socio-cultural 
input (e.g., parent-child discourse about mental states) and children‘s developing 
understanding of ordinary human minds (for a review, see Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). 
Further, it is clear that socio-cultural input affects older children's judgments of, for 
example, God's extraordinary ability to create the living world (Evans, 2001). However, 
surprisingly little is known about the effects of such input, and focally exposure to 
religious ideas, on children‘s developing concepts of extraordinary minds. It now seems 
unlikely that young children are cognitively prepared to understand extraordinary mental 
capacities, in that very young children evidence a reality bias, rather than an 
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understanding of extraordinary mental capacities (Lane et al., 2010). Nonetheless, once 
children do begin to consider the mental capacities of various agents, exposure to certain 
religious doctrine may facilitate the acquisition and application of concepts of 
extraordinary mental capacities. In particular, children who are heavily exposed to ideas 
about agents with extraordinary cognitive abilities (e.g., doctrine about God‘s 
omniscience) may more easily resist attributing cognitive limitations (e.g., false beliefs) 
to such agents. 
Many of the studies mentioned have included children from religious 
communities but, again, offer unclear or conflicting results. Makris and Pnevmatikos 
(2007) offer evidence in favor of the anthropomorphism hypothesis in a sample of Greek 
Orthodox children. Further, in a sample of Spanish children, Giménez-Dasí and 
colleagues (2005) found that only after age five did children attribute extraordinary 
abilities of God rather than the fallible mental abilities representative of humans; and this 
was true for religiously-schooled as well as secularly-schooled children. But Barrett and 
colleagues arguably found support for the preparedness hypothesis in a sample of 
Christian children from the United States (Barrett et al., 2001) and in a sample of 
Yukatek Mayan children (Knight et al., 2004).  
To understand how these seemingly conflicting results may contribute to a unified 
theory of children‘s understanding of extraordinary minds, in the current study we 
addressed the interplay between socio-cultural, religious input and children‘s developing 
concepts of extraordinary minds in three ways: (1) we used the methods employed by 
Lane et al. (2010) with a sample of children who attended religious schools and who were 
knowledgeable about God, (2) we directly compared the religiously-schooled children to 
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the secularly-schooled children from Lane et al., (2010), (3) across both samples, we 
examined relations between children‘s knowledge of God and their understanding of 
extraordinary minds. To capture the potentially nuanced developmental trajectory of 
children‘s appreciation for extraordinary minds, we followed Lane and colleagues (2010) 
by densely sampling children in an age-range when they were beginning to attribute 
particular mental fallibilities (ignorance and false beliefs) to ordinary humans, and asked 
children about the mental capacities of agents with contrasting abilities. These agents 
included ordinary humans, agents with exceptional perceptual capacities (a cat with night 
vision, and a superhero with x-ray vision), and agents with extraordinary mental 
capacities (Mr. Smart—an agent who ―knows everything,‖ and God). We also 
systematically asked children to provide justifications for their decisions.  
In advance, we can consider three possibilities. First, we might find results for 
religiously-schooled children very similar to those found by Lane and colleagues (2010), 
who studied children from secular schools. In particular, when these religiously-exposed 
children begin to appreciate a particular limitation of human minds (e.g., ignorance or 
false beliefs) they could, like secularly-schooled children, initially attribute that same 
limitation to agents with extraordinary mental capacities (focally, agents purported to be 
all-knowing). This would suggest that exposure to information about extraordinary minds 
does not affect young children‘s initial understanding of extraordinary mental capacities. 
On the other hand, socio-cultural input about extraordinary minds might facilitate 
an early ability to understand extraordinary mental capacities. Facilitation of children‘s 
understanding of extraordinary minds due to early religious exposure could manifest in 
either of two ways in the current study. One straightforward possibility is that young 
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children who are knowledgeable about God will resist attributing ignorance or false 
beliefs to God at any point, even as they begin to attribute such mental fallibilities to 
ordinary humans. However, the effects of religious exposure and knowledge might be 
less straightforward and more subtle. For example, religiously-exposed children may hear 
and accept information about God‘s extraordinary capacities, but those capacities may 
not loom large in their everyday thinking about God. Thus, a third possibility is that the 
influence of religious exposure may surface only when such children are explicitly 
informed and reminded about some agent‘s extraordinary abilities. Indeed, while even 
adults believers tend to think of God as subject to many human-like psychological 
constraints, they are less likely to do so if first asked questions (and so reminded) about 
the nature of God‘s powers (Barrett & Keil, 1996). 
Children‘s open-ended justifications for the ToM tasks could also shed light on 
the nature and timing of any facilitation due to religious exposure. For example, possible 
facilitation effects could potentially occur very early, even before children begin to 
appreciate limits of ordinary minds. In this case, very young religiously-exposed children 
should mention agents‘ special mental abilities (rather than merely reference reality) in 
their justifications. Alternatively, children may only begin to mention extraordinary 
capacities after they appreciate certain ordinary limits of human minds (e.g., false-beliefs 
or ignorance). 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four children participated, all of whom attended religious Protestant 
Christian preschools; they were primarily of European-American descent and middle-
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class socioeconomic status. We densely sampled in an age-range (54 to 59 months) in 
which, pilot testing showed, children were particularly likely to begin attributing 
ignorance or false beliefs to ordinary humans. The data from three children who were 
notably distracted were excluded, leaving 61 children (27 males) in the final sample, 
ranging in age from 37.87 to 76.53 months (M age = 56.92 months).  
Children were recruited from Christian schools (all of which mentioned God 
and/or Christ in their mission statements); these institutions provide a pool of participants 
who are typically exposed to religion, at least at school. School affiliation is the most 
commonly-used method employed in prior research to recruit religiously-exposed 
children (e.g., Bering, Hernández Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005; Giménez-Dasí et al., 2005; 
Richert & Barrett, 2005). However, because parents undoubtedly vary in their reasons for 
having their children attend religious schools, we sought additional information as to 
children‘s religious exposure and knowledge. In particular, we asked children about God 
at several points in our procedures. From these data (see Results) we found that 87% 
were familiar with God, and that 79% were able to provide specific details about God 
(e.g., ―God made us‖; ―God knows everything‖). Thus, our sample was not only 
religiously-exposed; children remembered key details about God. To gather additional 
information on children‘s religious exposure, we distributed a follow-up questionnaire to 
all of the children‘s parents. Thirty-eight parents (parents of 62% of the children) 
returned the questionnaire. Parallel to the proportion of children who evidenced 
familiarity with the concept of God, 84% of these parents reported that their children 
attend a place of worship; most on a weekly basis.  
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Procedure 
Children were interviewed individually at school, using two tasks identical to 
those employed by Lane and colleagues (2010): a contents false-belief task (Perner et al., 
1987), and a knowledge-ignorance task similar to that used by Barrett and colleagues 
(2001). Half of the children received the knowledge-ignorance task first; the others 
received the false-belief task first. Children were introduced to each agent (displayed on a 
card) upon their first exposure to that agent (for images of the agents and details on how 
each agent was introduced, see Appendix). For each task, children were presented the girl 
first; the remaining agents were presented in random order (except Mom was never 
presented following the girl).  
Measures 
False-belief understanding. Children were shown a crayon box and paper bag. 
The interviewer asked children what they thought was inside the crayon box, and then 
opened both containers to reveal that the box held marbles and the paper bag held 
crayons. Both containers were then closed and the interviewer checked if children 
remembered the contents of both containers; corrective feedback was offered when 
necessary, but was rarely required. Then, for each of five agents, children were asked: 
―__ has never been in the room with these things before. If we show __ this box, all 
closed up, [pictured agent approaches crayon box] what will __ think is inside here?‖ 
Children were asked this question with regard to a girl, their mother, Mr. Smart (a man 
who, children were instructed, ―knows everything‖), Heroman (a superhero with x-ray 
vision), and God (no information was given about God). Importantly, the example that 
we provided to children in Mr. Smart‘s introduction (his knowing the contents of a box 
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without looking inside) is directly applicable to our social-cognitive tasks, for which 
children decide whether agents know the contents of containers. To assess the effects of 
anthropomorphic cues on children‘s concepts of God, half of the sample was not shown a 
picture representing God and were not told that God had ―never been in the room;‖ they 
were just asked ―What will God think is inside here?‖ To assess children‘s understanding 
of Mr. Smart‘s all-knowing abilities (without reliance on visual abilities), children were 
asked what Mr. Smart would think is in the box if he was far from the box facing in the 
opposite direction. For each agent, children earned a score of 0 if they ascribed a correct 
belief or 1 if they ascribed a false belief. Following each judgment, the interviewer 
prompted children to justify their answer by asking, ―Why will __ think __ are inside?‖  
Knowledge-ignorance understanding. Children were shown two boxes that each 
had a slit, allowing visual access. Above the first box, a lamp was turned on, illuminating 
the inside of the box and revealing a red plastic frog inside. Above the second box, a 
lamp was turned off, and that box appeared empty. Children looked into each box and 
reported what they saw. After children affirmed that the lit box contained a frog and that 
they could see nothing in the unlit box, the experimenter turned on the lamp above the 
previously unlit box, revealing another red frog inside. That light was then turned off, and 
the experimenter reminded children, ―So, both boxes have a frog inside but you can‘t see 
the frog when this one is dark [pointing at the unlit box].‖ The interviewer then checked 
if children remembered the contents of both boxes; corrective feedback was offered when 
needed, but this was rarely required. Children were then asked the following for each of 
six agents with regard to the unlit box: ―__ has never been in this room with these boxes 
before. If __ comes very close to the top of the dark box, what will __ think is inside 
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here; a frog or nothing?‖ For this focal question, the experimenter held the agent‘s picture 
above the unlit box, facing the contents of the box. Children were asked this question for 
each of six different agents: a girl, their mom, Mr. Smart (a man who ―knows 
everything‖), Heroman (a superhero with x-ray vision) and God (about whom children 
were told nothing). Because this knowledge-ignorance task involves specifically 
children‘s understand that darkness limits visual access to information, we added another 
agent with perceptual abilities that were directly applicable to this task—a cat that can see 
in the dark (see also Barrett et al., 2001; Lane et al., 2010). Again, half of the sample 
received no picture of God and were not told that God had ―never been in this room;‖ 
they were only asked ―What will God think is inside here; a frog or nothing?‖ To 
emphasize Mr. Smart‘s reliance on mental and not visual abilities, children were asked 
what Mr. Smart would think is in the box if he was far from the box, facing away from 
the box. For each agent, children earned a score of 0 if they attributed correct knowledge 
or 1 if they attributed ignorance. Following each judgment, the interviewer prompted 
children to justify their answer by asking, ―Why will __ think __ is inside?‖ Children‘s 
understanding of ignorance can be measured with a variety of tasks. We chose this task 
because it parallels that used by Barrett and colleagues (2001) and is identical to the one 
used by Lane et al. (2010), thus allowing a direct comparison with their findings. As is 
typical with knowledge-ignorance tasks (Wellman & Liu, 2004), Lane et al. (2010) found 
that children pass this task earlier than the false-belief task. 
Knowledge of God. To obtain further information about children‘s knowledge of 
God, following the theory-of-mind tasks, the interviewer told children, ―Tell me about 
God.‖ If children could not provide any details initially, they were prompted, ―Tell me 
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anything you know about God.‖ If children still provided no information, children were 
asked ―Have you ever heard of God?‖ 
Coding. The reasoning children used to justify their knowledge-ignorance and 
false-belief judgments were coded into 10 focal categories (see Table 2-1) and an 
additional ―uninformative‖ category. To assess inter-rater reliability, 25% of the 
justifications were coded by two coders (one blind to all hypotheses of the study); all κs ≥ 
.88.  
Children‘s acquaintance with information about God was assessed using their 
justifications for God‘s knowledge and beliefs for the theory-of-mind tasks combined 
with children‘s responses to the final open-ended questions about God. Knowledge of 
God was coded as an ordinal variable with higher values representing greater knowledge 
of God, especially God‘s extraordinary powers: (0) Child does not report knowing about 
God, (1) child has heard of God but cannot provide details, (2) child provides some 
details about God (e.g., location, physical status, role, relevance in prayer, connection 
with Jesus, connection with Heaven; mentions that God is ―loving‖, ―not a person‖, ―a 
special person‖), (3) child mentions exceptional abilities that are not perceptual or mental 
(e.g., role in creation, omnipresence, "God has powers"), or (4) child specifically 
mentions extraordinary perceptual or mental abilities. Similar measures (aggregating 
across multiple responses) have been used effectively in other studies investigating 
relations between children‘s religious knowledge and conceptual development (e.g., 
Bamford & Lagattuta, 2010). Inter-coder agreement was 96.7% for the current 
Knowledge of God measure. 
67 
 
Results 
 In preliminary analyses, we assessed whether the presentation of the image 
representing God and language suggesting God‘s physical presence affected children‘s 
attribution of anthropomorphic, fallible mental abilities to God. For the false-belief task, 
27% of children who were presented the image and language, and 16% of those children 
who neither saw the image nor heard the language, attributed to God a false belief, χ2(1, 
N = 61) = 1.01, ns. For the knowledge-ignorance task, 47% of children who were 
presented the image and language, and 19% who neither saw the image nor heard the 
language, attributed ignorance to God, χ2(1, N = 61) = 5.16, p = .023. Because this one 
effect of image did not vary between age groups—i.e., in a 3 (age group) X 2 
(image+language vs. no-image+language) ANOVA there was no interaction between 
age and image, F(2,55) = .35, ns, ηp
2 
= .01—and because of modest sample sizes, we 
combined both groups of children in our main analyses. 
In the following analyses, ―correct knowledge‖ and ―correct beliefs‖ refer to 
judgments that an agent knows what is actually in the boxes (for the false-belief task, 
marbles; for the knowledge-ignorance task, a frog). ―Ignorance‖ and ―false beliefs‖ refer 
to judgments that an agent is mistaken about the contents of the boxes (for the 
knowledge-ignorance task, that the agent thinks nothing is inside; for the false-belief task, 
that the agent thinks crayons are inside). Initial analyses assessed whether some children 
concurrently attributed human-like, fallible mental states to normal humans and to 
extraordinary beings, as expected under an anthropomorphism hypothesis. Indeed, many 
children attributed ignorance or false beliefs to each of the special agents—God, Mr. 
Smart, and Heroman—and those who did so also attributed false beliefs and ignorance to 
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the girl and mom at levels above chance—God: χ2s(1) > 9.30, ps < .01; Mr. Smart: χ2s(1) 
> 9.30, ps < .01; Heroman: χ2s(1) > 3.50, ps < .06. Thus, children consistently attributed 
limited mental capacities to all agents.  
Of focal interest was whether a pattern of attributing human-like capacities to 
―special‖ agents would be common when children began to understand that humans may 
hold fallible mental states. Thus, initially, we examined children‘s judgments to find 
developmental periods during which children first began attributing ignorance and false 
beliefs, respectively, to ordinary humans (their mom and the girl)—constitution of the 
‗middle‘ age groups for both tasks were based on these data, their judgments of ordinary 
humans. For the oldest age groups, we identified immediately subsequent periods during 
which children consistently attributed accurate knowledge or beliefs, respectively, to 
God.  Because children often reach an understanding of ignorance and false beliefs at 
different points in ToM development (Wellman & Liu, 2004), it was important to create 
separate age groupings for the knowledge-ignorance task and false-belief task. Based 
upon this preliminary analysis, we divided children into three age-groups for the 
knowledge-ignorance task: 15 in the young group (37.9-51.0 months; M = 45.6), 20 in 
the middle group (51.2–59.6 months; M = 55.9), and 26 in the oldest group (59.7–76.5 
months; M = 64.2); and for the false-belief task: 23 in the young group (37.9–55.4 
months; M = 48.3), 12 in the middle group (55.6–59.7 months; M = 57.7), and 26 in the 
oldest group (59.7–76.5 months; M = 64.2). Thus, the middle age group for the 
knowledge-ignorance task is younger than the middle age group for the false-belief task 
(consistent with the meta-analysis of Wellman & Liu, 2004, as well as the findings of 
Lane et al., 2010). 
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Judgments 
Figures 2-1 and 2-2 depict the percentage of children who attributed ignorance 
and false beliefs to each agent, by age group. An initial repeated-measures ANOVA for 
children‘s attributions of ignorance with age as a between-subjects factor (3: young, 
middle, old), and agent as a within-subjects factor (6: mom, girl, Mr. Smart, Heroman, 
cat, God), revealed significant main effects for age (F(2, 58) = 9.66, p < .001, ηp
2
=.25), 
and agent (F(5, 54) = 10.43, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .49), and a significant interaction between age 
and agent, F(10, 108) = 2.16, p < .05, ηp
2 =.17. A separate ANOVA assessing children‘s 
attributions of false beliefs to the five agents (the cat was not included in the false-belief 
tasks) revealed similar effects of age (F(2, 58) = 10.48, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .27), and agent 
(F(4, 55) = 11.63, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .46), and a significant interaction between age and 
agent, F(8, 110) = 3.23, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .19. 
These interactions were explored in individual, repeated-measures ANOVAs for 
each age group, revealing that for the youngest children there were no differences 
between agents in children‘s attributions of ignorance (F(5, 10) = 1.63, ns, ηp
2 
= .20) or 
false beliefs (F(4, 19) = 1.26, ns, ηp
2 
= .16); young children attributed correct mental 
states to all agents at levels significantly greater than chance (ts > 2.80, ps < .05). 
Compared to the youngest children, those in the middle age-groups attributed ignorance 
more often to the girl, Mom, God, and Mr. Smart (ts(33) > 2.03, ps < .05, Cohen‘s ds 
>.70), and attributed false beliefs more often to the girl, Mom, and God (ts(33) > 3.03, ps 
< .01, Cohen‘s ds > .95). There were, however, no differences between the youngest and 
middle groups in attributions of correct mental states (i.e., the containers‘ actual contents) 
to the agents with exceptional perception—Heroman and the cat. 
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Within the middle age-groups, children selectively attributed ignorance (F(5, 15) 
= 3.13, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .51) and false beliefs (F(4, 8) = 3.29, p = .07, ηp
2 
= .62) to the 
different agents, as did children in the oldest age-groups for the knowledge-ignorance 
task (F(5, 21) = 13.05, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .76) and the false-belief task, F(4, 22) = 8.67, p < 
.001, ηp
2 
= .61. Specifically, children in the middle groups differentiated between the 
correct mental states of Heroman and the cat, and the fallible mental states of ordinary 
humans (mom and the girl), (for knowledge, ts(19) > 2.90, ps < .01, Cohen‘s ds > 1.30; 
for beliefs ts(11) > 2.34, ps < .05, Cohen‘s ds > 1.40). But children in the middle groups 
generally did not differentiate between the mental states of the ordinary humans (mom 
and the girl) and the mental states of God (to whom more than half of the children 
attributed ignorance or false-beliefs). Across multiple comparisons between God and the 
ordinary humans, just one—mom versus God for the false-belief task—was significant, 
t(11) = 2.35, p < .05, Cohen‘s d =1.41. Only the oldest children (59 months and older) 
consistently differentiated between the correct knowledge and beliefs of God and the 
fallible knowledge and beliefs of mom and the girl, (ts(25) > 4.04, ps < .001, Cohen‘s ds 
> 1.60). In these respects, our data mimic those of Lane and colleagues (2010). In 
contrast to those data on children from non-religious schools, however, these religiously-
schooled children in both middle and older groups attributed correct knowledge and 
beliefs to Mr. Smart, unlike mom and the girl, ts > 2.66, ps < .05, Cohen‘s ds > 1.50.    
Parametric statistics were used in these focal analyses because ANOVAs are 
robust against violations of assumptions of normality for such data, and indeed may be 
preferable in repeated-measures designs using dichotomous data (Seeger & Gabrielsson, 
1968). Non-parametric results further confirm our core findings. In these analyses, the 
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overall effects for agent remained significant for knowledge-ignorance judgments 
(Cochran‘s Q = 78.61, p < .001), and for false-belief judgments (Cochran‘s Q = 60.15, p 
< .001). Significant differences in judgments of ignorance and false-beliefs between the 
youngest and middle age-groups were replicated using Mann-Whitney U tests (Us ≤ 
107.50, Zs ≥ 1.95, ps ≤ .05). And within-age-group differences in children‘s attributions 
of ignorance or false-beliefs to pairs of agents (e.g., Mom versus Mr. Smart) were 
replicated using Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests (Zs ≥ 2.00, ps < .05).  
Justifications 
Children‘s justifications clarify the reasoning used in making their judgments. We 
focus on three contrasting ―special‖ agents: Heroman (whose special vision was 
described), Mr. Smart (who was described as having an extraordinary mind, but no 
specific exceptional perceptual mechanism), and God (about whom we told children 
nothing). Justifications for correct knowledge and beliefs are particularly revealing 
because they address which (if any) extraordinary capacities children attributed to these 
agents. Table 2-2 presents data on the primary ways in which children justified these 
three agents‘ correct knowledge and beliefs. The column with the mean ages depicts an 
age-graded trend in children‘s justifications: at younger ages, children cited reality (e.g., 
―There are marbles inside the box‖, ―There is a frog‖) or provided uninformative answers 
(e.g., ―Because‖, ―I don‘t know‖), at a somewhat older age children cited agents‘ 
adequate perceptual or mental capacities (e.g., ―He saw it‖, ―She knows‖), and at the 
oldest ages children made specific reference to agents‘ exceptional perceptual or 
extraordinary mental abilities (e.g., ―He can see through the box‖, ―He‘s super smart‖).  
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Children could offer different types of justifications for each of the three ‗special‘ 
agents, and so to assess whether these age trends were statistically significant, we split 
children into two independent groups for both of the tasks: (1) Those children who 
referred to reality or provided uninformative answers (and who never cited 
exceptional/extraordinary mental or perceptual capacities); and (2) Those children who 
cited exceptional/extraordinary mental or perceptual capacities (and who never cited 
reality or provided uninformative answers). For the false-belief task, 85% of the children 
fell into one of the two groups, and children who provided uninformative or reality-based 
justifications were significantly younger (M age = 50.02, SD = 7.39) than children who 
cited extraordinary mental or perceptual abilities (M age = 60.62, SD = 6.49), t(50) = 
5.49, p < .001, Cohen‘s d = 1.52. For the knowledge-ignorance task, 80% of the children 
fit into one of the two groups, and children who cited reality or provided uninformative 
answers were again significantly younger (M age = 51.51, SD = 8.97) than children who 
explicitly cited extraordinary mental or perceptual capacities (M age = 60.45, SD = 5.63), 
t(47) = 4.30, p < .001, Cohen‘s d = 1.19. Thus, although the youngest and oldest groups 
of children both attributed ‗correct‘ mental states to the special agents, they evidenced 
very different reasoning, with the youngest children displaying a reality bias and the 
oldest children demonstrating an appreciation for the agents‘ particular mental and 
perceptual powers. 
Religiously-Schooled Versus Secularly-Schooled Children 
The tasks and procedures used here are identical to those used by Lane and 
colleagues (2010) for 56 children attending secular preschools (ages 40 to 73 months; M 
age = 54 months). Across both samples, 77 parents (66%) completed a questionnaire on 
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their children‘s religious exposure—38 parents (62%) for the current religiously-schooled 
sample, and 39 parents (70%) for Lane et al.‘s secularly-schooled sample. Using a scale 
from 1 (Never) to 5 (Daily), those parents in the current religiously-schooled sample 
reported that their children were exposed to significantly more media (stories, movies, 
music, games) about God (M = 3.29, SD = .93) than did parents of secularly-schooled 
children from Lane et al. (M = 1.99, SD = .96), t(75) = 6.07, p < .001, Cohen‘s d = 1.37. 
Moreover, parents of the religiously-schooled children reported that their children more 
frequently attended a place of worship (M = 3.45, SD = 1.03) than the secularly-schooled 
children from Lane et al. (M = 2.26, SD = 1.35), t(75) = 4.34, p < .001, Cohen‘s d = .99.  
These parental data help confirm that school attended (religious vs. secular) was a 
reliable proxy for children‘s overall exposure to concepts of God. Moreover, the identical 
procedures used in the two studies allow some informative comparisons based on 
religious exposure. Comparisons across all conditions for the two groups of children 
(religious vs. secularly schooled) would be problematic because the children came from 
different communities and the age ranges indentified for the critical ‗middle age‘ children 
are different for the religiously- and secularly-schooled groups. Nonetheless, several 
focal comparisons are possible. In particular, while trends and results are largely parallel 
in both studies for most agents, there are some key differences, especially for Mr. Smart. 
First, using the same age range for the middle group as that used by Lane and colleagues 
(2010) (for knowledge-ignorance: 49.5 to 54.5 months; for false-belief: 52.5 to 58.9 
months), religiously-schooled children in this middle age-group attributed correct mental 
states (knowledge and beliefs of the containers‘ actual contents) to Mr. Smart (but not 
God) significantly above chance: χ2(1, n = 9) = 5.44, p < .05 for knowledge;  χ2(1, 
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n = 14) = 7.14, p < .01 for beliefs; whereas similarly-aged secularly-schooled children 
attributed fallible mental states to Mr. Smart, just as they did for mom, the girl, and God. 
Further, religiously-schooled children in this age range were much more likely to 
attribute correct knowledge and beliefs to Mr. Smart (Mann-Whitney Us < 60.00, Zs > 
2.78, ps < .01) than were their secularly-schooled peers. They were also somewhat more 
likely to attribute correct knowledge and beliefs to God (Mann-Whitney Us < 77.00, 
Zs > 1.97, ps < .05). 
Beyond using school as a proxy for religious exposure, we also more directly 
gauged children‘s religious exposure by their scores on our Knowledge of God measure. 
These data, yielding a score of 0-4 summarizing children's knowledge of God, were 
available for every child in both studies (n = 117). On this Knowledge of God measure, 
religiously-schooled children in the current study scored significantly higher (M = 2.56, 
SD = 1.38) than secularly-schooled children in Lane et al. (M = 1.88, SD = 1.67), t(115) = 
2.41, p < .05, Cohen‘s d = .44. Of the religiously-schooled children, 79% received scores 
greater than 1 (provided details about God), and 56% received scores of 3 or 4 
(mentioned God‘s exceptional abilities). In contrast, only 59% of the secularly-schooled 
children from Lane et al. (2010) received a score of 1 or greater and only 37% received 
scores of 3 or 4.  
Children‘s knowledge of God not only further validates the group differences in 
religious exposure, it provides an additional way to consider how exposure to religious 
instruction influenced children‘s responses on our tasks. Collapsing across data from both 
the religious and secular samples, we assessed the relation between children‘s knowledge 
of God and their attributions of ignorance and false beliefs to three of the ‗special‘ 
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agents: God, Mr. Smart, and Heroman. For both tasks, Pearson correlations indicated that 
children‘s knowledge of God predicted their attributions of correct mental states to the 
three agents, but only among children who understood the constraints of human minds 
(i.e., who attributed ignorance or false beliefs, respectively, to both the girl and Mom). 
Thus, for children who attributed false beliefs to Mom and the girl, knowledge of God 
predicted attributions of correct beliefs to God (r(55) = .50, p < .001), to Mr. Smart 
(r(55) = .35, p < .01), and to Heroman, r(55) =.45, p < .001. Similarly, among children 
who attributed ignorance to Mom and the girl, knowledge of God predicted attributions 
of correct knowledge to God (r(65) = .45, p < .001), and Heroman (r(65) = .24, p = .05); 
for Mr. Smart the trend was in the expected direction, albeit non-significant, r(65) = .20. 
We next assessed relations between children‘s knowledge of God and the 
justifications they offered when considering the mental states of the other two special 
agents, Heroman and Mr. Smart. For each of the five most often used categories—
extraordinary mental abilities, exceptional perception, adequate abilities, reality-based 
reasoning, and uninformative reasoning—children were given a point if they used that 
justification for either Heroman or Mr. Smart on the false-belief task, and a point if they 
used that justification for either agent on the knowledge-ignorance task (scores for each 
of the five justification categories could range from 0 to 2). Controlling for age, 
children‘s knowledge of God predicted less use of uninformative justifications (r(114) = -
.19, p < .05), marginally fewer references to adequate abilities (r(114) = -.16, p = .09), 
and focally, greater reference to exceptional perception (r(114) = .24, p < .01) as well as 
extraordinary mental abilities (r(114) = .25, p < .01). In sum, more sophisticated 
knowledge of God‘s abilities predicted greater reference to exceptional or extraordinary 
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capacities for other special agents, and this was not merely a function of other age-related 
developments.  
Discussion 
 Human social cognition is characterized by an ability to consider the ordinary 
minds of fellow humans as well as the extraordinary minds of non-human and 
superhuman beings (Boyer, 1996). Several recent studies suggest that the route through 
which children come to appreciate such extraordinary minds is best described as 
anthropomorphic. Initially, very young children treat all minds the same way in that they 
fail to understand the distinction between (potentially fallible) mental states and reality. 
Thus, if required to judge others‘ knowledge or beliefs they merely report states of reality 
for ordinary humans and for extraordinary agents. Second, and critically, when children 
begin to appreciate certain limitations of human epistemic states (e.g., false beliefs) they 
attribute those same cognitive constraints to most other agents, including supernatural 
agents (Giménez-Dasí et al., 2005; Lane et al., 2010; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007). The 
current study revealed this overall pattern of results from children who were raised in 
specifically religious contexts and who were knowledgeable about God, using methods 
that help to resolve discrepancies in prior results. The detailed findings go beyond 
confirming an early childhood anthropomorphism, however, to shed light on ways in 
which socio-cultural input about agents with supernatural mental capacities (i.e., 
exposure to knowledge about God) influences an early appreciation for extraordinary 
mental abilities. 
A strict anthropomorphism account would claim that young children think of God 
(and all other special agents) in terms of human capacities and do so throughout the 
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preschool years and well beyond (Piaget, 1969). Much recent data, including our own, 
contradict any such strict account by demonstrating that 4- and 5-year-olds often allow 
some agents certain non-human capacities, as is first apparent for exceptional perceptual 
capacities (our Heroman and cat, but see also Richert & Barrett, 2005). As we have 
noted, however, one key issue concerns children at transitional points when they are 
beginning to acknowledge particular limits of human mental capacities. Although they 
espouse preparedness rather than anthropomorphism, Richert and Barrett (2005) also 
adopt this view when they say that, if the anthropomorphism account is correct, then 
―when children understand that humans have limited perspectives, they will also attribute 
limited perspectives to God and other nonhumans…a 3-year-old‘s apparently accurate 
representation of God will begin to disintegrate as he or she acquires a ‗theory of mind‘‖ 
(p. 292). The current study, along with others (Giménez-Dasí et al., 2005; Lane et al., 
2010; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007), lends support to just such an anthropomorphism 
hypothesis.  
Our evidence from children‘s justifications reveals that, much like secularly-
schooled children (Lane et al., 2010), young religiously-schooled children‘s failure on 
false-belief and knowledge-ignorance tasks reflects an early reality bias, not an 
appreciation for extraordinary mental abilities. That is, very young children simply 
reference conditions in the world, reality, to infer others‘ mental states, without 
considering others‘ mental limits (like false beliefs) or mental capacities (like 
omniscience). Further, the current data demonstrate that, much like children from secular 
schools, religiously-schooled children who are beginning to appreciate certain limitations 
of human minds (ignorance and false beliefs) typically also attribute those constraints to 
78 
 
agents whom they are raised to believe ‗know everything‘—in this case, the Judeo-
Christian God. We focus on God here, for the moment, because Barrett and colleagues in 
articulating their preparedness account claim that children should always ―resist treating 
God like a human.‖ Further, they claim that it is ―quite easy for young children to 
represent God as different from humans‖ (Richert & Barrett, 2005, pp. 292-293). On the 
contrary, with regard to God in particular, data from the current study provide compelling 
evidence that when children begin to understand the cognitive limitations of humans, 
they typically apply those same limitations to God, and this applies even to religiously-
exposed children. Only later, at around age 5-years did religiously-exposed children 
reliably differentiate between humans‘ fallible mental abilities and inaccurate mental 
states versus God‘s less fallible abilities and states. These results suggest that, in their 
everyday reasoning, even children who are raised in religious settings often initially 
understand God‘s mind as constrained and fallible, very similar to their understanding of 
ordinary human minds. Indeed, in their everyday reasoning, even adults who profess 
beliefs in God‘s extraordinary capacities tend to think of God as being subject to 
ordinary, human-like perceptual and mental constraints (Barrett & Keil, 1996). 
However, our results also speak to the important influence of socio-cultural input, 
as indexed by religious exposure, in children‘s conceptual development and suggest that, 
with guidance, even quite young children can consider some agents‘ minds as less 
fallible. Four-year-olds in this religiously-exposed sample, just as secularly-schooled 
children in the earlier study (Lane et al., 2010), attributed accurate knowledge and beliefs 
to agents with exceptional perceptual abilities (e.g., Heroman), and, moreover, 
specifically referred to special perceptual abilities when justifying why these agents hold 
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privileged information. As described earlier, this may be, in part, a product of children‘s 
exposure to media about certain agents‘ exceptional perception (e.g., Superman‘s x-ray 
vision) from a very early age.  
More novel and intriguing, religiously-exposed children in this study as young as 
4-years evidenced an early appreciation for extraordinary mental abilities in their 
responses to Mr. Smart, an agent whose mental prowess they were first primed and then 
reminded about (Mr. Smart ―knows everything‖). This contrasts with the secularly-
schooled children studied by Lane and colleagues (2010) who received the same 
instructions and reminders about Mr. Smart. Thus, consistent exposure to ideas about the 
extraordinary mental and perceptual abilities of one agent—the Judeo-Christian God—
may have facilitated children‘s understanding of Mr. Smart when children were 
specifically instructed and reminded he ―knows everything.‖  This occurred even though 
religious exposure had not yet resulted in children‘s spontaneous attribution of 
extraordinary mental capacities to God. Thus, at 4-years, an understanding that 
extraordinary agents can have extraordinary knowledge (know the contents of containers 
without perceiving those contents) had not yet reached a level of ―intuitive fluency‖ 
(Shweder et al., 2006, p. 733). These data suggest that children‘s anthropomorphism 
strongly influenced their ability to apply the culturally/religiously-provided information 
about "God", but that their on-going religious instruction nonetheless facilitated their 
ability to apply information about extraordinary mental states when that information was 
directly and immediately provided. This could account for their relative sensitivity to 
information that we explicitly provided about Mr. Smart‘s extraordinary mind. 
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Notably, the difference between the religiously-schooled children in this study 
and the secularly-schooled children in a previous study (Lane et al., 2010) with respect to 
Mr. Smart (and even somewhat to God) was found for children in the middle age groups; 
that is, those children who were beginning to appreciate certain capacities and limitations 
of ordinary human minds. Indeed, among children who understood the fallible mental 
capacities of the girl and mom, children‘s knowledge of God predicted attributions of 
correct mental states to Heroman, Mr. Smart, and God. Thus, this period—when children 
are beginning to appreciate the limits of human minds—may also represent a period 
when children are particularly receptive to cultural input about extraordinary capacities 
that exceed those particular limits, and can begin to incorporate this information into their 
existing theory-of-mind.  
In sum, the current study reveals that developing concepts of extraordinary 
perceptual and psychological abilities are a function of both children‘s conceptual 
architecture and the socio-cultural input that children receive; and that conceptual change 
is not a simple product of the two. Importantly, the impact of socio-cultural input on 
conceptual development varies depending upon children‘s existing conceptual structure 
(see also Evans, 2001). One way to describe the current results, therefore, is that socio-
cultural input is assimilated only to the extent that children‘s current conceptual 
structure—in this case, children‘s theory-of-mind—is able to integrate that input. Taken 
together with the data from Lane et al. (2010), we provide evidence that, although 
children may not be prepared to understand extraordinary mental capacities, at a certain 
point in theory-of-mind development (at around 4-years in this population), socio-cultural 
input can facilitate an early appreciation for extraordinary minds. This would represent a 
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developmental version of Sperber‘s reasoning about the ―epidemiology of beliefs,‖ with a 
focus on how ―previously internalized cultural representations are a key factor in one‘s 
susceptibility to new representations‖ (Sperber, 1996, p. 84). Children‘s developing 
understanding of ordinary minds makes them susceptible, at key junctures, to socio-
culturally provided information about extraordinary minds. 
A next step in understanding children‘s concepts of extraordinary minds is to 
chart more specifically the intricate interplay between conceptual development and socio-
cultural input over the preschool and early elementary school years. Two lines of research 
seem particularly important for this endeavor. First, although we provide evidence that, 
with cultural assistance, children as young as 4-years can begin to appreciate the 
extraordinary capacities of some agents (e.g., knowing the contents of containers without 
looking inside); children at this age are not evidencing a full-fledged understanding of 
anything like omniscience. Omniscience refers to an agent‘s ability to know everything—
not just the contents of boxes, but also facts about the past and present, an ability to 
foretell the future, an ability to read minds, and much more. Arguably children‘s 
appreciation that some special agents can know contents of containers without seeing 
those contents marks the very beginning of a developing grasp of extraordinary mental 
abilities—the first of many steps involved in achieving an understanding of omniscience. 
Much as a developing understanding of ordinary minds proceeds through a series of 
developmental steps (Wellman & Liu, 2004), so might a developing understanding of 
extraordinary minds. Future research should address when and how children come to 
appreciate that certain extraordinary agents (such as the Judeo-Christian God) can 
possess these other types of knowledge and how the progressive understanding of 
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extraordinary mental capacities undergirds a remarkably counterintuitive understanding 
of total omniscience.  
Second, as detailed in the current study and by Lane et al. (2010) some of these 
developmental transitions may last for only brief periods and are thus difficult to capture 
using cross-sectional data. Thus, a worthwhile next venture is to examine how these 
developments unfold longitudinally, using a microgenetic approach. Such work will shed 
further light on the precise development of supernatural concepts as children are 
beginning to confront the limits of the human mind. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Study 3: Approaching an Understanding of Omniscience  
from the Preschool Years to Early Adulthood 
By the late preschool years, children in many communities throughout the 
world—in Greece, Mexico, Spain, and the United States—can distinguish between the 
minds of ordinary humans and the minds of more extraordinary beings (e.g., Barrett, 
Richert, & Driesenga, 2001; Giménez-Dasí, Guerrero, & Harris, 2005; Knight, Sousa, 
Barrett, & Atran, 2008; Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2010; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007; 
Richert & Barrett, 2005). For example, 5-year-olds understand that an ordinary person 
(e.g., their mother) who has not looked in a novel box will not know its contents, but that 
God will know the box‘s contents. At this age, children can also articulate that God will 
know the box‘s contents because he has a special mind, and children can even apply this 
understanding to a novel being who ―knows everything‖ (Lane et al., 2010; Lane, 
Wellman, & Evans, in press). There is general consensus that data such as these 
demonstrate that children can understand some extraordinary mental capacities by the 
late preschool years. However, there is continued debate about the route through which 
children develop that understanding as well as the extent of children‘s understanding at 
this age.  
On the issue of how 5-year-olds reach an understanding of extraordinary mental 
capacities, there are two broad camps. Some theorists believe that very young children 
are prepared to understand all-knowingness or mental infallibility (e.g., Barrett & 
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Richert, 2003). This position was inspired by research which demonstrates that when 
younger children (3-year-olds) are aware of a certain state of reality—for example, the 
contents of the box described above—they typically over-attribute such knowledge to 
others, including God. Drawing upon this common finding, and the findings that 5-year-
olds also attribute accurate knowledge to God (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001), Barrett and 
Richert surmise that, ―on many properties, young children seem equipped with default 
assumptions that better match theological descriptions of God than adult conceptions of 
people. Three-year-olds assume beliefs and percepts are infallible. They assume greater 
access to background knowledge than humans actually have‖ (2003, p. 309). Others have 
made stronger claims. In a recent CNN.com interview, a Theology faculty member at 
Oxford University recently explained that ―‘Children in particular [find] it very easy to 
think in religious ways,‘ such as believing in God's omniscience‖ (Greene, 2011).  
Other theorists argue against this ―preparedness‖ interpretation, and instead 
endorse a type of anthropomorphism hypothesis, which states that children typically 
think of the capacities of many agents, including extraordinary beings, in ordinary, 
human-like terms. This hypothesis is supported by studies showing that when 3-year-olds 
judge that God or other all-knowing beings are aware of the true contents of the box 
described above, they justify such judgments by citing reality (―That‘s what‘s in there‖); 
they rarely mention those agents‘ mental abilities at all—in other words, they rarely 
consider individuals‘ capacities and constraints on these tasks. In contrast, 5-year-olds 
overwhelmingly explain that God will know the box‘s contents because he has a special 
mind or because he has special vision (e.g., Lane et al., 2010; Study 1 in this 
dissertation). Thus, what 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds are doing on these tasks is quite 
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different. Moreover, several studies now demonstrate that 4-year-olds, who are just 
beginning to report that ordinary humans will not know the contents of the box, often 
report that God will be ignorant as well (e.g., Giménez-Dasí et al., 2005; Lane et al., 
2010, in press; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007). Thus, when children first consider how an 
individual's mental capacities function in a particular situation, they often over-attribute 
ordinary limitations to extraordinary beings, even to God. 
Given these data, it might be easy to conclude that by 5 years, children  are 
demonstrating an understanding of omniscience—they attribute incorrect knowledge to 
ordinary humans (e.g., their mother) while simultaneously attributing accurate knowledge 
to God. While 5-year-olds‘ performance in these studies is impressive, I argue that it does 
not reflect an understanding of omniscience. Omniscience refers to one‘s ability to know 
everything; not just ordinary information about the here-and-now, but all facts about the 
past and present, an ability to foretell the future, an ability to read minds, and much more. 
An omniscient agent also knows more about a domain of knowledge than the world‘s 
greatest expert on that subject. However, most of these studies have only demonstrated 
that children attribute to extraordinary beings certain readily-accessible information about 
the here-and-now—for example, the contents of closed containers, or the appearance or 
smell of things that are placed far away. Moreover, in most of these paradigms, children 
themselves possess the knowledge. Perhaps children‘s appreciation of some special 
agents' access to such information marks the very beginning of a developing appreciation 
for extraordinary mental abilities—the first of many steps. Thus far, no data speak to 
children‘s ability to entertain increasingly counterintuitive concepts of extraordinary 
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minds, like an omniscient being‘s ability to predict the future, read minds, or outsmart 
experts.  
In Study 3, I assess preschoolers‘, elementary-school children‘s, and adults‘ 
understanding of the breadth and depth of an all-knowing being‘s knowledge. By 
―breadth‖, I am referring to the types or domains of knowledge that someone possesses; 
here I focus on an all-knowing agent‘s knowledge of facts about the past, present, and 
future, as well as knowledge of others‘ personal information (for example, someone 
else‘s thoughts, preferences, and actions). These forms of knowledge were chosen 
because children‘s attribution of such knowledge to extraordinary beings may mark 
different points in a developing understanding of extraordinary minds. While younger 
preschoolers may grant an all-knowing agent knowledge about certain facts in the past 
and present—indeed on standard knowledge-ignorance and false-belief tasks, 
preschoolers clearly understand that ordinary people possess information about the past 
and present—they may resist the idea that an agent can possess knowledge of the future. 
Young children are also developing an understanding of the private nature of one‘s 
beliefs and desires. By 4 years, children understand that mental phenomena—such as 
desires, beliefs, knowledge, and dreams—are contained in one‘s brain or mind, and that 
other people do not have direct access to the contents of people‘s minds (for reviews, see 
Miller, 2009; Wellman & Johnson, 2008). Thus, young children, who are developing a 
firm understanding of the private nature of the mind, may be particularly unwilling to 
overturn their assumptions about the mind to accept that any agent has access to others‘ 
personal mental states.  
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I also assess participants‘ understanding of the depth of an all-knowing being‘s 
knowledge. By ―depth‖, I am referring to the amount of knowledge that one possesses 
within a domain. To assess this understanding, I examine when children begin to 
appreciate that an omniscient agent‘s knowledge surpasses experts‘ knowledge within the 
experts‘ domains of expertise. To understand this, children must make the distinction 
between knowing a lot about a specific domain (i.e., being expert) and knowing 
everything there is to know about every domain (being omniscient). Children‘s 
understanding of expertise is well-researched, with prior studies indicating that 
preschool-age children appreciate that experts know more than others about specific 
domains—for example, doctors know more about health than do mechanics (Lutz & Keil, 
2002). It is unclear just how deep young children consider experts‘ knowledge to be. If 
preschoolers conceptualize an expert as being all-knowing about a specific domain, they 
may be unwilling to accept that anyone can hold more information about a domain than 
an expert. Thus, addressing how children differentiate between experts and omniscient 
beings promises to address when children understand that experts‘ domain-specific 
knowledge is substantial but not necessarily complete. Even if young children understand 
that an expert is ignorant about certain domain-specific information, in order to 
understand omniscience, they must also conceptualize that another being can possesses 
more domain-specific knowledge than an expert, even in the absence of deliberate 
training.  
If, by the late preschool years, children fully understand omniscience, they should 
easily grasp the breadth and depth of an all-knowing agent‘s knowledge—such a being 
can predict the future, can read minds, knows more than experts about every domain, and 
88 
 
so on. However, much as a developing understanding of ordinary minds proceeds across 
a series of developmental milestones (Wellman & Liu, 2004), so may a developing 
understanding of extraordinary minds. As discussed, during early childhood, children are 
developing initial concepts of the nature and capacities of ordinary minds—for example, 
that the contents of the mind are private and that some types of people are more 
knowledgeable than others—and so may be particularly unwilling to override their 
newly-formed intuitions about the mind. In addition to examining when children can 
conceptualize these components of omniscience, I also ask whether children think that a 
being with these capacities can exist. 
Another goal of the current studies is to identify contextual and cognitive factors 
that support children‘s developing understanding of omniscience. As demonstrated by 
Lane and colleagues (in press; Study 2 in this dissertation), children raised in contexts in 
which ideas about omniscient beings are more prominent—for example, children raised 
with the idea of a Judeo-Christian God—develop an initial understanding of 
extraordinary mental capacities somewhat earlier than children who are not as heavily 
exposed to such ideas. Moreover, Lane and colleagues (in press) demonstrated that 
children‘s knowledge of God predicts attributions of privileged knowledge to 
extraordinary beings, but only among children who have a robust representational theory 
of mind.  In the current study, I examine how exposure to religious contexts and ideas 
about the Judeo-Christian God relates to children‘s developing understanding of 
omniscience, and I examine whether such relations vary by age.  
An understanding of omniscience may also be contingent upon the development 
of other cognitive competencies that are not in place until later in childhood. For 
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example, it is not until age 8 that children begin to appreciate that numbers are 
unlimited—that the amount of numbers exceeds even extremely large finite quantities 
(Falk, 1994; Falk & Ben-Lavy, 1989). If a similar concept of ‗unlimited‘ underlies 
children‘s understanding of omniscience, it may not be until middle childhood when 
children appreciate that all-knowing agents‘ knowledge surpasses even the extremely 
large amount of knowledge held by experts. However, as conceptual development 
proceeds at different rates and timings in different domains (Wellman & Gelman, 1998; 
Gelman & Kalish, 2006), these developments may be unrelated. Another capacity that 
may play an important role in children‘s understanding of omniscience is their ability to 
imagine improbable phenomena. Preschoolers are particularly doubtful that improbable 
phenomena, which they have not personally seen, can actually occur (Shtulman & Carey, 
2007); and this is equally true of children‘s reasoning about biological, psychological, 
and physical phenomena (Shtulman, 2009). Because children do not interact with all-
knowing beings, they may be especially skeptical that someone can actually be all-
knowing. In the current studies, I examine how both children‘s understanding of 
limitlessness and their ability to imagine the improbable relate to their understanding of 
omniscience, and how such relations vary across development. 
These issues will be addressed in two studies. Study 3A examines a developing 
understanding of the breadth and depth of all-knowing beings‘ knowledge in a small 
sample of preschoolers, elementary-school children, and adults. Study 3A also examines 
whether children (and adults) believe such beings can really exist. Study 3B addresses 
these same issues, but with a refined protocol designed to scaffold children‘s 
understanding of extraordinary mental capacities and thus assesses the limits of 
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children‘s understanding at different points in development. Study 3B additionally 
examines the roles of socio-cultural input and other cognitive developments in facilitating 
an understanding of omniscience. Study 3B includes a larger sample, permitting more 
fine-grained analysis of the development of an understanding of extraordinary minds. 
Study 3A 
Study 3A is an initial investigation of the breadth and depth of knowledge that 
children and adults grant to a being that they are taught ―knows everything about 
everything.‖ Study 3A also examines the extent to which children and adults believe that 
all-knowing beings can really exist.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 21 preschoolers (ages 3 years, 8 months – 6 years) and 19 
elementary-school children (6 years – 12 years, 8 months) who were attended schools or 
camp in southeastern Michigan. One 3-year-old was not fluent in English and one 4-year-
old did not want to complete the interview, resulting in a preschool sample of 19. 
Twenty-four adults (18 years – 21 years, 8 months) also participated, all of whom were 
recruited through the University‘s Introduction to Psychology Subject Pool. Participants 
were primarily White and of middle- to upper-middle-class socioeconomic status.  
Procedure and Measures 
Understanding experts’ depth of knowledge. First, participants were presented 
four experts—a doctor, mechanic, chef, and pilot—on laminated cards and told what each 
expert does (for expert images and introductions, see Appendix B). For each of the four 
experts, participants were asked how much each expert knows about their respective 
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domain; for example, ―How much does a doctor know about being healthy? Some things, 
lots of things, or everything?‖ Half of the participants received the options as ordered 
above, the other half were asked if the experts know ―Everything, lots of things, or some 
things?‖ As a visual aid, participants were shown a graph with three vertical bars 
reflecting each of the three amounts; younger children often responded to the questions 
by pointing to the respective bars. For these questions, and for all questions that follow, if 
a participant responded ―I don‘t know‖ or did not offer an answer, he or she was 
encouraged to provide an answer (e.g., ―You can answer however you like; there are no 
wrong answers‖, the question was repeated, and, for closed-ended questions, response 
options were given). 
Understanding domain-specific expertise. Following Lutz and Keil (2002), 
participants‘ understanding of domain-specific expertise was assessed by asking them 
eight questions in which they compared the knowledge held by the different experts (e.g., 
"Who knows more about why you get a runny nose, a doctor or a mechanic?"; for the full 
pool of questions, see Appendix C). Participants could respond by naming or pointing to 
the expert. 
Understanding an all-knowing beings’ breadth of knowledge. Participants were 
then introduced to Ms. Smart (for boys, Mr. Smart) a character who "knows everything 
about everything" (see Appendix D), and were asked six closed-ended questions 
concerning the types of knowledge that Ms. Smart possesses. These included three 
questions about whether Ms. Smart would know non-personal information about the past, 
present, and future, as well as three questions about whether Ms. Smart would know 
personal information—about the child‘s preferences, thoughts, and life events (for 
92 
 
closed-ended questions, see Table 3-1). Open-ended data were also collected. For two 
closed-ended questions—whether Ms. Smart would know about the future and would 
know the child‘s thoughts—if participants granted Ms. Smart knowledge, they were 
asked ―How did she know?‖ and if participants denied Ms. Smart knowledge, they were 
asked, ―Why not?‖  
Understanding an all-knowing being’s depth of knowledge. To understand 
omniscience, one must appreciate that an all-knowing being knows even more about a 
specific domain than an expert—an omniscient beings‘ knowledge is so broad that it 
encapsulates all experts‘ knowledge and then some. To examine participants 
understanding of the depth of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge, across 16 questions, they 
compared the knowledge held by the experts and Ms. Smart (e.g., ―Who knows more 
about why you get a runny nose, a doctor or Ms. Smart?‖). Participants could respond by 
naming or pointing to the expert or Ms. Smart. Four questions were asked for each of the 
four experts, and experts were presented one at a time. To limit the extent to which the 
experts‘ mere appearance (rather than their actual knowledge) affected participants‘ 
responses, images of the experts and Ms. Smart were turned over before asking the 
questions. Eight of these questions referred to knowledge outside of the experts’ domains, 
and eight referred to knowledge within the experts’ domains (for the complete pool of 
questions, see Appendix C). For half of the participants, comparisons between Ms. Smart 
and each expert began with an item within the expert‘s domain; half of the participants 
first received items that were outside of each expert‘s domain. 
Belief that someone can know everything. To gather more information on 
participants‘ understanding of the capacities and constraints of the mind, participants 
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were asked several additional questions about their knowledge of beings with 
extraordinary mental abilities. These questions included, ―Have you ever heard of anyone 
else who knows everything about everything?‖ and if so, ―Who?‖; and ―Do you think 
someone can really know everything about everything?‖ 
Coding. A coding system for all open-ended responses was developed through an 
iterative process. These included responses to open-ended questions concerning Ms. 
Smart‘s breadth of knowledge, participants‘ knowledge of anyone who knows everything 
about everything, the types of knowledge those individuals would possess, and whether 
someone can really know everything about everything. Lane and a research assistant 
developed a preliminary coding system, individually coded small subsamples of data, and 
compared coding. Coding discrepancies were discussed and the system was modified as 
needed to limit future discrepancies. To establish inter-rater reliability with the final 
coding system, data were categorized independently by Lane and the research assistant 
until a criterion of at least 85% inter-rater agreement was reached for each question, 
across 20% of the data (12 interviews). Remaining discrepancies were discussed by both 
coders and resolved. Once this criterion had been met, the remaining open-ended 
responses were coded by the research assistant.   
Results 
In the following, I first examine participants‘ understanding of expertise—their 
understanding of the depth of experts‘ knowledge as well as their understanding of the 
types of information contained within experts‘ domains of expertise. Next, and focally, I 
assess participants‘ understanding of the breadth of an all-knowing being‘s knowledge 
(by asking about the types of knowledge that Ms. Smart possesses), as well as the depth 
94 
 
of an all-knowing being‘s knowledge (by having participants compare Ms. Smart‘s 
knowledge to that of the experts). Finally, I assess participants‘ beliefs about the 
existence of all-knowing beings. 
Understanding Experts’ Depth of Knowledge 
If children believe that experts are all-knowing about their domain, then it would 
be impossible for anyone (even an omniscient being) to hold more domain-specific 
knowledge than an expert. Thus, it was first necessary to assess how much domain-
specific knowledge children actually attribute to experts. Participants were asked how 
much each of four experts—a doctor, mechanic, pilot, and chef—knows about their 
respective domain. For example, they were asked, ―How much does a doctor know about 
medicine? Some things, lots of things, or everything?‖; with ―some things‖ coded as 1, 
―lots of things‖ coded as 2, and ―everything‖ coded as 3. Using this calculation, an initial 
one-way ANOVA indicated that attributions of knowledge to the experts did not vary by 
age group, F(2, 59) = .37, ns. However, there was a significant age difference in 
participants‘ (incorrectly) attributing knowledge of ―everything‖ to the experts, 
χ2(2) = 8.61, p < .05. Preschoolers attributed knowledge of ―everything‖ to the experts for 
50% of their responses, compared to 39% for elementary school-children and only 24% 
for adults.  
 Participants were next asked to compare the knowledge held by the different 
experts; for example, ―Who knows more about why you get a runny nose, a doctor or 
mechanic?‖ For this task, there were no age differences in correct attributions of 
knowledge to the experts, F(2, 59) = 1.88, p = .16. Children in both age groups 
(preschool: M = 7.58, SD = 1.43; elementary-school: M = 8.00, SD = 0) as well as adults 
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(M = 8.00, SD = 0) correctly identified that experts were more knowledgeable about their 
respective domains (for preschoolers, t(18) = 10.94, p < .001; there was no variability in 
older participants‘ responses, so one-sample t-tests against chance could not be 
conducted). This is consistent with prior research demonstrating that children have an 
initial understanding of expertise by the late preschool years (Lutz & Keil, 2002).  
Understanding an All-Knowing Beings’ Breadth of Knowledge 
 To assess participants‘ understanding of the breath of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge, 
they were asked whether she would know six different types of information (see Table 3-
1). Preschoolers only attributed one type of knowledge to Ms. Smart above chance—
knowledge of where to find the tallest tree in the world; essentially, knowledge of the 
present. Older children additionally granted to Ms. Smart knowledge of their birthday and 
favorite food—both pieces of personal information that are publicly displayed—but not 
knowledge of the child‘s mental states. In contrast, adults typically reported that Ms. 
Smart would know all six pieces of information. Thus, preschoolers were particularly 
conservative in their estimations of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge. This trend becomes 
especially clear when considering who attributed all six pieces of information to Ms. 
Smart—only 16% of preschoolers did so, compared to 63% of older children and 83% of 
adults.  
 Participants were asked to explain their answers for two of the six items: ―Does 
Ms. Smart know who will win the Super Bowl next year?‖ and ―Does Ms. Smart know 
what you‘re thinking right now?‖ Among preschoolers, who typically denied that Ms. 
Smart would know what they are thinking, most (54%) provided uninformative reasoning 
(e.g., ―Because‖ or ―I don‘t know‖) while the remaining children referred to the private 
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nature of the mind (e.g., ―My brain is hidden in my head,‖ ―I didn‘t tell her,‖ ―I‘m not 
talking to her‖) or Ms. Smart‘s inability to access the information (e.g., ―He can‘t see 
us‖). Preschoolers and elementary-school children were equally skeptical of Ms. Smart‘s 
knowledge of the next Super Bowl winner. Among children who denied that Ms. Smart 
would possess this knowledge, the most common explanation was that the event had not 
happened yet (40%) and that Ms. Smart was not capable of acquiring the knowledge 
(20%).  
Understanding an All-Knowing Being’s Depth of Knowledge 
 Information outside of experts’ domains of expertise. To assess whether and at 
what age participants grant greater knowledge to Ms. Smart compared to more 
recognizable experts, participants were asked whether Ms. Smart or the experts would 
know more about information outside of the experts‘ respective domains (see Figure 3-1). 
Attributions of greater knowledge to Ms. Smart differed between the three age groups, 
F(2, 59) = 6.12, p < .01. Compared to preschoolers, elementary-school children (p < .05) 
and adults (p < .01) attributed more knowledge to Ms. Smart on this task, according to 
Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons. However, and importantly, participants in every age 
group attributed more knowledge to Ms. Smart than to the experts (preschool children: 
t(18) = 5.97, p < .001; elementary-school children: t(18) = 14.20, p < .001; adults: 
t(23) = 47.00, p < .001). Thus, participants in each age group were willing to attribute 
greater knowledge to the new being, Ms. Smart, even compared to more familiar experts. 
 Information within experts’ domains of expertise. I next examined whether and at 
what age individuals grant greater knowledge to Ms. Smart within experts‘ domains. This 
task is a more direct test of participants‘ understanding of the depth of Ms. Smart‘s 
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knowledge—in any given domain, Ms. Smart does not just know a lot, she knows 
everything and thus even more than experts. Figure 3-2 depicts participants‘ attributions 
of greater domain-specific information to Ms. Smart compared to the experts. 
Attributions of greater knowledge to Ms. Smart differed significantly between the three 
age groups (F(2, 59) = 9.02, p < .01), with adults attributing to Ms. Smart more of such 
knowledge than did preschoolers (p < .001, according to Tukey HSD pairwise 
comparisons) or elementary-school children (p < .05, according to Tukey HSD pairwise 
comparisons). Analyzed separately, preschoolers typically attributed greater knowledge 
to the experts (t(18) = -4.76, p < .001), elementary-school children were at chance (t(18) 
= -1.33, ns), and adults typically attributed greater knowledge to Ms. Smart (t(23) = 2.29, 
p < .05).  
Conceivably, the order in which participants were asked these questions may 
frame how they conceptualize the depth of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge. Elementary-school 
children attributed greater knowledge to Ms. Smart than to the experts when the first item 
per expert was within the expert‘s domain (M = 4.56, SD = 4.10) rather than outside the 
expert‘s domain (M = 1.40, SD = 2.50), t(12.98) = 1.99, p = .067, with correction for 
unequal variances between groups. Preschoolers‘ and adults‘ responses did not vary by 
question order. 
Belief That Someone Can Really Know Everything 
Before being introduced to Ms. Smart, participants were asked whether they had 
ever heard of anyone who knows everything. Most participants in each age group 
reported that they had not heard of anyone who knows everything. Fewer than half (42%) 
of the preschoolers said ―Yes‖ (binomial p = .65), and this dropped to 21% among 
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elementary-school children (binomial p < .05), and 8% among adults (binomial p < .001). 
A similar developmental pattern emerged when, at the end of the interview, participants 
were asked whether someone can really know everything about everything: 37% of the 
preschoolers said ―Yes‖ (binomial p = .36), 32% of the elementary-school children said 
―Yes‖ (binomial p = .17), and no adults said ―Yes‖ (binomial p < .001). Thus, belief that 
someone can truly know everything is uncommon even among preschoolers. Of the seven 
preschoolers who said that someone could know everything about everything, one child 
mentioned that the knowledge would be acquired (―Being in college‖), three mentioned 
people who are knowledgeable (―Because he [Mr. Smart] knows lots of things‖, ―My 
baby sister knows some stuff‖, ―Because I know everything‖). The remaining three 
preschoolers provided uninformative reasoning (e.g., ―I don‘t know‖). Of the seven 
elementary- school children who reported that someone can know everything about 
everything, all children explained that the knowledge would be acquired (e.g., ―They read 
a lot and get smart‖, ―Maybe they‘re really old and they live the longest and they learned 
a lot more and a lot faster‖). Just one of these children mentioned (additionally) that the 
knowledge might be inherent, ―if they were born with it.‖    
Discussion 
The results of Study 3A demonstrate a slowly emerging understanding of 
omniscience, which seems to progress over many years. Elementary-school children and 
adults granted Ms. Smart knowledge about a variety of domains, including knowledge of 
the past and knowledge of some personal information, like birth dates and preferences. 
However, preschoolers were particularly conservative in their estimations of the breadth 
of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge, only attributing to her knowledge of the here-and-now. 
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Surprisingly, both preschoolers and elementary-school children had difficulty 
conceptualizing the depth of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge, often reporting that experts hold 
more domain-specific information than she does. Most children reported that someone 
cannot really know everything about everything, and those who did explained that 
someone would acquire their knowledge through relatively ordinary means. 
Because there are no prior data addressing these issues, Study 3A provides an 
important start. Of course a legitimate question relevant to a preparedness position, which 
claims not only that young children actually attribute omniscience to ordinary people but 
also that they are prepared to easily understand such a possibility, is whether the methods 
of Study 3A seriously underestimate children's understanding. For this reason, several 
changes were instituted in the next study 3B, including a greater emphasis on Ms. 
Smart‘s extraordinary mind. Study 3B also included additional measures to more 
sensitively assess children‘s understanding of the depth and breadth of an extraordinary 
being‘s knowledge and how it compares to the knowledge of ordinary people. Finally, 
Study 3B also considers cognitive and socio-cultural factors that might facilitate a 
developing understanding of omniscience. 
Study 3B 
In Study 3A, children‘s conservative estimation of the depth of Ms. Smart‘s 
knowledge might be the product of several factors, including: (a) some children‘s 
(particularly young children‘s) intuition that experts know everything about their 
respective domains; (b) not appreciating the depth of information to be known about a 
particular domain, thus reasoning that experts know all there is to know about their 
domains (or that experts and Ms. Smart are equally knowledgeable); (c) a deficit in 
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conceptualizing or applying the concept of ―all-knowingness‖, or (d) if able to 
conceptualize ―all-knowingness‖, a resistance to the idea that someone could really know 
everything and thus a refusal to apply that capacity to Ms. Smart. The youngest children 
were also conservative in the types (or breadth) of knowledge they attributed to Ms. 
Smart, often denying her knowledge of anything other than the here-and-now. This, too, 
may be a product of (c) or (d) above. To address these possibilities, the introductions to 
Ms. Smart and to the experts were modified in several ways in Study 3B.  
To address (a) and (b), participants were offered corrective feedback about the 
depth of experts‘ knowledge. For example, when participants were asked, ―Does a 
mechanic know some things about cars, lots of things about cars, or everything about 
cars?‖, if they responded ―everything‖ they were told, ―No. A mechanic knows lots of 
things about cars, but not everything.‖ To further address (b), for each comparison 
between Ms. Smart and an expert, an additional, broader, question was included (e.g., 
―Who knows more about cars, a mechanic or Ms. Smart‖?). Compared to narrower 
questions (e.g., ―Who know about why some cars go very fast, a mechanic or Ms. 
Smart‖?), these broader questions ask participants to consider a greater amount of 
information and thus participants might think that Ms. Smart‘s all-knowingness gives her 
a particular advantage over the experts. Note that these broader questions used the same 
language as that used in the corrective feedback about experts‘ limited knowledge. For 
half of the children, one of these broad questions was asked first for each comparison 
between Ms. Smart and an expert; the other children received the broad item last in each 
comparison between Ms. Smart and an expert.  
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To address possibilities (c) and (d), Ms. Smart‘s capacities were highlighted and 
elaborated in several ways in Study 3B. Children were told that Ms. Smart was born with 
a ―very, very special brain‖, and she was given a complementary larger cranium (a tactic 
often used by animators to highlight the intelligence of television and movie characters 
such as Jimmy Neutron, Megamind, Stewie from ―Family Guy‖, and Brain from ―Pinky 
and the Brain‖). To further highlight her extraordinariness, a bright glow emanated from 
Ms. Smart in her picture.  To further reinforce the idea that Ms. Smart is indeed all-
knowing, following her introduction, children were asked ―Does Ms. Smart know some 
things, lots of things, or everything?‖ and were provided corrective feedback if needed—
participants who reported that she knows anything less than ―everything‖ were told, ―No. 
Remember, Ms. Smart knows everything about everything‖, while the interviewer spread 
his or her arms.  
In Study 3A, an interesting developmental pattern emerged with respect to the 
types of knowledge that participants granted to Ms. Smart. Preschoolers granted to Ms. 
Smart knowledge of the present, but often denied her knowledge of the past, future, and 
personal information. Elementary school children additionally attributed to Ms. Smart 
knowledge of personal events and preferences, but not knowledge of the child‘s mental 
states or knowledge of the future. However, this pattern raises questions. When a child 
denies that Ms. Smart holds personal knowledge (for example, about the child‘s birth 
date or thoughts), is it because she is ignorant of others‘ personal information in general, 
or just the child’s personal information? To address this, Study 3B included an additional 
complementary set of questions that referred to personal information about others (e.g., 
―Does Ms. Smart know what your dad is thinking right now?‖). Participants were asked 
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whether Ms. Smart knows four forms of personal information—events, behavior, 
preferences, and thoughts. To examine consistency in responses, in Study 3B, 
participants were asked two (rather than one) question about Ms. Smart‘s knowledge of 
non-personal information—facts about the past, present, and future. For example, to 
assess whether participants understood that Ms. Smart holds knowledge about the future, 
they were asked whether she would know about the weather next year and about the 
population next year. Conceivably, the additional measures taken to emphasize Ms. 
Smart‘s extraordinariness might increase children‘s willingness to grant these types of 
knowledge to Ms. Smart.    
Study 3A raised additional questions that I address with Study 3B. First, although 
the youngest children only granted to Ms. Smart one type of knowledge above chance—
readily-accessible information about the here and now—children did grant Ms. Smart 
other forms of knowledge at chance levels. This raises the question of whether children 
were actually responding to these questions randomly or if some children did genuinely 
grant Ms. Smart these other forms of knowledge. A stronger case can be made regarding 
children‘s understanding of extraordinary mental abilities if they simultaneously attribute 
extraordinary knowledge to Ms. Smart but deny that knowledge to a non-extraordinary 
being. To address this issue, in Study 3B participants were additionally asked a set of 
identical questions about an ordinary human—their mother. Their mother serves as a 
particularly good comparison because: (a) their mother was used as an agent by Lane et 
al. (2010; in press), (b) children‘s parents presumably do have access to personal 
information about them (e.g., their favorite food and date of birth), (c) children are 
familiar with their mothers and are thus exposed more often to her ordinary cognitive 
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shortcomings, (d) for Study 3A, some children named family members as people who 
know everything, and (e) it addresses some parents‘ lay intuitions that their children think 
they are all-knowing. 
The development of other cognitive capacities likely supports a developing 
understanding of omniscience, and I consider two such capacities in Study 3B. First, an 
understanding of omniscience may be contingent upon an ability to conceptualize 
extremely large quantities or to conceptualize limitlessness. Conceivably then, an 
understanding of omniscience may share some of the cognitive underpinnings needed to 
represent the concept of infinity. Thus, I use tasks similar to those employed by Falk 
(1994; Falk & Ben-Lavy, 1989) to assess participants‘ understanding of the infiniteness 
of number. It is also possible that a more general ability to imagine improbable 
phenomena might underpin children‘s developing understanding of omniscience—itself 
unlikely (indeed, nonexistent in the natural world). Thus, Study 3B includes additional 
questions similar to those used by Shtulman (2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007) to measure 
children‘s belief in the possibility of improbable events, as well as questions similar to 
those asked by Wellman and Estes (1986), to assess children‘s ability to think about 
unlikely events. An ability to think about unlikely events (a dog that flies) emerges during 
the preschool years (Wellman & Estes, 1986), whereas preschoolers rarely report that 
improbable events (e.g., someone drinking onion juice) are actually possible (Shtulman, 
2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007). Rather, a willingness to entertain the possibility of 
improbable events increases gradually throughout middle and late childhood. 
Conceivably, both of these measures are tapping children‘s ability to imagine unusual 
phenomena—to picture those things happening in their minds or in real life—and thus 
104 
 
may be predictive of children‘s ability to entertain ideas about (improbable) omniscient 
beings.  
Cognitive factors are not solely responsible for children‘s developing 
understanding of ordinary minds and are likely not solely responsible for children‘s 
understanding of extraordinary minds either. As demonstrated by Lane et al. (in press) 
socio-cultural input about beings with extraordinary minds—specifically, exposure to 
ideas about the Judeo-Christian God—can play an important role in this development. 
Thus, for Study 3B, I obtained additional information about participants‘ exposure to 
media about God as well as their religious involvement. As many religions consider God 
to be all-knowing, it is conceivable that exposure to information about God will influence 
children's appreciation of omniscience. 
Because of the additions to Study 3B, it was necessary to prune other elements 
from the interview, in order to keep the interview brief enough for the youngest children 
to complete. First, because the bar graph used at the beginning of Study 3A might 
concretize the concept of ―everything‖, it was removed from Study 3B. I also removed 
the questions where experts were compared against one another—children performed at 
ceiling for Study 3A, consistent with the findings of Lutz and Keil (2002). Thus, I 
established that even preschoolers can distinguish between the knowledge possessed by 
the four experts. Since the same experts were being used in Study 3B, I eliminated this 
set of questions.  
Finally, a theory of ordinary minds develops rapidly during the preschool years 
and so may an understanding of extraordinary minds. Thus to better capture a potentially 
rapid and nuanced early developmental trajectory, Study 3B includes a sizeable number 
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of children at an age before they typically develop a robust representational theory of 
mind (3 to 4.5 years), and at an age after they have typically developed a representational 
theory of mind (4.5 to 6.5 years), in addition to a group of older elementary-school 
children (6.5 to 11 years), and group of young adults (18 to 21 years). Having the sample 
split into these four age groups also allows me to better assess when in development other 
cognitive and contextual factors are likely to exert their greatest influence. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included three groups of children: 32 children 3 to 4.5 years (M = 
3.88, SD = .42 years), 29 children 4.5 to 6.5 years (M = 5.27, SD = .69 years), and 28 
children 6.5 to 11 years (M = 8.86, SD = 1.41 years) from southeastern Michigan. Thirty-
four young adults (M age = 19.35, SD = .78 years) participated, all of whom were 
recruited through the University‘s Introduction to Psychology Subject Pool. Five children 
(1 three-year-old, 3 four-year-olds, and 1 five-year-old) were excluded from analyses 
because they were not paying attention to the tasks or because they decided to end the 
interview session early, resulting in a sample of 28 children 3 to 4.5 years, and 28 
children 4.5 to 6.5 years. Participants were primarily White and of middle- to upper-
middle-class socioeconomic status. Sixty-seven parents (80%) completed follow-up 
questionnaires about children‘s engagement in various activities, exposure to media, and 
frequency with which they attend a place of worship. All adult participants completed 
similar follow-up questionnaires concerning their engagement in various activities and 
their religious exposure.  
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Procedure and Measures 
 Participants were administered tasks similar to those from Study 3A, with some 
critical changes and additions. For Study 3B, Ms. Smart‘s (for boys, Mr. Smart‘s) 
extraordinary mind was further emphasized—she was given a larger cranium, she emitted 
a glow, and participants were additionally told that she was born with a ―very, very 
special brain.‖ The new introduction and image of Ms. Smart can be found in Appendix 
E. Following her introduction, children were asked if Ms. Smart knows ―some things, lots 
of things or everything‖ (half of the participants were asked if she knows ―everything, 
lots of things, or some things‖). Participants who did not respond ―everything‖ were 
offered corrective feedback: ―No. Remember, Ms. Smart knows everything about 
everything [interviewer spreads arms wide].‖ For these questions, and for all of the 
following questions, if participants replied ―I don‘t know‖ or did not provide an answer 
they were encouraged to provide an answer (e.g., ―You can answer however you like; 
there are no wrong answers‖, the question was repeated, and, for closed-ended questions, 
response options were given). Additional changes to the protocol for Study 3B are 
described below.  
Understanding experts’ depth of knowledge. Participants were presented the same 
four experts as in Study 3A—a doctor, mechanic, chef, and pilot—and were asked how 
much each expert knows about their respective domain (e.g., ―How much does a doctor 
know about being healthy? Some things, lots of things, or everything?‖; half of the 
participants were given these options in reverse order). To avoid concretizing 
―everything‖, participants were not shown a graph representing the three amounts 
(though several 3-year-olds had difficulty answering the questions without a visual aid, 
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so interviewers resorted to using the graph for them). Participants were provided 
corrective feedback if they reported that any expert knows everything, ―No. ___ knows 
lots of things about ___, but not everything [spread arms].‖  
Understanding an all-knowing being’s depth of knowledge. To examine 
participants‘ understanding of the depth of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge, across 20 questions 
(five per expert), they compared the knowledge held by Ms. Smart and each of four 
experts. To limit the influence of the characters‘ appearance (rather than their 
knowledge), images of Ms. Smart and the experts were flipped over before asking the 
questions. Participants could either name their choice or point to her (flipped over) 
picture. Eight of these questions referred to knowledge outside of the experts‘ domains 
(e.g., ―Who knows more about how a TV works, a doctor or Ms. Smart?‖), four were 
questions that referred to the experts‘ knowledge domains broadly (e.g., ―Who knows 
more about being healthy, a doctor or Ms. Smart?‖), and eight dealt with more specific 
information within the experts‘ domains (―Who knows more about why you get a tummy 
ache, a doctor or Ms. Smart?‖). Because elementary-school children in Study 3A 
attributed (marginally) more knowledge to Ms. Smart when first reasoning about 
knowledge within the experts‘ domains, all participants in Study 3B were first asked 
questions referring to information within the experts‘ domains. For half of the 
participants, comparisons between Ms. Smart and each expert began with an item about 
the expert‘s domain broadly (e.g., ―Who knows more about cars; a Mechanic or Ms. 
Smart?‖); half of the participants received orders that began with a question about more 
specific information within the expert‘s domain (e.g., ―Who knows more about what cars 
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are made of; a Mechanic or Ms. Smart‖). For the complete pool of questions, see 
Appendix C. 
Understanding an all-knowing being’s breadth of knowledge. After being 
introduced to Ms. Smart (and reminded that she knows ―everything about everything‖), 
participants were asked 14 yes/no questions about the types of knowledge Ms. Smart 
possess. These 14 items fell into seven categories: three non-personal categories (facts 
about the past, present, and future) and four personal categories (facts about one‘s own 
and others‘ behavior, events, preferences, and thoughts). For a complete list of questions, 
see Appendix F. Open-ended follow-up questions were asked following participants‘ 
answers to five of these items: knowledge of what their father‘s favorite food is, 
knowledge of their behaving naughty, knowledge of what they are thinking of, 
knowledge of their father‘s birthday, and knowledge of the weather next summer. For 
each of these items, if participants answered ―Yes‖ they were asked, ―How did she 
know?‖, and if they answered ―No‖ they were asked, ―Why not?‖ 
Understanding mom’s breadth of knowledge. Participants were asked whether 
their mother knows each of the 14 pieces of information that were asked regarding Ms. 
Smart.  
Understanding infinity. To assess participants‘ understanding of limitlessness, 
they were administered an infinity task patterned after a measure used by Falk (Falk, 
1994; Falk & Ben-Lavy, 1989). This task was chosen because, unlike several other 
existing infinity tasks, it has revealed clear developmental trends across several studies. 
There were three components to this task. First, participants were presented two images 
(leaves and hairs) and asked ―What are there more of, leaves on all the trees in on Earth, 
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or hairs on all people‘s heads?‖ Participants could respond by naming or pointing to their 
choice. The set that was judged larger was compared to the amount of sand (―What are 
there more of, [previous choice] or all of the grains of sand on Earth?‖) as participants 
saw a picture of their previous choice and a picture of sand side-by-side. The set that was 
judged largest was then compared, in the target question, to the set of all numbers: ―What 
are there more of, [previous choice] or all the numbers?‖  
The second component began by asking participants to name the largest number 
they could think of, whether there is a number bigger than that, and if there is a number 
even bigger than that one. These questions were asked to get participants thinking about 
the never-ending nature of numbers. Then, participants were asked the focal question: 
―Do numbers ever stop or do they go on and on and on?‖ 
For the third component, participants were shown a horizontal line with 
progressively smaller arrows on the right side and told ―This line shows how many things 
there are. This side [the left] shows that there are just a few things; and this side [the 
right] shows that there are lots and lots of things. So, if the amount of [sand/leaves/hair] 
goes here [experimenter writes child‘s last choice beside a hatch mark near the right end 
of the line], is it possible to show where the amount of numbers goes on this line?‖ If 
participants responded ―yes‖, they were invited to draw a hatch mark on the line 
indicating where the amount of numbers goes. If participants answered ―no‖, they were 
asked ―Why?‖ A correct answer to this final question is ―no,‖ since the infinity (of 
numbers, or anything else) cannot actually be represented on a number line.  
Belief that someone can know everything. To gather more information on 
participants‘ understanding of the capacities and constraints of the mind, they were asked 
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several more questions about their knowledge of beings with extraordinary mental 
abilities. These questions included, ―Have you ever heard of anyone else who knows 
everything about everything?‖ and if so, ―Who?‖; ―What kinds of things will 
[person/being] know about?‖; and ―Do you think someone can really know everything 
about everything?‖ If so, ―How?‖ and if not, ―Why not?‖ 
Religious exposure. Parents of all children were distributed a questionnaire—
similar to that used by Lane et al., 2010, in press—which asked about children‘s daily 
activities and exposure to various media. Focally, parents answered four questions about 
how often their children are exposed to media about God: ―How often do you read to/tell 
your child stories about God?‖; ―How often does your child listen to music that mentions 
God?‖; ―How often does your child watch movies or TV shows that mention/portray 
God?‖; and ―How often does your child play games or play with toys that depict or 
mention God.‖ Responses to each of these four questions could range from (0) Never to 
(4) Daily. An exposure-to-God score was computed by averaging across these four items 
(cronbach‘s α = .89). The questionnaire also asked how often children attend a place of 
worship, with response options ranging from (1) Never, to (5) Daily. Sixty-seven parents 
(80%) completed this voluntary questionnaire. All adult participants completed a similar 
questionnaire about their own engagement in various activities, including activities 
involving God concepts (e.g., listening to music about God, reading about God), and how 
often they attend a place of worship, and a similar exposure-to-God score was computed 
(cronbach‘s α = .68).  
 Imagining the improbable.  Entertaining the idea that a being can possess 
extraordinary knowledge may depend upon an ability to imagine unlikely phenomena. To 
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examine this possibility, participants were asked whether they had seen, whether they 
could think about, or whether it was really possible for four improbable events to occur 
(see Appendix G). These items were derived from those used by Shtulman (2009; 
Shtulman & Carey, 2007) and by Wellman and Estes (1986). Participants earned a point 
for each event that they reported either (a) they could think about, or (b) could really 
happen. An imagining-the-improbable score was computed by summing scores across the 
four events (range: 0-4).  To examine whether any relations between these questions and 
the focal measures may simply reflect a ―Yes‖ bias (a more general tendency to answer 
―Yes‖ to Yes/No questions), another, theoretically-unrelated, variable was computed 
from these questions—a seen-the-improbable score (ranging from 0-4). This variable was 
included in certain analyses to detect effects that might simply stem from a ―Yes‖ bias.  
Coding. A coding system for all of the open-ended responses was developed 
through an iterative process. These included responses to open-ended questions 
concerning Ms. Smart‘s and Mom‘s breadth of knowledge, participants‘ knowledge of 
anyone or anything who knows everything about everything and the types of knowledge 
those beings would possess, whether someone can really know everything about 
everything, and participants‘ justifications for why they could not indicate the location of 
numbers on the line for the Infinity task. Lane and two research assistants developed an 
initial coding system, individually coded small subsamples of data, and compared coding. 
Discrepancies were discussed among the three coders, and the system was modified to 
limit future discrepancies. To establish inter-rater reliability with the final coding system, 
data were categorized independently by Lane and one research assistant until a criterion 
of at least 85% inter-rater agreement was reached for each question, across 15% of the 
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data (25 interviews). Remaining discrepancies were discussed by both coders and 
resolved. Once this criterion had been met, the remaining open-ended responses were 
coded by the research assistant who had established inter-rater reliability. 
Results  
In what follows, a first set of analyses examines the effectiveness of changes 
made to Study 3B in increasing participants‘ attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart, by 
directly comparing the performance of participants in Study 3A to those from Study 3B, 
for items that both studies had in common. Subsequent analyses used the entire Study 3B 
sample to examine the knowledge that participants attributed to Ms. Smart and how that 
compares to knowledge attributed to ordinary people, as well as participants‘ beliefs that 
all-knowing beings can exist. Finally, I present analyses focused on cognitive and socio-
cultural factors that might facilitate an understanding of omniscience.  
Influence of Revised Protocol on Attributions of Knowledge to Ms. Smart 
 An initial set of analyses examined whether the changes made to Study 3B 
influenced participants‘ attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart. For these analyses, age 
ranges were matched between the two studies (3.60 to 21 years). Thus, seven of the 
youngest children were excluded from the Study 3B sample, reducing the sample to 111. 
For these analyses, the Study 3B sample was also divided into the same three age groups 
used in Study 3A (preschoolers: n = 36; elementary-school children: n = 35; adults: 
n = 34).  
First, I examined whether the elaborated introduction and information provided in 
Study 3B about Ms. Smart—her larger cranium, glow, and her ―very, very special brain‖, 
and the corrective feedback that was provided to participants about her ―knowing 
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everything about everything‖—as well as the corrective feedback offered about experts 
(that they know ―lots of things, but not everything‖ within their domain) influenced the 
depth of knowledge that children attributed to Ms. Smart. Considering first participants‘ 
attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart outside of the experts‘ domains, a 2 (study 
version: 3A, 3B) X 3 (age group: preschool, elementary-school, adult) ANOVA revealed 
a significant effect of age group (F(2, 167) = 16.49, p < .001), and a significant effect of 
study version, F(1, 167) = 6.13, p < .05. Overall, participants in Study 3B (M = 7.80, 
SD = .77) granted Ms. Smart greater knowledge than did participants in Study 3A (M = 
7.43, SD = 1.36). Lack of an interaction effect indicated that the effect of study version 
did not vary by age group. A similar 2 (study version) X 3 (age group) ANOVA 
examined participants‘ attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart within experts‘ domains. 
This analysis also revealed a significant effect of age group, (F(2, 167) = 28.22, p < .001) 
as well as a significant effect of study version, F(1, 167) = 4.69, p < .05. Overall, 
participants in Study 3B (M = 4.49, SD = 3.65) granted Ms. Smart greater knowledge 
within experts‘ domains, compared to participants in Study 3A (M = 3.39, SD = 3.68). 
There was no significant interaction between age and study version. The main effects of 
age noted above mirrored those found in Study 3A, with older participants attributing 
greater knowledge to Ms. Smart. Developmental trends will be considered in greater 
detail later, using the full sample from Study 3B. 
I next examined whether Study 3A and Study 3B participants differed in the 
breadth of knowledge they attributed to Ms. Smart. Table 3-2 shows participants‘ 
attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart, for the five items asked in both studies. In 
contrast to participants in Study 3A, preschoolers and elementary-school children in 
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Study 3B attributed all five forms of knowledge to Ms. Smart above chance. I next 
directly compared participants in the two studies. Preschoolers in Study 3B were 
significantly more likely to attribute to Ms. Smart knowledge about themselves, including 
knowledge of their birth date, their favorite food, and what they were thinking. Between 
the two studies, preschoolers were equally likely to report that Ms. Smart knows non-
personal information about the past and present. There were no significant differences 
between the two studies for elementary-school children or adults.  
Thus the revised protocol effectively increased the depth as well as the breadth of 
knowledge that participants, especially preschoolers, granted to Ms. Smart. All 
subsequent analyses are performed using the full sample from Study 3B (N = 118). To 
examine developmental trajectories more precisely, these analyses include participants in 
four age groups: 3.5 to 4.5 years, 4.5 to 6.5 years, 6.5 to 11 years, and young adults.  
Of course, increased endorsement of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge in Study 3B does 
not necessarily show that participants understood that Ms. Smart‘s knowledge is 
particularly extraordinary, unless participants can also distinguish between her 
knowledge and the knowledge held by ordinary people. Thus, a particularly important 
contrast to consider is Ms. Smart versus the child‘s own mother. A child‘s mother might 
be considered by young children to be particularly capable and knowledgeable, so 
comparing Ms. Smart against mothers provides valuable insight into children‘s 
appropriate understanding of Ms. Smart‘s unique, extraordinary knowledge. These 
comparisons are included in the analyses in the next section. 
Understanding Experts’ Depth of Knowledge 
To assess the depth of knowledge that participants attributed to experts, they were 
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asked how much each of the four experts knows about their respective domains—some 
things, lots of things, or everything. In contrast to Study 3A, participants were offered 
corrective feedback for this task—if participants reported that any expert knows 
―everything‖ about their domain, they were told that the expert knows lots of things, but 
not everything. There was a significant age difference in (incorrectly) attributing 
knowledge of ―everything‖ to the first expert, χ2(3) = 9.50, p < .05. Roughly half (54%) 
of 3- to 4.5-year-olds attributed knowledge of ―everything‖ to the first expert, compared 
to 46% of 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds, 21% of 6.5- to 11-year-olds, and 12% of adults. 
However, the corrective feedback appropriately reduced children‘s attributions of 
―everything‖ to the experts. Whereas 54% of the youngest children attributed knowledge 
of everything to the first expert, only 17% attributed knowledge of everything to the last 
expert, Z = -2.71, p < .01. Among the 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds, a similar decrease was found 
between the first expert (46%) and last expert (12%), Z = -2.71, p < .01. No decrease in 
knowledge attribution was found among the older children or adults, who typically 
attributed knowledge of ―lots of things‖ even to the expert presented first. Further 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the corrective feedback, there were no age differences 
in attributions of ―everything‖ to the last expert, χ2(3) = 3.00, ns. 
Understanding an All-Knowing Being’s Depth of Knowledge 
 Information outside of experts’ domains of expertise. Using the full Study 3B 
sample and four age-groups (N = 118) I assessed age differences in attributions of 
knowledge outside of experts‘ domains to Ms. Smart; these data are presented in Figure 
3-3. A one-way ANOVA revealed that knowledge attributions varied significantly 
between the four age groups, F(3, 114) = 9.87, p < .001. Three- to 4.5-year-olds, while 
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typically attributing more of this knowledge to Ms. Smart than to the experts, did so less 
than participants in the other three age groups (ps < .05, according to Tukey HSD 
pairwise comparisons). However, participants in every age group attributed greater 
knowledge to Ms. Smart (compared to the experts) at levels significantly above chance 
(for the two youngest age groups, ts(27) > 11.00, p < .001; all of the oldest children and 
adults performed at ceiling on this task and thus one-sample t-tests could not be 
computed).  
 Information within experts’ domains of expertise. As mentioned earlier, a more 
convincing demonstration of understanding the depth of an omniscience being‘s 
knowledge is understanding that Ms. Smart possesses more knowledge than experts 
within their domains of expertise. The full sample from Study 3B was used to conduct a 
fine-grained examination of age differences in attributions of such knowledge to Ms. 
Smart; these data are presented in Figure 3-4. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant 
differences in knowledge attributions between the four age groups, F(3, 114) = 16.89, 
p < .001. Compared with children in each of the three age groups, adults more often 
attributed greater knowledge to Ms. Smart (ps < .001, according to Tukey HSD pairwise 
comparisons), and 6.5- to 11-year-olds attributed greater knowledge to Ms. Smart 
(marginally) more than 3- to 4.5-year-olds (p = .09, according to Tukey HSD pairwise 
comparisons). Analyzed separately, the youngest children typically attributed greater 
knowledge to the experts than to Ms. Smart (t(27) = -3.99, p < .001), children in both of 
the middle age groups were at chance (4.5 to 6.5 years: t(27) = -1.21, ns; 6.5 to 11 years: 
t(27) = -.25, ns), and adults typically attributed greater knowledge to Ms. Smart than to 
the experts, t(33) = 8.04, p < .001.  
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 Study 3B included four additional broad items (e.g., ―Who knows more about 
cars; Ms. Smart or a mechanic?‖), which might encourage children to think about the 
large amount of information there is within a domain. These items used similar language 
as the initial questions that participants were asked about experts‘ depth of knowledge 
and for which they were offered corrective feedback if necessary (e.g., ―A mechanic 
knows lots of things about cars, but not everything‖). Thus, children may be more likely 
to attribute greater knowledge to Ms. Smart for these broader items. A broad-item 
composite was computed by averaging across the four broad items and a narrow-item 
composite was created by averaging across the eight narrow items, for scores ranging 
from 0 to 1. A 2 (question depth: narrow, broad) X 4 (age group) repeated measures 
ANOVA predicting children‘s attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart revealed no effect 
of question depth (F(1, 114) = 1.96, ns) and no significant interaction between question 
depth and age group (F(3, 114) = 1.27, ns); only a main effect of age group, F(3, 114) = 
19.18, p < .001. Across all ages, participants were as likely to attribute greater knowledge 
to Ms. Smart on the four broad items (M = .51, SD = .47) as they were on the more 
narrow eight items (M = .52, SD = .46).   
Understanding Mom’s Breadth of Knowledge 
 How children and adults attribute knowledge to ordinary humans serves as an 
important comparison to their attributions of knowledge to extraordinary beings, like Ms. 
Smart. Participants were asked if their mothers possess each of 14 pieces of information 
that constituted seven categories of knowledge. As a conservative estimate of 
participants‘ attributions of categories of knowledge to their mothers (as opposed to just 
individual pieces of information), they needed to attribute to their mother both pieces of 
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information within the category. For example, to consider a child as having attributed 
knowledge of the future generally to mom, he or she had to report that mom would know 
both about the weather next summer and would know how many people will live on 
Earth next year. As depicted in Table 3-3, children in all three age groups as well as 
adults attributed to their mothers knowledge of personal preferences (their own and their 
father‘s food preferences). All participants also attributed to their mothers knowledge of 
personal events (their own and their fathers‘ birthdays). No other forms of knowledge 
were attributed, above chance, to mothers. Moreover, the majority of participants in all 
age groups did not attribute all seven types of knowledge to mothers.  
Understanding an All-Knowing Beings’ Breadth of Knowledge 
Using participants‘ attributions of the same seven categories of knowledge to Ms. 
Smart (who, in contrast to mothers, knows ―everything about everything‖), I examined 
participants‘ conceptualization of the breadth of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge. Preliminary 
analyses revealed that attributions of one‘s own personal information to Ms. Smart 
(averaging across items about one‘s own events, activities, thoughts, and preferences; 
M  = .85, SD = .29) did not differ significantly from attributions of others‘ personal 
information to Ms. Smart (M = .85, SD = .28)—in a 2 (Person: Self, Other) X 4 (Age 
group) repeated-measures ANOVA predicting attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart, 
there was no effect of person or interaction between person and age group. Thus 
knowledge of oneself and others were combined into four categories: knowledge of 
personal events, activities, thoughts, and preferences. Attributions of the seven categories 
of knowledge to Ms. Smart are presented in Table 3-4. The youngest children in the 
sample (3 to 4.5 years) consistently attributed to Ms. Smart knowledge of the present and 
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future, as well as knowledge of others‘ thoughts and preferences. Slightly older children 
(4.5 to 6.5 years) additionally attributed to Ms. Smart knowledge of the past and 
knowledge of others‘ personal events (their own and their father‘s birthdays) and 
personal actions (their own and their friend‘s naughty behavior). However, omniscience 
is more than holding several types of knowledge, it is a state of holding all forms of 
knowledge. Only the oldest children (6.5 to 11 years) and adults consistently attributed 
all seven categories of knowledge to Ms. Smart.  
To reiterate, it is important to know if such knowledge attribution is particular to 
Ms. Smart or if it is characteristic of children‘s knowledge attribution more generally. To 
assess this, attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart and to mom were compared; these 
findings are also presented in Table 3-4. Participants in every age group attributed to Ms. 
Smart more knowledge of non-personal facts about the past, present, and future, and 
more knowledge of others‘ personal thoughts. Participants of all ages did not differ in 
their attributions of certain personal information to Ms. Smart and to mom—participants 
reported that both would know about their own and their fathers‘ personal events 
(birthdates) and preferences (favorite foods). Whereas the youngest children (3 to 4.5 
years) were equally skeptical that their moms or Ms. Smart would know about their 
personal actions (i.e., their naughty behavior), older participants attributed more of such 
knowledge to Ms. Smart than to their mothers.  
Thus, although the youngest children were relatively conservative in their 
estimations of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge, they understood that her knowledge would 
exceed that of ordinary people, in particular she was judged to know more non-personal 
information about the past, present, and future, and more about others‘ thoughts. The 
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reasoning that participants used in making their decisions sheds further light on their 
understanding of Ms. Smart‘s capacities. Following their response to each of five 
questions about Ms. Smart‘s knowledge, participants were asked an open-ended follow-
up question: either ―How?‖ if they reported that Ms. Smart would hold that knowledge, 
or ―Why not?‖ if they reported that she would not hold that knowledge. Follow-up 
questions were asked concerning Ms. Smart‘s knowledge of: (1) what the participant is 
thinking, (2) whether the participant did something naughty, (3) what the participant‘s 
dad‘s favorite food is, (4) when the participant‘s dad‘s birthday is, and (5) what the 
weather will be like next summer. These five items were chosen because, in Study 3A, 
children often denied Ms. Smart knowledge of personal information and knowledge of 
the future, so I thought it would be particularly interesting to see children‘s reasoning 
about how a being could ever possess that type of knowledge; for example, whether such 
knowledge it is inherent or is acquired. 
The reasoning that participants used to explain how Ms. Smart would hold certain 
knowledge is focal here, as it sheds light on participants‘ understanding of Ms. Smart‘s 
powers and how she acquires her knowledge. Participants‘ response fell into seven 
categories, six of which were frequently used; see Table 3-5. These six categories 
include: (1) explicit reference to ―knowing everything‖, (2) references to Ms. Smart‘s 
intelligence (e.g., ―She‘s the smartest person in the world‖, ―She‘s got the smartest 
brain‖), (3) explanations about how Ms. Smart would acquire information through 
ordinary experience (e.g., ―She was spying on me‖, ―She would ask people‖, ―She took a 
recorder and stole it from the weather man‖), (4) participants‘ volunteering the 
information or citing their own knowledge (―Because I‘ll know‖, ―It should be like 80 to 
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100 [degrees next summer]‖, ―I'm really thinking about pizza right now‖), (5) other 
reasoning which was informative but did not fit into any other category (e.g., ―He‘d be 
guessing‖), and (6) uninformative responses, including ―I don‘t know‖ and ―Because.‖  
The proportion of responses (across the five questions) for which each of the six 
forms of reasoning was used is presented in Table 3-5. These data reveal two noteworthy 
developmental trends. First, participants‘ mention of Ms. Smart‘s capacities—her 
knowledge of everything or her intelligence—increased from the preschool years, 
through the elementary-school years, to early adulthood. Second, compared to older 
participants (especially adults) preschoolers more often used alternative forms of 
reasoning, in particular reasoning that Ms. Smart would possess knowledge because the 
children themselves held the information (e.g., ―I know it‖) because she would acquire it 
through ordinary experiences (e.g., ―She would spy on me‖), or because of some other 
reason (e.g., when asked whether Ms. Smart would know when the child‘s dad‘s birthday 
is, one child responded ―He‘d be guessing‖ and another child responded ―Because he‘s 
easy‖). Thus, for older children and adults, the fact that Ms. Smart knows everything 
about everything was reason enough for her to hold a broader variety of knowledge, 
whereas young children often came up with everyday mechanisms through which Ms. 
Smart would acquire information or they cited their own knowledge.  
Belief That Someone Can Really Know Everything 
At a young age, children attribute a broad set of knowledge to Ms. Smart, but do 
they believe that all-knowing beings can actually exist? Several additional questions were 
asked to address this issue. At the beginning of the interview, participants were asked 
whether they had ever heard of anyone or anything who knows everything about 
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everything. Half (50%) of the 3- to 4.5-year-olds said ―Yes‖ (binomial p = 1.00), but this 
dropped with increasing age, to 27% among 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds (binomial p < .05), 14% 
among 6.5- to 11-year-olds (binomial p < .001), and 6% among adults (binomial p < 
.001). Parallel to these results, at the end of the interview, when asked whether there 
could be a real person like Ms. Smart, 63% of the youngest children said ―Yes‖ (binomial 
p = .31), and so did 34% of 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds (binomial p = .17), and 7% of 6.5- to 11-
year-olds (binomial p < .001), but no adults said ―Yes‖ (binomial p < .001). Finally, 
when asked at the end of the interview if someone can really know everything about 
everything, about half (46%) of the youngest children said ―Yes‖ (binomial p = .84), and 
this decreased to 19% of 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds (binomial p < .01), 18% of 6.5- to 11-year-
olds (binomial p < .01), and none of the adults (binomial p < .001).  
Thus, the youngest children (3 to 4.5 years) neither believed, above chance, that 
omniscient beings exist nor that omniscience is even really possible, and indeed children 
as young as 4.5 to 6.5 years often reported, above chance, that such capacities are not 
possible. However, a sizeable number of children between 3 and 6.5 years did answer 
these questions in the affirmative. Who did these children have in mind and what types of 
knowledge did children assume they held? Participants who reported that they had heard 
of someone or something who knows everything were asked ―Who?‖, and ―What kinds 
of things will __ know about?‖ Participants could provide multiple responses to these 
questions. Three- to 6.5-year-olds most often mentioned family members (39%) or 
professionals (e.g., doctors or teachers; 17%), but also referred to a range of other people, 
beings, and artifacts (Bob the Builder, friends, ―You‖, ―Your mom‖, ―Nick‖, ―God‖, ―A 
monster truck‖; 30%). The most common forms of knowledge that children attributed to 
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these beings were knowledge of objects (e.g., ―basketballs, soccer balls, footballs, 
baseballs‖, ―how bricks and houses are made‖; 25%), people (―She knows about a person 
who flies planes‖, ―firefighters‖; 25%), and nature (e.g., ―when the snow falls‖, ―She 
knows about holes that have water in it and dirt‖; 15%). Several children (20%) reported 
that such beings would know how to do certain activities (e.g., ―kicking‖, ―how to make 
bread, jelly, and peanut butter‖, ―What direction to go to take people to fly‖).  
Among the participants who affirmed that someone can really know everything 
about everything, what was their rationale? First consider the reasoning used by the 
youngest children (3- to 4.5-year-olds) who had the most limited understanding of Ms. 
Smart‘s knowledge. Of the 13 youngest children who claimed that such beings could 
exist, most either mentioned someone who knows everything, like Ms. Smart or a parent 
(31%), or provided uninformative reasoning, including ―I don‘t know‖ and ―Because‖ 
(42%). Next consider the older children (4.5 to 11 years), who had a more sophisticated 
understanding of what it means to know everything about everything. Of the 11 older 
children who reported that an all-knowing being could really exist, the most common 
responses were explanations that someone could acquire that knowledge during their 
lifetimes (e.g., ―If they start reading science books and everything books when they're 
first born‖, ―By going on the computer‖; 55%), and references to someone who knows 
everything, like Ms. Smart or God (18%).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Relations between Understanding Omniscience and Understanding Infinity 
 Potentially, an ability to conceptualize very large quantities (or perhaps 
limitlessness) may underlie both children‘s understanding of omniscience as well as their 
understanding of infinity. Thus, one may expect to find significant relations between 
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understanding omniscience and understanding infinity. First, I will present developmental 
trends in participants‘ responses to the three components of this task. For the first 
component, when asked to compare a large but finite amount to all of the numbers (e.g., 
―What are there more of, all of the grains of sand on Earth, or all of the numbers?‖), 43% 
of children 3 to 4.5 years, 46% of children 4.5 to 6.5 years, 57% of children 6.5 to 11 
years, and 94% of adults accurately reported that there were more numbers. For the 
second component, when asked if numbers stop of if they go on and on, there was also a 
clear developmental trend in reporting that numbers continue: 54% of children 3 to 4.5 
years, 70% of children 4.5 to 6.5 years, 82% of children 6.5 to 11 years, and 100% of 
adults reported that numbers go on and on. For the third component, participants were 
asked whether it was possible to indicate on a number line where the largest number 
goes. Participants were considered correct if they replied ―No‖ and provided a relevant 
justification (by explaining that numbers are too large or that the line is too small). 
Performance on this third component also increased with age: 4% of 3- to 4.5-year-olds, 
4% of 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds, 32% of 6.5- to 11-year-olds, and 74% of adults responded 
correctly.  
An understanding infinity composite was computed as the number of components 
that participants understood, for potential scores ranging from 0 to 3. Means and standard 
deviations for this measure, per age group, are presented in Table 3-6. Partial correlations 
for each age group (additionally controlling for age within each age group) revealed that 
understanding infinity was significantly related to the depth of knowledge that 
participants attributed to Ms. Smart (i.e., attributing more knowledge within experts‘ 
domains to Ms. Smart), but this was only the case among 6.5- to 11-year-olds, 
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r(25) = .38, p = .05. For all age groups, understanding infinity was unrelated to the 
breadth of knowledge attributed to Ms. Smart.  
Relations between Understanding Omniscience and Imagining the Improbable 
Potentially, entertaining the idea that Ms. Smart possesses extraordinary 
knowledge may depend upon a more general ability to imagine improbable phenomena. 
To assess this possibility, participants were asked whether they could think about or 
whether it was really possible for four improbable events to occur (see Appendix G). 
Participants earned a point for each event that they reported could really happen or that 
they could think about, for an imagining-the-improbable score ranging from 0 to 4. Table 
3-6 presents means and standard deviations for this measure, for each age group. Table 3-
7 displays partial correlations between participants‘ ability to imagine the improbable and 
their attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart, controlling for age within each of the four 
age groups.  Overall, an ability to imagine the improbable was significantly related to 
children‘s attributions of six of the seven categories of knowledge to Ms. Smart, as well 
as a composite summing across the seven categories, but this was true only among the 
oldest children (6.5- to 11-year-olds). An ability to imagine the improbable did not 
predict attributions of knowledge within experts‘ domains to Ms. Smart, for any age 
group. Thus, an ability to entertain the improbable is related to older children‘s 
understanding of the breadth, but not the depth, of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge.  
These relations do not merely reflect individual differences in a tendency to 
answer ―Yes‖ to all Yes/No questions—a ―Yes‖ bias. If so, there would be positive 
relations between children‘s attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart and any other 
measure that called for Yes/No responses. However, as illustrated in Table 3-7, 6.5- to 
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11-year-olds‘ seen-the-improbable scores (their tendency to report that they saw the four 
unlikely activities) was unrelated to the breadth of knowledge they attributed to Ms. 
Smart. Moreover, the relations between imagining the improbable and knowledge 
attributions were specific to Ms. Smart—6.5- to 11-year-olds‘ ability to imagine the 
improbable was unrelated to the knowledge they attributed to their mothers. 
Relations between Understanding Omniscience and Religious Exposure 
Potentially, participants‘ exposure to ideas about beings with extraordinary minds 
might facilitate an understanding of omniscience. Data on participants‘ religious 
affiliation, exposure to media and activities involving the idea of God, as well as the 
frequency with which participants attend a place of worship were provided by 80% of 
parents who completed a follow-up questionnaire, and by all adult participants who 
completed a similar questionnaire about themselves. Among the 67 children whose 
parents provided data, 42 (63%) children attended a place of worship. Of these, 11 
attended rarely, 9 attended monthly, and 22 attended weekly. Parents of 51 of these 
children (76%) identified with Christianity. Among the 34 adult participants, 23 (68%) 
attended a place of worship; 7 rarely, 8 monthly, and 8 weekly. The most common belief 
systems that participants identified with were Christianity (59%) and Agnosticism (12%). 
Table 3-6 presents means and standard deviations for participants‘ exposure to media 
about God, per age group.  
Table 3-8 presents partial correlations between participants‘ exposure to media 
about God and religious attendance on one hand, and attributions of knowledge to Ms. 
Smart on the other hand, controlling for age within each age group. In sum, exposure to 
ideas about God correlated significantly with attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart 
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only among 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds, an age shortly after most children have acquired a 
robust representational theory of mind. For these children, greater exposure to media 
about God or more frequently attending a place of worship were either individually or 
both significantly related to children‘s attributions of three of the seven categories of 
knowledge to Ms. Smart—knowledge of the past, present, and personal events—as well 
as the composite measure summing across the seven categories. These relations were 
specific to Ms. Smart—among 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds, religious exposure was unrelated to 
the knowledge they attributed to their mothers.  
Interestingly, a different trend emerged for the oldest children (6.5 to 11 years)—
exposure to media about God and attending a place of worship were generally negatively 
related to attributions of different types of knowledge to Ms. Smart. However, only one 
of these relations was statistically significant—children who were exposed to more media 
about God attributed less knowledge of the present to Ms. Smart. Religious exposure was 
unrelated to the depth of knowledge (i.e., knowledge within experts‘ domains) that 
participants attributed to Ms. Smart, and this was true for all age groups. Thus, religious 
exposure is related to children‘s understanding the breadth, but not the depth, of 
omniscient beings‘ knowledge.  
Study 3 General Discussion 
 By the late preschool years, children understand that certain beings possess 
extraordinary mental capacities that exceed the limits of ordinary human minds. Most 
research that demonstrates this has taken a singular approach—examining whether 
children attribute to extraordinary beings readily-accessible (though somewhat 
obstructed) knowledge about the here-and now; knowledge that ordinary people would 
128 
 
typically not possess (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Giménez-Dasí et al., 2005; Lane et al., 
2010; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007; Richert & Barrett, 2005). Moreover, most of these 
studies have been limited in that children themselves typically possessed the knowledge 
that they attributed to extraordinary beings. Thus, in those studies, children‘s attribution 
of knowledge to others might have simply been the product of a ―curse of knowledge‖—
an over-attribution of one‘s own knowledge to others, a tendency that even adults exhibit 
(for reviews, see Birch & Bloom, 2004; Nickerson, 1999). To demonstrate an 
understanding of omniscience, children must attribute more than their own knowledge to 
an all-knowing being. 
Though limited, this prior work laid the foundation for research on children‘s 
understanding of extraordinary mental capacities. In the current studies, I 
comprehensively examined the progressive development of an understanding of 
extraordinary minds from the preschool years to early adulthood. Using novel tasks, I 
examined the breadth of knowledge that children and adults attributed to a being whom 
they were instructed ―knows everything about everything‖—Ms. Smart. By ―breadth‖ I 
am referring to the kinds of knowledge that participants attributed to Ms. Smart. 
Importantly, in contrast to prior studies, the types of knowledge that participants 
considered were not limited to factoids about the here-and-now, but also included 
information about the past and future as well as personal information. Participants also 
considered whether Ms. Smart possesses information that they were familiar with (e.g., 
their favorite food) as well as information that participants did not themselves possess 
(e.g., what the weather will be like next summer). Study 3 additionally examined the 
depth of knowledge that children and adults attribute to all-knowing beings. By ―depth‖, I 
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am referring to the amount of knowledge that participants attributed to Ms. Smart within 
a given domain.  
 The preparedness hypothesis holds that, because young children‘s default 
assumption is that all minds are infallible, young children should be particularly able and 
willing to attribute all types of knowledge (as well as complete knowledge about every 
domain) to Ms. Smart. ―If the preparedness hypothesis is correct, it would predict that 
children should easily be able to incorporate the sense of infallibility into their concepts, 
even of nonreligious entities. In other words, making salient particular features of agents 
that otherwise have human-like attributes should influence children‘s responses for these 
entities‖ (Richert & Barrett, 2005, p. 286). However, this is not what I found. Consider 
first the breadth of knowledge that children attributed to Ms. Smart. In Study 3A, 
preschoolers only attributed to Ms. Smart knowledge of one (out of six) pieces of 
information—where to find the tallest tree in the world; an accessible fact about the here-
and now that can be retrieved through ordinary means. In fact, only 16% of preschoolers 
attributed all six pieces of information to Ms. Smart. Contrast this with elementary-school 
children who attributed four of the six pieces of information to Ms. Smart, including 
knowledge of the past and some personal information (e.g., participants‘ favorite foods); 
and adults who typically attributed all six pieces of information to Ms. Smart, including 
knowledge about the future and about private thoughts.  
It seems that, relative to older children and adults, preschoolers are particularly 
conservative in the breadth of knowledge they attribute to extraordinary beings. These 
findings seem to lend more support to an anthropomorphism hypothesis—young children 
tend to think of many agents, including extraordinary agents, as constrained by ordinary, 
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human, mental limits. This tendency is relaxed over the course of development, as 
children grant an increasingly broad body of knowledge to extraordinary beings, 
eventually including knowledge that people are not likely to possess (e.g., knowledge of 
strangers‘ birth dates and food preferences) and, by adulthood at least, knowledge that 
would be  impossible to possess (e.g., knowledge of what strangers are thinking). 
However, preschoolers are not entirely incapable of attributing a broad body of 
knowledge to extraordinary beings. Indeed, in Study 3B, when provided a more 
elaborated introduction and background information about Ms. Smart, and when provided 
corrective feedback about her knowledge, preschoolers attributed each of five pieces of 
information (five of the six items from Study 3A) to Ms. Smart above chance, and more 
than half of the preschoolers attributed all five pieces of information to Ms. Smart. 
However, even with this extensive training, an understanding of Ms. Smart‘s breadth of 
knowledge was clearly not an understanding of omniscience as outlined earlier and as 
usually understood theologically. Moreover, an understanding of extraordinary beings‘ 
breadth of knowledge was not consolidated or consistently applied among preschoolers, 
especially when compared to older children and adults. In Study 3B, participants 4.5-
years and older consistently attributed to Ms. Smart knowledge of non-personal 
information about the past, present, and future, as well as knowledge of others‘ personal 
events, actions, thoughts, and preferences. In contrast, in Study 3B, 3- to 4.5-year-olds 
did not consistently attribute to Ms. Smart knowledge of the past, personal events, or 
personal actions, which complements findings from Study 3A, where preschoolers also 
denied Ms. Smart knowledge of the past and personal information.  
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Perhaps young children denied Ms. Smart knowledge of the past because young 
children consider that information less accessible (it has already passed and cannot be 
retrieved), whereas information about the present can be learned now and information 
about the future can either be learned later or can be derived from one‘s understanding of 
the current state of the world. This interpretation is admittedly post-hoc, and future 
studies should more systematically examine children‘s understanding of how information 
about the past and future is acquired by extraordinary beings. Preschoolers‘ tendency to 
deny Ms. Smart knowledge of others‘ actions and events (but attribute to her knowledge 
of others‘ thoughts and preferences) is also interesting. This may reflect the types of 
information that children can access about themselves—a young child can report on his 
thoughts and preferences but may not know his birth date, and may assume that strangers 
do not know either. Children‘s reasoning sheds some light on why they often denied Ms. 
Smart knowledge of others‘ actions, in this case, misbehaving. Some children explained 
that Ms. Smart would not know about their naughty behavior because they would not 
misbehave (e.g., ―Because I wouldn‘t do anything bad‖), and thus there was nothing for 
Ms. Smart to know.   
The reasoning that participants used to explain why Ms. Smart does possess 
knowledge sheds additional light on the capacities that participants attributed to Ms. 
Smart. Two developmental trends are noteworthy. First, participants‘ reference to Ms. 
Smart‘s capacities—her knowledge of everything or her intelligence—increased steadily 
from the preschool years to early adulthood. Second, compared to older participants 
(particularly adults) preschoolers used more alternative forms of reasoning, including 
reasoning that Ms. Smart holds knowledge because children themselves hold the 
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information, or because Ms. Smart would acquire it through ordinary experiences (e.g., 
by asking someone). Indeed, among children who reported that someone can know 
―everything about everything‖, many explained that the knowledge would be acquired 
through relatively ordinary means—through television, books, and conversations with 
others. Thus, for older children and adults, the fact that Ms. Smart ―knows everything 
about everything‖ was sufficient for her to hold a wide variety of knowledge. In contrast, 
younger children often reasoned about the means and mechanisms through which that 
information could be acquired.  
Thus, although it does not come intuitively, with extensive training older 
preschoolers can grasp that an extraordinary being—someone described in ways that 
adults would understand as omniscient—has a broad (though incomplete) body of 
knowledge, including knowledge that children themselves do not hold. Moreover, they 
appreciate that such a being holds a variety of knowledge that other ordinary people (in 
this case, their mothers) do not possess. However, it is important to note that these 
methods may have overestimated the breadth of knowledge that young children actually 
attribute to omniscient beings. The questions that children were asked called for ―Yes‖ or 
―No‖ answers (i.e., to report that Ms. Smart knows X, all participants needed to do was 
say ―Yes‖). Young children in particular, have a well-document ―Yes‖ bias—a tendency 
to respond ―Yes‖ to Yes/No questions in order to please the experimenter, to seem 
agreeable, or to seem competent (Okanda & Itakura, 2010). The methods of Study 3B 
provide some assurance against the interpretation that children‘s knowledge attributions 
were merely driven by a general ―Yes‖ bias. In particular, participants were asked 
identical Yes/No questions about the breadth of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge and the breadth 
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of their mothers‘ knowledge, and even the youngest children granted Ms. Smart several 
forms of knowledge that they often denied to their own mothers. Still, future research 
should examine not just when children affirm that an all-knowing being possesses certain 
knowledge, but also how children reason about how all-knowing beings acquire that 
information (e.g., Is it there at birth or learned through relatively ordinary processes?) and 
how they use that information (e.g., Can Ms. Smart use her knowledge of the weather to 
plan her next vacation?). 
 Next, consider results on the depth of knowledge that participants attributed to 
Ms. Smart. For participants to truly grasp omniscience, they must appreciate that Ms. 
Smart holds more knowledge about a given domain than any other ordinary person, 
including experts. Thus, Ms. Smart was pitted against four experts and participants were 
asked who knows more about information outside and within the experts‘ domains of 
expertise. Participants‘ attributions of knowledge within the experts‘ domains is 
particularly revealing as it juxtaposes experts‘ large body of knowledge with Ms. Smart‘s 
even more substantial body of knowledge. Again, the preparedness hypothesis would 
predict that young children will be particularly capable on this task—they should always 
attribute more knowledge to Ms. Smart. But this is not what I found. In fact, when 
considering who holds more knowledge within the experts‘ domains, 3- to 4.5-year-olds 
overwhelmingly attributed greater knowledge to the experts. This was the case even in 
Study 3B, where Ms. Smart‘s powers were further emphasized, and where participants 
were specifically taught that Ms. Smart knows ―everything about everything‖, whereas 
the experts just know ―lots of things‖ about their domains. Older children performed 
better on this task, but still underperformed when compared with adults, who almost 
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always attributed greater knowledge to Ms. Smart. Importantly, these results are not 
merely a product of the types of questions that children were asked or a more general 
preference for the experts over Ms. Smart—when reasoning about information outside of 
the experts‘ domains, even the youngest children attributed more of such knowledge to 
Ms. Smart. 
Why was reasoning about the depth of Ms. Smart‘s knowledge so difficult 
relative to reasoning about the breadth of her knowledge? When considering the types of 
knowledge that Ms. Smart holds, children could have employed a simple heuristic: if 
there is something to be known then Ms. Smart knows it. That heuristic will always yield 
the correct answer (―Yes, she knows it‖) for the breadth-of-knowledge questions, but the 
heuristic does not apply to the depth-of-knowledge questions, which require children to 
think beyond the mere absence or presence of a single piece of knowledge. If this is 
indeed the heuristic that young children are employing, it may play a critical initial role in 
the emergence of a full-fledged understanding of omniscience—it allows children to 
loosen their constraints about the types of information a being can possess. However, 
even this initial loosening required substantial input and training about a being‘s 
extraordinary mental abilities. 
Much of the knowledge that participants considered for the depth-of knowledge 
task—knowledge of planes, cars, medicine, and food—is accessible and can be obtained 
through ordinary means like books and the internet. These topics were chosen on 
purpose; they were domains that even preschoolers are familiar with and this was a first 
attempt to examine the development of an understanding of the depth of extraordinary 
beings‘ knowledge. However, because of its focus on commonplace domains of 
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knowledge, this measure might have overestimated participants‘, even adults‘, 
understanding of the depth of extraordinary beings‘ knowledge. Future studies should 
examine how children and adults conceptualize the depth extraordinary beings‘ 
knowledge in other domains, like knowledge of others‘ minds, knowledge of the origins 
of the universe, knowledge of the fate of the universe, and so on. 
 At this point, it is important to reiterate why Study 3 focused on Ms. Smart as 
opposed to God. One reason was to standardize the information that children received 
about an extraordinary being‘s mind. Children from different contexts undoubtedly vary 
in the extent to which they are exposed to ideas about the Judeo-Christian God, so if 
children do not understand a particular aspect of God‘s extraordinary mind, it might 
simply reflect their lack of knowledge about God rather than a fundamental difficulty 
conceptualizing extraordinary minds. Use of Ms. Smart allowed me to provide multiple 
converging pieces of evidence about her mental capacities as well as corrective feedback 
about her capacities, perhaps more input than religiously-schooled children receive about 
God‘s mind. This extensive and immediate input about Ms. Smart‘s mind was designed 
to capitalize upon any understanding that children may have of extraordinary minds, 
which children may not intuitively apply when reasoning about God‘s mind. Indeed, 
Lane et al. (in press; Study 2 of this dissertation) demonstrated that religiously-schooled 
4-year-olds (who were knowledgeable about the Judeo-Christian God) found it easier to 
conceptualize the extraordinary knowledge possessed by a being whom they were taught 
and reminded ―knows everything‖ (Mr. Smart),  as opposed to God (about whom the 
interviewer taught children nothing). 
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A major aim of these studies was to identify socio-cultural factors that facilitate a 
developing understanding of the breadth and depth of knowledge possessed by all-
knowing beings. Lane and colleagues (in press) demonstrated that children‘s exposure to 
ideas about the Judeo-Christian God—an omniscient being—may be particularly 
powerful in facilitating an initial understanding of extraordinary mental abilities. Thus, in 
Study 3B, I collected data on participants‘ exposure to these ideas. Parents reported on 
their children‘s engagement in activities that involve ideas about God, and adult 
participants reported on their own engagement in these activities. Both children‘s 
exposure to media about God (e.g., movies and stories) and the frequency with which 
they attended a place of worship predicted attributions of broader knowledge to Ms. 
Smart, but this was true only for children who had recently developed a representational 
theory of mind, consistent with the findings of Lane and colleagues (in press). Exposure 
to God concepts was unrelated to participants‘ understanding of the depth of Ms. Smart‘s 
knowledge. 
The reason exposure to ideas about God is related to understanding an 
extraordinary beings‘ breadth of knowledge, but not her depth of knowledge, may have 
something to do with the specific messages children receive about God‘s extraordinary 
mind. Many of the messages that children receive may deal with specific types of 
knowledge that God holds (e.g., God knows what is in your heart, God knows if you 
misbehave), which may facilitate the general idea that God knows many things, even 
things that ordinary people do not know. This is precisely the understanding that children 
need to apply when considering Ms. Smart‘s breadth of knowledge. But, as discussed 
earlier, merely appreciating that a being knows many things is not enough to grasp the 
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depth of that being‘s knowledge. Future studies should systematically examine the types 
of messages that children receive about God‘s and other beings‘ (e.g., superheroes‘) 
extraordinary knowledge and mental powers. 
 Another major aim of Study 3 was to identify cognitive competencies that support 
an understanding of omniscience. Two candidates were considered. The first is an 
understanding of infinity, which develops during middle and late childhood (Falk, 1994; 
Falk & Ben-Lavy, 1989). The rationale was that both an understanding of infinity and an 
understanding of omniscience require one to think of extremely large quantities (numbers 
and knowledge, respectively), or perhaps limitlessness; and this might be particularly 
useful in understanding that an omniscient beings‘ knowledge exceeds the knowledge of 
experts (the measure of the depth of knowledge attributed to Ms. Smart). In Study 3B, an 
understanding of infinity was significantly related to understanding the depth of Ms. 
Smart‘s knowledge, but only among 6.5- to 11-year-olds. Understanding infinity was 
unrelated to the breadth of knowledge that these older children attributed to Ms. Smart. It 
is noteworthy that, of the three cognitive and socio-cultural variables considered, an 
understanding of infinity differed the most between the oldest children (6.5 to 11 years) 
and adults. A developing understanding of infinity between late childhood and early 
adulthood may account for the large increase in the depth of knowledge attributed to Ms. 
Smart between late childhood and early adulthood. 
The second cognitive capacity that I considered in Study 3B was an ability to 
imagine the improbable, an ability that also develops progressively during middle and 
late childhood (Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007). The rationale here was that 
children do not actually interact with omniscient beings and thus may not entertain the 
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(improbable) notion that a being could possess so many forms of knowledge, especially 
knowledge that ordinary people do not possess; indeed even preschoolers often reported 
that all-knowing beings could not really exist. This imagining-the-improbable measure 
proved fruitful. Participants who were better able to imagine improbable phenomena also 
attributed to Ms. Smart a broader body of knowledge; but this was again only the case for 
the oldest children (6.5 to 11 years). An ability to imagine the improbable was unrelated 
to the depth of knowledge that children attributed to Ms. Smart.   
Why were these cognitive factors—an understanding of infinity and an ability to 
imagine the improbable—related to an understanding of omniscience only among older 
children? As discussed earlier, younger children‘s attributions of different types of 
knowledge to Ms. Smart may be been guided by a simple heuristic: if asked whether Ms. 
Smart knows X, the answer is always ―Yes.‖ Using this heuristic would allow the 
youngest children to attribute a wide variety of knowledge to Ms. Smart without having 
to actually imagine what it means for a being to know X. Older children on the other 
hand, might make a more concerted effort to actually imagine a being who can know X, 
and thus a capacity to imagine the improbable would be particularly helpful to them. 
Understanding infinity was also related to the depth of knowledge attributed to Ms. 
Smart, but only among the oldest children. Perhaps this is because understanding infinity 
must reach a more complete and qualitatively different level of sophistication before 
contributing to an understanding of omniscience. No children younger than 6.5 years 
understood all three components of infinity measured. In contrast, 25% of the oldest 
children (6.5 to 11 years) understood all three components, and these children (M = 6.71, 
SD = 2.63) were similar to adults (M = 7.18, SD = 2.30) in the depth of knowledge they 
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attributed to Ms. Smart. The remaining 6.5- to 11-year-olds (who understood just two, 
one, or none of the components of infinity) granted Ms. Smart a depth of knowledge (M= 
2.86, SD = 3.76) similar to what 4.5- to 6.5-year-olds granted her (M = 3.25, SD = 3.28). 
Results of prior studies have been taken as evidence of children‘s early 
understanding of mental infallibility or omniscience, even though that work does not 
directly examine children‘s understanding of infallibility or omniscience. The current 
studies reveal that, when studied directly, young children do not know much about all-
knowingness, and are unprepared to entertain such a notion or to grant it, even to 
extraordinary beings. Instead, developing an understanding of omniscience is a protracted 
process beginning in early childhood and proceeding well into late childhood, and 
perhaps even adolescence and adulthood. Although young children in particular are quite 
conservative in the knowledge they attribute to extraordinary beings and often deny that 
all-knowing beings can really exist, they can entertain the idea of a being who possesses 
certain types of knowledge that most other people, including themselves, do not possess. 
Understanding the depth of such beings‘ knowledge is more difficult to grasp, and may 
not become intuitive until adolescence or early adulthood. Importantly, an understanding 
of omniscience does not develop in isolation but is influenced by socio-cultural input that 
children receive about beings with extraordinary minds, and is supported by the 
development of other cognitive capacities, including a developing ability to imagine the 
improbable and an understanding of limitlessness. 
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CHAPTER V 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
Children‘s understanding of the mind has been a topic of intense research over the 
past three decades (for reviews, see Flavell & Miller, 1998; Harris, 2006; Wellman, 
2011). Most of this research has focused on the nature, precursors and consequences of 
children‘s developing understanding of ordinary, constrained human minds. However, 
children and adults learn about and believe in minds that are less constrained than the 
human mind; these include the minds of animals with exceptional perceptual abilities, 
fantastical characters with extraordinary mental powers, and omniscient religious figures. 
Understanding how children develop an understanding of extraordinary minds promises 
to provide a more comprehensive look at their understanding of minds in general. Such 
research can shed important light on children‘s developing understanding of the 
fundamental limitations of the human mind, which has important implications for how 
children interact with and learn from others. Successfully learning from others requires 
that children understand that some informants are more knowledgeable than others, that 
some informants are less knowledgeable than children themselves, and that there are 
certain things that ordinary people can never know (for reviews of this early 
development, see Gelman, 2009; Harris, 2007).  
Moreover, research on children‘s understanding of extraordinary minds can help 
address crucial issues in the cognitive science of religion, including questions about how 
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prepared young children are to represent certain religious concepts, how culturally-
provided religious concepts are assimilated and accommodated by children‘s cognitive 
architecture, and when and under what conditions children believe certain religious 
concepts. In the following sections, I briefly review prior studies on children‘s 
developing understanding of extraordinary minds, and again outline the two most 
prominent theories that have emerged from this research: the anthropomorphism and 
preparedness hypotheses. Next, I explain how the three studies in this dissertation help to 
reconcile prior conflicting findings as well as extend the literature in several important 
ways. Finally I provided some directions for future research in this area. 
Prior Research, and the Preparedness and Anthropomorphism Hypotheses 
 A small body of research has begun to shed light on how children come to 
understand extraordinary minds. The earliest studies were inspired by Piagetian theory, 
and identified a general trend: older children entertain more abstract notions of God (e.g., 
Nye & Carlson, 1984). These early studies often lumped together all notions that children 
held about God—his physical presence, biological nature, mental abilities, and physical 
abilities—and so they reveal little about children‘s understanding of God‘s extraordinary 
mind in particular. Moreover, because conceptual development proceeds differently for 
different domains of knowledge (Gelman & Kalish, 1996; Wellman & Gelman, 1998), a 
developing understanding of extraordinary minds may proceed on a different timetable 
than developing understandings of other extraordinary capacities. Acknowledging these 
limitations and recognizing that children can entertain some abstract notions much earlier 
in development than Piaget proposed, Barrett and colleagues set out to examine just how 
early an understanding of mental infallibility emerges (Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 
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2001; Barrett & Richert, 2003; Knight, Sousa, Barrett, & Atran, 2004; Richert & Barrett, 
2005). They administered to young children theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks for which a 
piece of information was obstructed or obscured (e.g., an object was in an unfamiliar 
closed container) and only the child and experimenter knew the information. Children 
reasoned whether God, ordinary humans, and other beings would hold that knowledge as 
well. Findings revealed that children attributed correct knowledge to God both before and 
after they started to report (at around 5-years of age) that ordinary humans (e.g., their 
mother) would lack such knowledge.  
Drawing upon their findings, Barrett and colleagues forwarded a preparedness 
hypothesis, which states that very young children are prepared to understand all minds as 
infallible, and this makes them particularly capable of representing radically non-human, 
extraordinary minds, including the mind of the Judeo-Christian God: ―on many 
properties, young children seem equipped with default assumptions that better match 
theological descriptions of God than adult conceptions of people‖ (Barrett & Richert, 
2003, p. 309).   
The preparedness hypothesis is intriguing, especially when teamed with research 
demonstrating that we have a host of other cognitive biases that predispose us to detect 
and believe in extraordinary beings, including biases to detect agency in the world, to see 
nature as purposeful, and to see the world, including people, as intentionally designed 
(Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2003; Evans, 2000a; Guthrie, 1993; Kelemen, 2004). However, 
there are many problems with the preparedness hypothesis, both theoretical and 
empirical. One theoretical problem involves how adaptive it would be for children to 
think that everyone is all-knowing or mentally infallible, considering that children 
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interact daily with individuals who clearly are neither. Indeed, if it is somehow adaptive 
to believe that other people are all-knowing, why do young children begin to 
acknowledge others‘ mental limits so early in development? Later, I will discuss why it 
might be advantageous for children to recognize others‘ fallibilities from an early age. 
 Further theoretical issues become apparent when considering non-human and 
atypical ToM development. From a preparedness perspective, young preschoolers‘ over-
attribution of their own knowledge to others on ToM tasks, for example false-belief tasks, 
is taken as evidence that children are prepared to understand infallible minds (e.g., Barrett 
et al., 2001; Barrett & Richert, 2003; Richert & Barrett, 2005). By 5-years, most children 
realize that people will hold false beliefs on these tasks (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001), but some older children (and adults) continue to over-attribute knowledge to 
others on these tasks; notably, individuals who have autism spectrum disorders (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, in press). Using the logic 
of the preparedness hypothesis, these individuals should be particularly likely to find 
beings with infallible minds, like the Judeo-Christian God, appealing. Yet a recent study 
suggests that the exact opposite is true—individuals with autism spectrum disorders are 
more likely than typically-developing individuals to be atheist (Caldwel-Harris, Murphy, 
Velazquez, & McNamara, 2011). A similar problem with the preparedness hypothesis 
arises when the social-cognitive capacities of other species are considered. Recent 
research demonstrates that chimpanzees have some rudimentary understanding of the 
mind, but they typically fail false-belief tasks (for review, see Call & Tomasello, 2008). 
Would preparedness theorists argue then that chimpanzees (as well as other non-human 
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animals that have concepts of others‘ minds) are prepared to represent and believe in 
extraordinary, infallible beings? 
The last theoretical problem with the preparedness hypothesis becomes apparent 
when considering children‘s concepts and naïve theories about other domains. The 
preparedness hypothesis holds that children‘s failure to acknowledge others‘ mental 
fallibilities reflects an understanding of (or at least a preparedness to understand) mental 
infallibility. In other words, not understanding particular constraints prepares children to 
understand phenomena that exceed those constraints. Consider what this logic (about 
children‘s understanding of psychology) would suggest if it is applied to other domains 
of thought? We might conclude that young children‘s difficulty conceptualizing time, 
teamed with an early difficulty conceptualizing space, prepares young children to 
understand Einstein‘s theory that space and time are relative. 
In addition to the theoretical arguments against the preparedness hypothesis, 
empirical evidence is also needed. In advance of the studies presented here, two studies 
made initial strides in that direction (Giménez-Dasí, Guerrero, & Harris, 2005; Makris & 
Pnevmatikos, 2007). In these studies, preschoolers were given knowledge-ignorance and 
false-belief tasks where they reasoned about the epistemic states of ordinary humans and 
of God. In contrast to Barrett and colleagues‘ findings, Makris and Pnevmatikos (2007) 
found that 3- and 4-year-olds attributed ignorance not just to an ordinary human but also 
to God, and Giménez-Dasí and colleagues (2005) also found that 4-year-olds attributed 
false beliefs to God. Older children differentiated between humans‘ fallible mental states 
and God‘s less fallible mental states. Thus, these results undermine preparedness claims 
that for older children to represent God‘s mind they merely continue to apply their earlier 
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(3-year-old) default understanding of extraordinary minds. Rather, there may be 
developmental periods when children first attribute ordinary human limits to ordinary 
and extraordinary beings before appropriately attributing extraordinary capacities to 
extraordinary beings. These results thus support an alternative anthropomorphism 
hypothesis, which states, broadly, that children‘s understanding of extraordinary minds 
emerges from an understanding of ordinary, anthropomorphic minds; not the other way 
around.  
There are several variants of an anthropomorphism hypothesis (for different 
versions, see Barrett & Richert, 2003; Boyer, 1996; Piaget, 1969/1929). Perhaps the most 
popular version, taken from Piagetian theory, is that young children consider adults and 
God to possess many of the same psychological, biological, and physical properties: 
―Either God is a person or men are gods, or else God is the chief of men‖ (Piaget, 
1969/1929, p. 382). Piaget himself, however, did not take a strong stance on whether 
children consider adults to be perfect (like God) or whether children initially consider 
God to be imperfect (like humans). The anthropomorphism hypothesis that I focus on 
here reflects the latter assumption—children‘s God concepts build upon their 
understanding of ordinary humans—and is consistent with the reasoning that Makris and 
Pnevmatikos (2007) use to interpret their findings: ―younger children are not better 
prepared to understand God‘s mental properties than those of humans but rather that they 
tend to project systematically onto God the properties that each time they attribute to 
humans‖ (Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007, p. 373).  
What about the data showing that 3-year-olds over-attribute correct knowledge 
and beliefs to many agents on ToM tasks? Here we do not face conflicting results; all of 
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the studies reviewed have found this trend, and this tendency has long been acknowledge 
in the ToM literature (e.g., Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  Here 
we face conflicting interpretations with, as yet, no further data to distinguish them. From 
a preparedness perspective, these data represent young children‘s attribution of mental 
infallibility to all beings. From an anthropomorphism perspective, these data do not 
represent an understanding of mental infallibility, they represent a reality bias—the 
tendency for young children, who have little explicit knowledge of the mind, to answer 
questions about others‘ knowledge by simply referring to or reporting reality (or, what 
they themselves represent to be the actual state of affairs).  
The studies of Barrett and colleagues on the one hand (Barrett et al., 2001; Knight 
et al., 2004; Richert & Barrett, 2005), and the studies of Giménez-Dasí et al. (2005) and 
of Makris and Pnevmatikos (2007) on the other hand leave us with two sets of contrasting 
findings, not to mention different sets of interpretations, apparently supporting two 
contradictory theories concerning children's emerging understanding of extraordinary 
minds. The three studies in this dissertation were designed to resolve these conflicting 
findings and interpretations as well as to extend prior work, by examining not just when 
children first begin to attribute privileged knowledge to extraordinary beings, but also by 
assessing the breadth and depth of knowledge that children of different ages (as well as 
adults) attribute to extraordinary beings. Moreover, these studies were designed to 
identify socio-cultural and cognitive factors that might facilitate a developing 
understanding of omniscience.  
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Resolving Discrepancies in Prior Findings 
Discrepancies in prior findings may be products of several factors, notably 
differences in sampling techniques and differences in the tasks that children completed. 
The methods that I employed in Studies 1 and 2 attended to both of these factors. First, 
prior discrepancies may be products of sampling differences. Most studies have assessed 
developmental trends by splitting their samples into broad age groups—for example, a 
group of 3-year-olds, a group of 4-year-olds, and a group of children 5-years and older—
with the intent of using the middle group (4-year-olds) as a test of the anthropomorphism 
versus preparedness hypotheses. The logic goes that, if 4-year-olds (who are often 
beginning to attribute false beliefs and ignorance to ordinary humans) also attribute 
mental fallibilities to God, then the preparedness hypothesis loses support. The problem 
with this sampling technique is that, in some populations, the initial understanding of 
certain ordinary mental limits (and thus the extension of mental limits to extraordinary 
beings) may occur during that pre-defined middle period (4-years of age), whereas in 
other populations it may not. Indeed, the average age at which children begin to 
acknowledge that ordinary people have certain mental fallibilities, for example false 
beliefs, may differ on the order of several months, or even close to a year between 
populations (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
The fact that some studies do not find that children in this middle group attribute 
fallibilities to God could simply be because sampling techniques glossed-over this 
(potentially brief) developmental period. Studies 1 and 2 attended to this possibility by 
densely sampling children at an age when children in those particular populations began 
to attribute certain mental fallibilities to ordinary humans. The two mental fallibilities 
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that I focused on were ignorance and false-beliefs. Because children reach an 
understanding of ignorance before understanding false beliefs (Wellman & Liu, 2004), 
age groupings were appropriately different for the two tasks—the key middle groups 
were slightly younger for analyses using the knowledge-ignorance task. 
Another potential reason why findings vary between prior studies is because 
different studies have used different ToM tasks. Barrett and colleagues typically used 
tasks in which children had access to the information they were asked about, and thus 
children were able to merely attribute their own knowledge (of reality) to others on these 
tasks. Makris and Pnevmatikos (2007) used one of Barrett et al.‘s (2001) tasks, where 
children themselves possessed the critical knowledge, as well as a task for which children 
did not themselves have access to the key information. Using Barrett and colleagues‘ 
task, Makris and Pnevmatikos replicated Barrett and colleagues‘ results—children of all 
ages did not attribute ignorance to God; but when using the knowledge-ignorance task 
where children did not have access to the knowledge (so they were less subject to a 
reality bias), their 4-year-olds typically reported that all agents, including God, would not 
know the key information. These results may be a product of the different tasks used or 
they may be a function of the age-grouping and sampling issues discussed earlier, or they 
could be a product of both the tasks and age groupings. 
 Using the sampling methods discussed above, I employed tasks similar to those 
used by Barrett et al. (2001) to determine if their findings were simply artifacts of the 
tasks that they used or if their results can be better explained by the sampling issues 
discussed earlier. In both Studies 1 and 2, I found that children in the key middle age 
groups, who were just beginning to attribute ignorance or false beliefs to ordinary 
149 
 
humans, also attributed those same fallibilities to God. This was the case for children 
attending secular schools (Study 1) as well as for children who attended religious schools 
and were particularly knowledgeable about God (Study 2). Moreover, I was able to 
replicate the developmental trends reported by Barrett and colleagues—when I split my 
Study 1 sample equally into thirds (glossing over the periods when children developed 
initial understandings of the two fallibilities), none of the resulting age groups extended 
mental fallibilities to God. Thus it seems that Barrett and colleagues‘ results are largely a 
function of their sampling techniques. Conceivably though, the periods when children 
extend fallibilities to extraordinary beings may be lengthier and easier to capture with 
tasks where very young children cannot simply use reality to guide their mental 
inferences. This may explain how others have found these periods of over-extension with 
broader age-groupings—for Makris and Pnevmatikos‘ (2007) traditional knowledge-
ignorance task and for half of Giminez-Dasi‘s et al.‘s (2005) task, children were not 
aware of reality and could not attribute their own knowledge to other beings. 
Beyond the two factors discussed above (different tasks and sampling methods) 
an additional reason for the discrepancies in prior research could be that children from 
different backgrounds attribute different abilities to God. In these tasks, there are 
conceivably several reasons why children would attribute to God privileged knowledge. 
The first is a reality bias, discussed briefly above; for these tasks, children could simply 
use reality to guide their inferences about others‘ knowledge. But, as also discussed, this 
would not indicate that children understood that anything was extraordinary about God‘s 
capacities. Alternatively, if they had learned about God‘s perceptual powers, they may 
attribute knowledge to God because of his exceptional perceptual capacities (e.g., an 
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ability to see through the box); this is indeed extraordinary but it does not reflect mental 
infallibility per se. Lastly, children may have learned about God‘s extraordinary mind and 
so appreciated that God could possess knowledge by virtue of his mind and without the 
use of a sense like vision. To examine what extraordinary capacities (if any) young 
children grasp, I used two techniques in Studies 1 and 2: (1) children reasoned about the 
knowledge held by agents with different capacities (ordinary humans, a superhero and a 
cat with special vision, and Mr. Smart who ―knows everything‖ but does not have special 
perception), and (2) children explained why each agent would possess knowledge.  
The youngest children in both Studies 1 and 2 (3-year-olds) attributed ―correct‖ 
knowledge to all beings but their reasons for doing so were either uninformative (e.g., ―I 
don‘t know‖, ―Because‖) or reflected a reality bias (―Because I know‖, ―That‘s what‘s 
inside the box‖). These young children rarely mentioned agents‘ perceptual or mental 
abilities. Thus, it is not clear if 3-year-olds were actually considering the contents of 
different beings‘ minds or if they were just citing reality for these tasks. Indeed, even 
when children were taught that Mr. Smart ―is very smart, he knows everything‖, they 
very rarely mention that in their reasoning—information about Mr. Smart‘s mind did not 
seem relevant to the 3-year-olds. Four-year olds often attributed accurate knowledge to 
the superhero and to the cat, and explained that they would acquire their knowledge 
through their exceptional perception; however 4-year-olds did not use this reasoning for 
the other agents. 
In addition to referring to the special perception of the superhero and the cat, 5-
year-olds explained that God will know the contents of the container because of his 
extraordinary mind or perception, and explained that Mr. Smart will know the contents of 
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the container because of his extraordinary mind. Thus, how 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds 
reasoned about extraordinary beings‘ minds is quite different. These reasoning data 
provide additional support for an anthropomorphism hypothesis—an understanding of 
extraordinary minds is not simply continuous across the preschool years, as proposed by 
the preparedness hypothesis (Barrett & Richert, 2003; Richert & Barrett, 2005). 
Extending Beyond the Paradigms of Prior Research 
Studies 1 and 2 shed light on how children reach an initial understanding of 
extraordinary mental capacities. However, these studies, as well as most prior work, have 
been limited in several ways. The knowledge that children attributed to extraordinary 
beings in prior studies is often knowledge that children themselves possess. Moreover, 
the knowledge is typically about accessible (though somewhat obstructed) facts about the 
here-and-now (e.g., the contents of closed boxes, or the content of drawings that are 
placed at a distance). Five-year-olds‘ understandings that extraordinary beings can 
possess such knowledge is impressive, but this is far from understanding infallibility or 
omniscience. Omniscience is knowledge of everything about everything, not just 
knowledge that children possess and not just knowledge about the immediate, proximate, 
and tangible. Using a new set of tasks, Study 3 more comprehensively examined the 
types (or breadth) of knowledge that children and adults attributed to an extraordinary 
being as well as the amount (or depth) of knowledge that participants granted to that 
extraordinary being. Moreover, developmental trends were examined beyond the 
preschool years—Study 3 additionally included elementary-school children and adults.  
To examine the breadth of knowledge that participants attributed to an all-
knowing being, they were first taught about Ms. Smart, who knows ―everything about 
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everything,‖ and they were asked whether she possessed several types of knowledge, 
including knowledge of non-personal facts about the past, present, and future, as well as 
personal information about people. In contrast to adults, who attributed all forms of 
knowledge to Ms. Smart, children, especially preschoolers were conservative in the 
breadth of knowledge that they attribute to Ms. Smart. Children often denied Ms. Smart 
knowledge of other people (their thoughts and preferences) and non-personal facts about 
the past and future. Moreover, preschoolers very rarely attributed all forms of knowledge 
to Ms. Smart. Thus, far from being an idea that children are prepared to grasp, an 
understanding that beings possess these and all other types of knowledge is not intuitive 
to children, even by the elementary-school years.  
However, when provided additional evidence and instruction about Ms. Smart‘s 
extraordinary mind—including information about her ―very, very special brain‖, and 
corrective feedback about her knowledge of ―everything about everything‖—3- to 4.5-
year-olds granted her a broad body of knowledge, including knowledge about the future 
and some personal knowledge of other people (their thoughts and preferences). 
Moreover, and critically, these children attributed a broader set of knowledge to Ms. 
Smart than they attributed to an ordinary person—their mothers. Yet even with this rich 
instruction about Ms. Smart‘s mind, 3- to 4.5-year-olds were more conservative than 
older children and adults in their attributions of knowledge about the past and about other 
people to Ms. Smart, especially knowledge of others‘ behavior and personal events. 
Moreover, only a minority of 3- to 4.5-year-olds attributed to Ms. Smart all forms of 
knowledge that they were asked about. In contrast, when provided this more elaborated 
introduction about her extraordinary mind, older children (4.5-years and older) attributed 
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each form of knowledge to Ms. Smart.  Developmental shifts in understanding of Ms. 
Smart‘s capacities were also evident in participants‘ reasoning about her knowledge. 
When reasoning about how Ms. Smart would possess this knowledge, there was a steady 
age-graded increase in participants‘ reference to Ms. Smart‘s extraordinary mind; with 
preschoolers rarely using this reasoning and adults typically using this reasoning. Older 
children‘s understanding of Ms. Smart‘s breadth of knowledge was significantly 
correlated with their ability to imagine improbable phenomena, suggesting that this 
capacity may support a developing understanding of omniscience. 
Another novel component of Study 3 was an assessment of the extent to which 
participants understood the depth of extraordinary beings‘ knowledge. This was done by 
having participants decide who was more knowledgeable about certain domain-specific 
information, Ms. Smart or an expert on that domain. If participants understood that an 
extraordinary being can know everything within a domain, they should have always 
reported that Ms. Smart knows more than the expert. However, the exact opposite was 
true of 3- to 4.5-year-olds—they typically reported that the experts know more. 
Elementary-school children performed better on this task but still not as well as adults, 
who typically reported that Ms. Smart knows more than the experts. This developmental 
pattern held true even when participants were given the elaborated introduction and 
corrective feedback about Ms. Smart‘s knowledge. In sum, grasping the depth of an all-
knowing being‘s knowledge is particularly difficult, even with extensive training, and it 
is certainly not something that young children are prepared to understand. However, there 
is evidence that older children can grasp this idea if other, supporting, cognitive 
competencies are in place. Among the oldest participants, those whose understanding of 
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infinity was on-par with adults were also similar to adults in the depth of knowledge they 
attributed to Ms. Smart. 
The Role of Socio-Cultural Input in Facilitating an Understanding of Extraordinary 
Minds 
Concepts of extraordinary minds do not develop in a vacuum. Much as a 
developing understanding of ordinary minds is contingent upon social interaction, 
including conversations about the mind (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004), an understanding of 
extraordinary minds might also be contingent upon socio-cultural input, specifically 
exposure to ideas about extraordinary beings. The only researchers to consider this were 
Giménez-Dasí et al. (2005), who found trends suggesting that religiously-schooled 
children better understood God‘s extraordinary mental capacities, but this trend was not 
statistically significant and the study lacked statistical power to answer this question. 
Studies 2 and 3 specifically considered the socio-cultural input that children receive about 
beings with extraordinary mental abilities, namely the Judeo-Christian God.  
The role of socio-cultural input in facilitating an understanding of extraordinary 
minds was assessed in several ways. First, preschoolers who attended secular preschools 
(Study 1) were directly compared to preschoolers from religious preschools (Study 2), 
who engaged in more activities involving ideas about God, and whose parents reported 
that it was more important for them to know about God. Children in both samples went 
through a developmental period (at around 4-years of age) during which they attributed 
fallible mental states (false beliefs and ignorance) to God, consistent with an 
anthropomorphism hypothesis. However, intriguingly, in comparison to secularly-
schooled children from Study 1, religiously-schooled children from Study 2 did not go 
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through this developmental period when reasoning about Ms. Smart, whom children were 
just taught ―knows everything.‖ Thus, although children at this age may not intuitively 
think of familiar beings (like the Judeo-Christian God) as possessing extraordinary 
mental abilities, cultural input about God‘s powers facilitated their ability to apply this 
understanding to a new being when that being‘s powers were called to the forefront of 
children‘s minds—children were instructed and reminded about Mr. Smart‘s mind but 
experimenters told them nothing about God. 
Another way that I examined the role of socio-cultural input was by assessing 
relations between children‘s knowledge of extraordinary beings and their understanding 
of extraordinary minds. Combining data across samples from Studies 1 and 2, I assessed 
relations between children‘s knowledge of God and their attributions of mental states to 
God, Mr. Smart and Heroman (a superhero who has x-ray vision). Children‘s knowledge 
of God was related to attributions of correct mental states to all three agents; however, 
this was true only among children who simultaneously attributed ignorance and false-
beliefs to ordinary humans on the same tasks—children who had acquired a 
representational ToM. Among younger preschoolers, children‘s knowledge of God was 
unrelated to children‘s attributions of mental states to extraordinary beings. Likewise, in 
Study 3, children who engaged in more activities involving ideas of God and children 
who attended a place of worship more often attributed a broader set of knowledge to Ms. 
Smart. But again, this was true only among children who had acquired a representational 
ToM (4.5- to 6.5-year-olds), not younger children.   
The fact that socio-cultural input predicted advanced understanding of 
extraordinary minds, but only among children who understood certain limits of ordinary 
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human minds, is consistent with other research demonstrating that the force of socio-
cultural experience on social-cognitive development varies along with children‘s level of 
development. For example, the presence of older siblings facilitates a more advanced 
understanding of ordinary minds (specifically, false-belief understanding), but only 
among older preschoolers, not younger children (Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & 
Clements, 1998). My findings, as well as those of Ruffman and colleagues, are consistent 
with modern theories of conceptual development, which hold that the extent to which 
new information fosters conceptual change is a function of one‘s existing cognitive 
architecture (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). These results are 
also consistent with Sperber‘s (1990, 1996) reasoning that the successful cultural 
transmission of representations is a function of the cultural representations that 
individuals already hold. There is something about the period shortly after children 
develop a representational ToM that makes them particularly receptive to culturally-
provided information about extraordinary minds. 
Developmental Story Told by the Current Studies 
Collectively, the studies in this dissertation reveal an intriguing story about 
children‘s developing understanding of extraordinary minds. This is not a story of a 
general age-graded increase in children‘s abstract reasoning about God, as might be 
predicted from Piagetian theory (Piaget, 1969/1929). Moreover, it is not a nativist story 
of children intuitively understanding extraordinary mental capacities, as might be 
concluded from a preparedness perspective (Barrett & Richert, 2003; Richert & Barrett, 
2005). The actual story, which I have started to uncover here, is more nuanced and 
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multifaceted, and accords more with our current knowledge of children‘s conceptual 
development.  
 Children‘s earliest understanding of the mind is an understanding of an 
anthropomorphic mind. This is important, as the vast majority of the minds that children 
need to contemplate, interact with, and learn from are the minds of ordinary, fallible 
people. From a very young age, children acknowledge certain limits of people. Older 
infants and toddlers realize that people are imperfect producers of information; they will 
spontaneously deny and correct others (even adults) who make statements that are clearly 
false (Koenig & Echols, 2003; Pea, 1982). This early skepticism is arguably adaptive in 
several regards. First, falsely assuming that others are infallible might limit children‘s 
motivation to interact with and learn from their environment first-hand. Second, because 
the information that others provide is frequently unreliable (because of informants‘ 
ignorance, mis-statements, pretence, or deceptiveness), if children were to accept 
everything they heard as true, their knowledge base would become ―alarmingly unstable‖ 
(Perner, 1988, p. 145). 
However, at this young age, children do over-estimate others‘ knowledge—in 
particular, they are prone to attribute their own knowledge to others (Birch & Bloom, 
2003; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). I have referred to this early tendency as a reality bias, 
and have noted that this tendency is not specific to children—even adults over-attribute 
their own knowledge to others in certain situations (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Nickerson, 
1999)—and this tendency is also not specific to humans ( Call & Tomasello, 2008). This 
tendency should not be taken as evidence that children think that others are infallible or 
omniscient—omniscience is much more than a being knowing what others know. 
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Further, and importantly, there is also no evidence that this early tendency is necessary 
for children to initially understand certain extraordinary mental capacities. Indeed, 
consistent with the findings of others (Giménez-Dasí et al., 2005; Makris & Pnevmatikos, 
2007), in Studies 1 and 2, 5-year-olds understood that God holds privileged knowledge, 
even though children just months younger had not granted that knowledge to God. This 
demonstrates that there is no need to be ―prepared‖ to understand mental infallibility in 
order to develop an initial understanding of extraordinary minds (for a similar argument, 
see Rottman & Kelemen, in press). Not only do older preschoolers understand that a 
familiar being, like God, possesses privileged knowledge, but if they receive detailed 
information about a new being with an extraordinary mind older preschoolers report that 
he too possesses privileged knowledge and children explain that it is because of his mind.  
The current studies reveal that the knowledge young children attribute to 
extraordinary beings is not limited to information that children know or even to easily-
accessible information about the here-and-now. If provided extensive information and 
training about a being‘s extraordinary mind, preschoolers attribute to that being a broad 
set of knowledge, including knowledge of non-personal facts about the past and present, 
as well as some personal information (e.g., knowledge of others‘ actions and thoughts). 
Importantly, young children attribute this knowledge to extraordinary beings while 
appropriately denying that knowledge to familiar adults. This early understanding of 
extraordinary knowledge may reflect children‘s use of a heuristic: if X is something to be 
known, and if the agent is ―all-knowing‖, then the agent knows X. Though apparently 
simple, this heuristic is not consistently applied until about 5- or 6-years of age. In 
contrast, young preschoolers tend to deny certain forms of personal information to 
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extraordinary beings, even if they are taught that the being ―knows everything about 
everything.‖  
Once children have acquired a representational ToM and have begun to 
acknowledge certain limits of the human mind, such as ignorance and false beliefs, socio-
cultural input can play an important role in children‘s understanding of the types of 
knowledge that extraordinary beings possess. Older preschoolers who are regularly 
exposed to ideas about the Judeo-Christian God, an omniscient being, attribute to other 
all-knowing beings extraordinary knowledge at an earlier age than children with less 
exposure to God concepts. Moreover, older preschoolers with greater exposure to ideas 
about God attribute to other ―all knowing‖ beings a broader set of knowledge.  This 
facilitation may be a product of frequent messages that some children receive about the 
types of knowledge that God possesses (e.g., knowledge of people‘s beliefs, intentions, 
and behavior). Children can then apply this understanding to new beings with 
extraordinary minds.  
How beings acquire their knowledge factors strongly in how children reason 
about their knowledge base. If a being has mechanisms that can be used to acquire certain 
knowledge, children find it easier to grasp that the being will possess that knowledge. For 
example, 4-year-olds understand that beings with exceptional perception (e.g., 
superheroes with x-ray vision) can acquire knowledge that would be visually obstructed 
to ordinary people; and children understand this before understanding that an all-knowing 
being can possess the same knowledge without the use of perception (Lane et al., 2010). 
Children also spontaneously create means through which extraordinary beings acquire 
knowledge, and young children who believe that all-knowing beings exist commonly 
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explain that such beings acquire their knowledge through ordinary media, first-hand 
experience, and social interaction. Thus, when children seriously consider how a being 
could possesses information that would be difficult (or impossible) for ordinary people to 
possess, a typical first solution is that such beings use ordinary means to collect 
information. Assuming that extraordinary beings are using these mechanisms makes the 
idea of all-knowingness less counterintuitive and easier for children to cognitively 
represent. Older children and adults do not need to assume that an extraordinary being‘s 
knowledge hinges upon ordinary  mechanisms; for them the fact that a being ―knows 
everything about everything‖ is reason enough to attribute many (perhaps all) forms of 
knowledge to that being. An emerging ability to imagine beings who can acquire 
extraordinary knowledge without the use of ordinary mechanisms may be reflected in 
positive relations found between older children‘s ability to imagine the improbable and 
the breadth of knowledge they attribute to all-knowing beings. 
Thus, by 5- or 6-years of age, children can attribute a wide variety of knowledge 
to extraordinary beings, including knowledge that children and most other people do not 
and cannot possess. However, understanding omniscience is more than attributing many 
forms of knowledge to a being. Another important aspect of omniscience is the depth of 
an all-knowing being‘s knowledge. An omniscient being knows everything about every 
topic or domain, and thus an omniscient being‘s knowledge about a domain exceeds even 
experts‘ knowledge. This is something that children have particular difficulty grasping. 
When asked whether an all-knowing being or an expert holds more knowledge within the 
expert‘s domain, preschoolers overwhelmingly report that the expert is more 
knowledgeable. Elementary-school children perform better than preschoolers but are still 
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not on par with adults, who firmly understand that the all-knowing being will always 
possess more knowledge in a domain. Understanding the depth of extraordinary beings‘ 
knowledge may be facilitated by a more general ability to conceptualize extremely large 
amounts or to grasp the idea of limitlessness. Older children with an advanced 
understanding of infinity (which may rely on conceptualizing extremely large amounts 
and on conceptualizing limitlessness) have a more adult-like understanding of 
extraordinary beings‘ depth of knowledge. 
Thus, children can begin to represent some concepts of extraordinary minds 
during the preschool years; however, this understanding is initially limited. Although 
some preschoolers may report that they know someone who knows everything or may 
report that it is possible for someone to know everything, an understanding of what it 
means to ―know everything‖ is quite narrow in the preschool years and is certainly not 
what comes to mind when adults contemplate beings who know everything.  Moreover, 
children who claim that all-knowing beings exist typically grant those beings relatively 
ordinary knowledge (about objects, places, and people) and explain that their knowledge 
is acquired though ordinary (human-like) means (e.g., through common media, first-hand 
experience, and interactions with others).   
Future Directions 
We know much more now about how children develop an understanding of 
extraordinary minds. Yet the developmental story told by the studies in this dissertation is 
far from complete. Moreover, the data presented here raise several new questions that 
warrant future empirical attention. Both Studies 2 and 3 suggest that socio-cultural input 
plays an important role in children‘s initial understanding of extraordinary minds; 
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exposure to ideas about beings with extraordinary mental capacities, in this case the 
Judeo-Christian God, appears to facilitate children‘s understanding of other extraordinary 
beings‘ knowledge. All of these studies, however, were conducted in the United States, 
where ideas about extraordinary religious deities are commonplace, and thus even 
children who had not been exposed to religious concepts by their parents or teachers 
might have still been exposed to these concepts via the mass media or through their 
friends. Using the methods employed in these studies, it would certainly be interesting to 
see if the development of these concepts is delayed or more seriously compromised in 
cultures where such concepts are not as prominent.  
The current data also suggest another interesting role of culture in the 
development and application of these concepts. In Study 3B, older children‘s (6.5- to 11-
year-olds‘) exposure to ideas about the Judeo-Christian God was negatively related to 
their attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart. Though these correlations were not 
statistically significant, they are supported by the results of another, ongoing, study that 
uses the same methods as those from Study 3B. In this ongoing study, children were 
recruited from an elementary school with a predominately Muslim population, located in 
a community in which concepts of the Judeo-Christian God are prominent and strongly 
endorsed. Compared to elementary-school children in Study 3B, these children attributed 
fewer types of knowledge to Ms. Smart (a more limited breadth of knowledge) as well as 
greater knowledge to experts than to Ms. Smart (a more limited depth of knowledge). 
Thus, at a certain point in development, once children appreciate what it means for a 
being to possess particular knowledge, they may resist attributing that knowledge to 
extraordinary beings if they are raised with the notion that such knowledge is exclusive to 
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God. These results are preliminary but indicate that it is worth considering both 
facilitation and suppression effects in future studies that explore the influence of socio-
cultural input on an emerging understanding of extraordinary minds. 
So far, studies on the topic of children‘s developing concepts of extraordinary 
minds have examined the types, quality, and depth of knowledge that children attribute to 
all-knowing beings. Yet the mind is more than a container of knowledge; the mind is 
active. Ordinary people have certain mechanisms through which they acquire 
knowledge—for example, by asking others or by perceiving things first-hand—and they 
can use that knowledge to plan their behavior, to make predictions, and so on. From 
Study 1, we know that children more easily grasp that a being possesses privileged 
knowledge if that being has exceptional mechanisms allowing him to perceive that 
knowledge, for example x-ray vision. From Study 3, we know that children 
spontaneously create ordinary mechanisms through which extraordinary beings acquire 
knowledge (e.g., by perceiving it first-hand or by asking someone). Indeed, young 
children who report that someone can know ―everything about everything‖ often explain 
that the person or being will acquire their knowledge through ordinary mechanisms (e.g., 
books, television, or conversation). In contrast, adults are more comfortable concluding 
that a being has privileged knowledge simply because he ―knows everything about 
everything.‖ This developmental shift—from assuming that there are mechanisms that all 
beings use to acquire knowledge to entertaining the notion that an extraordinary being 
can possess knowledge without using any mechanism—seems to be an important one, 
and deserves further empirical attention. There are several ways to systematically study 
this development. For example, children can be asked to reason about the knowledge held 
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by an all-knowing being that is blind or to reason about the knowledge held by an all-
knowing baby, who has limited experience with the world.  
The mind does not just acquire and store information. The mind also uses that 
information to affect the world—to perform physical actions (e.g., to write a book), to 
influence others‘ actions (e.g., to get others to read your book), and to influence others‘ 
thoughts (e.g., to convince others that you are a good writer). Ordinary humans are 
limited in the extent to which they can affect the world with their minds alone—we 
cannot move objects with our minds (we need bodies), we cannot communicate with our 
minds alone (we need to use overt signals), and we cannot change others‘ minds simply 
because we will it. This is not the case for a being with an all-powerful mind, which 
would be able to do all of these things. Future studies should examine not just what 
knowledge children attribute to beings with extraordinary minds but also what types of 
extraordinary outcomes such beings can produce with their minds.   
Finally, it is important to know what cognitive architecture is necessary to support 
a developing understanding of extraordinary minds. As a start, in Study 3B I identified 
two capacities—an ability to imagine the improbable and an understanding of infinity or 
limitlessness—which were strongly related to knowledge that older children attributed to 
an all-knowing being. A central premise that I and others (e.g., Evans & Wellman, 2006; 
Makris & Pnevmatikos, 2007) have advanced is that children‘s understanding of 
extraordinary minds stems from their understanding of ordinary minds. Thus future 
studies can make use of scales that have recently been developed to gauge ToM 
development during the preschool and elementary-school years (Peterson, Wellman, & 
Slaughter, in press) to see how this relates to children‘s performance on the 
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extraordinary-minds tasks employed in these studies.  Future studies should also consider 
how capacities that contribute to children‘s understanding of ordinary minds—including 
executive functions and language (Astington, 2004; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Cutting & 
Dunn, 1999; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006)—might also contribute to 
children‘s understanding of extraordinary minds.  
In conclusion, young children are clearly not prepared to understand extraordinary 
minds, but the ability to do so begins to emerge relatively early, by the late preschool 
years. However, acquiring a full-fledged understanding of omniscience is a protracted 
developmental process that takes place through late childhood and perhaps through 
adolescence and early adulthood. This development is a gradual process of overturning 
intuitions about the capacities and constraints of the mind; a process facilitated by socio-
cultural input that children receive about extraordinary beings, and supported by the 
development of several other cognitive competencies.   
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Figure 1-1. Study 1: Percentage of children, by age group, reporting that the protagonist 
will hold a false belief (i.e., will think there are crayons in the crayon box). 
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Figure 1-2. Study 1: Percentage of children, by age group, reporting that the protagonist 
will not perceive the contents of the unlit box (i.e., will think that the unlit box is empty). 
 
 168 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Study 2: Percentage of children, by age group, reporting that the protagonist 
will be ignorant about as to the contents of the unlit box (i.e., will think that the unlit box 
has nothing inside). 
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Figure 2-2. Study 2: Percentage of children, by age group, reporting that the protagonist 
will hold a false belief (i.e., will think that there are crayons in the box). 
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Figure 3-1. Study 3A: Mean attributions of greater knowledge to Ms. Smart, for 
information outside of experts‘ domains of expertise. Participants could earn a maximum 
score of 8. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 3-2. Study 3A: Mean attributions of greater knowledge to Ms. Smart, for 
information within experts‘ domains of expertise. Participants could earn a maximum 
score of 8. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
 172 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3. Study 3B: Mean attributions of greater knowledge to Ms. Smart, for 
information outside of experts‘ domains of expertise. Participants could earn a maximum 
score of 8. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 3-4. Study 3B: Mean attributions of greater knowledge to Ms. Smart, for 
information within experts‘ domains of expertise. Participants could earn a maximum 
score of 8. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Table 1-1 
Study 1: Chi-Square Analyses Comparing Children’s Attribution of False-beliefs to 
Both Agents Against Chance 
Agent Heroman  Mr. Smart  God 
Mother χ2(1, 18) = 8.00**  χ2(1, 21) = 10.71**  χ2(1, 22) = 14.73*** 
Girl χ2(1, 18) = 5.56*  χ2(1, 21) = 8.05**  χ2(1, 22) = 11.64*** 
Note. Eighteen children attributed a false-belief to Heroman, 21 to Mr. Smart, and 22 to 
God.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
  
Table 1-2 
Study 1: Coding of Open-ended Responses 
Category Description 
Examples 
False-Belief Task Knowledge-Ignorance Task 
Reality-based 
 
Child cites actual contents of the 
containers. Child does not 
mention agent‘s mental or 
perceptual capacities 
―There are marbles inside the 
box‖ 
―The crayons are in the bag‖ 
―I saw it in there‖ 
―There is a frog inside‖ 
―I saw it in there‖ 
Appearance-based 
 
Child cites the appearance of the 
box 
―There are crayons on the box‖ 
―It looks like a crayon box‖ 
―It says ‗crayons‘‖ 
―It‘s dark‖ 
―It looks like its empty‖ 
Typicality-based 
 
Child cites the type of container 
or mentions what that the type of 
box typically holds 
―It‘s a crayon box‖ 
―There‘s usually crayons in a 
crayon box‖ 
―It‘s supposed to be in there‖ 
―Frogs live in boxes‖ 
Exceptional Perceptual 
Capacities  
 
Child cites agent‘s exceptional 
senses (vision, hearing) when 
justifying why the agent will 
think the true contents are inside 
―He has special/x-ray/lit-up eyes‖ 
―He can see in the dark‖ 
―He heard us talking about the 
marbles‖ 
―He can see in the dark‖ 
―Because he saw it‖ 
―Heard us talking about the frog‖ 
Inadequate Perceptual 
Capacities 
 
Child cites agent‘s inadequate, 
senses (e.g., inadequate vision) 
―He can‘t see through things" 
―He can‘t see‖ 
―Can‘t see in closed things‖ 
―It‘s too dark to see inside‖ 
―He can‘t see‖ 
―Light isn‘t on‖  
Extraordinary Mental 
Capacities 
 
Child cites agent‘s mental 
capacities without referring to 
perceptual capacities 
―He‘s super smart‖ 
―He knows everything‖ 
 
―He‘s very smart‖ 
―He thinks very good‖ 
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Table 1-2 
Study 1: Coding of Open-ended Responses 
Category Description 
Examples 
False-Belief Task Knowledge-Ignorance Task 
Inadequate Mental 
Capacities 
 
Child cites agent‘s inadequate 
mental capacities without 
referring to perceptual capacities 
―He doesn‘t know crayons are in 
there‖ 
―He doesn‘t know‖ 
―He‘s not as smart as Smarty‖ 
―She won‘t know there‘s a frog 
inside‖ 
1
7
6
 
  
Table 1-3 
Study 1: Reasoning Used to Explain Agents’ Correct Beliefs and Knowledge 
Age group Agent 
 Correct Belief Reasoning  Correct Knowledge Reasoning 
 
Reality-
based 
Exceptional 
Perceptual 
Capacities 
Extraordin. 
Mental 
Capacities 
Uninformative  
Reality-
based 
Exceptional 
Perceptual 
Capacities 
Extraordin. 
Mental 
Capacities 
Uninformative 
Young Heroman  24% 29% 6% 35%  29% 14% 14% 43% 
Mr. Smart  17% 6% 28% 33%  13% --- 13% 50% 
God  32% 5% 5% 37%  17% --- 17% 50% 
            
Middle Heroman  10% 60% 10% ---  18% 73% --- --- 
Mr. Smart  17% --- 67% 17%  33% --- 67% --- 
God  50% 17% 17% ---  67% --- --- 33% 
            
Oldest Heroman  --- 100% --- ---  33% 67% --- --- 
Mr. Smart  --- --- 100% ---  35% 5% 60% --- 
God  --- 22% 56% ---  42% 25% 17% 17% 
Note. Age ranges for the false-belief task are: Young (40.4 – 52.4 months), Middle (52.5 – 58.9 months), and Oldest (59.0 – 73.4 
months). Age ranges for the knowledge-ignorance task are: Young (40.4 – 49.4 months), Middle (49.5 – 54.5 months), and Oldest 
(54.6 – 73.4 months). Extraordin. Mental Capacities = Extraordinary Mental Capacities.  
 
1
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Table 1-4 
Study 1: Chi-Square Analyses Comparing Children’s Attribution of Ignorance to Both 
Agents Against Chance 
Agent Cat  Heroman  Mr. Smart  God 
Mother χ2(1, 14) = 4.57*  χ2(1, 20) = 7.20**  χ2(1, 22) = 6.55*  χ2 (1, 35) = 17.86*** 
Girl χ2(1, 14) = 7.14**  χ2(1, 20) = 12.80***  χ2(1, 22) = 18.18***  χ2 (1, 35) = 27.46*** 
Note. Fourteen children attributed ignorance to the cat, 20 to Heroman, 22 to Mr. Smart, and 
35 to God.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
  
Table 2-1 
Study 2: Coding of Open-ended Responses 
Category Description 
Examples 
Knowledge-Ignorance Task False-Belief Task 
Reality-based Cites actual contents of container 
without mentioning agent‘s mental or 
perceptual capacities 
―There is a frog‖ 
―Someone put it in there‖ 
―There are marbles inside the box‖ 
―The crayons are in the bag‖ 
Appearance-based Cites the appearance of the box ―It‘s dark‖ 
―It‘s very dark‖ 
―It has crayons on it‖ 
―There‘s a sign with crayons‖ 
Typicality-based Cites the type of container or 
mentions what that type of container 
typically holds 
―It‘s supposed to be in there‖ 
―It belongs in there‖ 
―It‘s a crayon box‖ 
―They belong in there‖ 
Inadequate Perceptual 
Capacities 
Cites agent‘s inadequate, senses (e.g., 
inadequate vision) 
―It‘s too dark to see inside‖ 
―He can‘t see all the way down‖ 
―She can‘t see what‘s inside" 
―Someone can‘t see there‖ 
Exceptional Perceptual 
Capacities  
Cites agent‘s exceptional senses (e.g., 
vision, hearing) 
―He can see in the dark‖ 
―He can see through everything‖ 
―He can see through the box‖ 
―He can look through stuff‖ 
Extraordinary Mental 
Capacities 
Cites agent‘s mental capacities 
without referring to perceptual 
capacities 
―He‘s very smart‖ 
―He‘s a good rememberer‖ 
―He‘s super smart‖ 
―He knows a lot‖ 
Adequate Perceptual 
or Mental Capacities 
Explains that the agent will perceive 
or know the contents of container 
without referencing extraordinary 
abilities 
―Because he saw it‖ 
―He‘ll see a frog‖ 
―She knows a frog‘s in there‖ 
―He‘ll see marbles‖ 
―She looked in there‖ 
―Because she knows‖ 
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Table 2-1 
Study 2: Coding of Open-ended Responses 
Category Description 
Examples 
Knowledge-Ignorance Task False-Belief Task 
Powerful Cites the agent‘s general 
powerfulness without referencing 
specific perceptual or mental abilities. 
―He has every kind of powers‖ 
―He has lots of power‖ 
―He‘s powerful and he‘s great‖ 
―He has powers‖ 
Creator Reports that the agent designed or 
created the focal stimuli. 
―He made animals‖ ―He made marbles‖ 
―He made them and put them in the 
crayon  box; and he made the box‖ 
Want/Desire-based Explains how agent‘s knowledge or 
beliefs were driven by desires or 
preferences 
―He wanted to play with it‖ 
―He wants to give it to another 
person for a pet‖ 
―She likes marbles‖ 
―Boys love to play with toys‖ 
―She wants to play with them‖ 
 
 
1
8
0
 
 181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-2 
Study 2: Reasoning used to Explain Agents’ Correct Knowledge and Beliefs 
   Correct Knowledge  Correct Beliefs 
Reasoning  M age (SE) n  M age (SE) n 
Uninformative  51.43 (2.53) 14  52.12 (2.14) 17 
Reality  52.70 (2.51) 8  52.53 (2.04) 14 
Adequate Perception or 
Adequate Mental  56.83 (3.05) 10  58.02 (3.60) 8 
Exceptional Perception  60.80 (1.03) 27  60.87 (1.28) 26 
Extraordinary Mental  60.54 (1.24) 24  60.79 (1.21) 25 
Note. n = Number of children who used reasoning category at least once to 
account for the correct knowledge or beliefs of Heroman, Mr. Smart, or God 
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Table 3-1 
Study 3A: Attributions of Knowledge to Ms. Smart 
Does Ms. Smart Know… 
3 - 5 
years 
 6 - 12 
years 
 
 
18 - 21  
years 
 
Where to find the tallest tree in the world? 84% 
** 
90% 
*** 
100% 
*** 
What the first dog looked like long ago? 68% 
 
74% 
† 
88% 
*** 
Who will win the Super Bowl next year? 68% 
 
68% 
 
88% 
*** 
When your birthday is? 56% 
 
84% 
** 
92% 
*** 
What your favorite food is? 47% 
 
79% 
* 
92% 
*** 
What you‘re thinking right now? 32%  63%  91% *** 
   All six of the above items 16% 
*** 
63% 
 
83% 
** 
Note. Asterisks indicate knowledge that was attributed to Ms. Smart at levels 
significantly different from chance (50%), according to binomial tests.  
†
p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 3-2 
Study 3B: Attributions of Knowledge to Ms. Smart 
Does Ms. Smart Know… 
3 - 5 
years 
 6 - 12 
years 
 
 
18 - 21  
years 
 
Where to find the tallest tree in the world? 76% 
** 
92% 
*** 
97% 
*** 
What the first dog looked like long ago? 80% 
*** 
86% 
*** 
91% 
*** 
When your birthday is? 83% 
***a 
81% 
*** 
94% 
*** 
What your favorite food is? 90% 
***c 
86% 
*** 
91% 
*** 
What you‘re thinking right now? 80% ***c 81% *** 88% *** 
   All five of the above items 61% 
c 
75% 
** 
85% 
*** 
Note. These five items were asked of participants in both Study 3A and Study 3B. 
Asterisks indicate knowledge that was attributed to Ms. Smart at levels significantly 
above chance (50%), according to binomial tests.  
Superscript letters indicate significantly greater attributions of knowledge to Ms. Smart 
in Study 3B compared to Study 3A, according to Z tests. Participants in Study 3B 
(3 - 5 years: n = 41; 6 - 12 years: n = 36; 18 - 21 years: n = 34) were matched on age to 
those from Study 3A.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
a
p < .05, 
b
p < .01, 
c
p < .001 
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Table 3-3 
Study 3B: Attributions of Knowledge to Mom for Both Items in Category 
Category 
3 - 4.5 
years 
 
4.5 - 6.5 
years 
 6.5 - 11 
years 
 
 
18 - 21  
years 
 
  Past 36%  7% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
  Present 32%  4% 
 
18% 
 
6% 
 
  Future 46%  4% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
  Personal Events 68% 
†
 86% 
*** 
100% 
*** 
100% 
*** 
  Personal Actions 39%  21% 
 
4% 
 
0% 
 
  Personal Thoughts 50%  11% 
 
4% 
 
0% 
 
  Personal Preferences 75% 
*
 71% 
* 
71% 
* 
88% 
*** 
    All seven of the above categories 14%  4% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Note.  Asterisks indicate knowledge that was attributed to Mom by significantly more 
than 50% of the sample, according to binomial tests. 
†
p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 3-4 
Study 3B: Attributions of Knowledge to Ms. Smart for Both Items in Category 
Category 
3 - 4.5 
years 
 
4.5 - 6.5 
years 
 6.5 - 11 
years 
 
 
18 - 21  
years 
 
  Past 61% 
a
 79% 
**c 
86% 
***c 
91% 
***c 
  Present 71% 
*c
 79% 
**c 
93% 
***c 
97% 
***c 
  Future 75% 
*b
 86% 
***c 
75% 
*c 
88% 
***c 
  Personal Events 61%  86% 
*** 
79% 
** 
91% 
*** 
  Personal Actions 54%  86% 
***c 
82% 
***c 
88% 
***c 
  Personal Thoughts 75% 
*a
 79% 
**c 
71% 
*c 
85% 
***c 
  Personal Preferences 82% 
***
 89% 
*** 
82% 
*** 
88% 
*** 
    All seven of the above categories 29% 
*a
 64% 
c 
71% 
*c 
85% 
***c 
Note. Asterisks indicate knowledge that was attributed to Ms. Smart by significantly 
more or less than 50% of the sample, according to binomial tests. 
Superscript letters indicate significantly greater attributions of knowledge to Ms. 
Smart compared to mom, according to Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests. Significantly 
fewer than 50% of 3- to 4.5-year-olds reported that Ms. Smart knew about all seven 
categories.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
a
p < .05, 
b
p < .01, 
c
p < .001 
  
Table 3-5 
Study 3B: Reasoning Used to Justify Ms. Smart’s Knowledge 
 Reasoning Category 
Age group 
Knows 
Everything Intelligence 
Ordinary 
Experience 
Participant‘s 
Knowledge Other Uninformative 
3 - 4.5 years 11% 19% 8% 17% 11% 34% 
4.5 - 6.5 years 33% 36% 9% 4% 1% 17% 
6.5 - 11 years 63% 19% 8% 3% 2% 6% 
Adults 90% 6% 2% 0% 5% 1% 
Note.  Numbers reflect percentage of questions, per age group, for which participants used each of the six focal reasoning 
categories. Each participant was allowed to use multiple forms of reasoning for each of the five questions, thus some rows 
total more than 100%.  
1
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Table 3-6 
Study 3B: Descriptive Statistics for Participants’ Understanding of Infinity, 
Ability to Imagine the Improbable, and Exposure to Media about God 
Age group 
Understanding 
Infinity 
 
 
Imagining the  
Improbable 
 
 
Exposure to 
God Media 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
3 - 4.5 years .96 (.69)  2.71 (1.63)  2.25 (1.19) 
4.5 - 6.5 years 1.18 (.61)  2.57 (1.69)  2.18 (.84) 
6.5 - 11 years 1.68 (.98)  3.79 (.79)  2.50 (.95) 
Adults 2.68 (.47)  4.00 (.00)  1.94 (.62) 
Note. Scores for understanding infinity can range from 0 to 3. Scores for 
imagining the improbable can range from 0 to 4. The composite measure of 
participants‘ exposure to media about God can range from 1 to 5. 
  
 
Table 3-7 
Study 3B: Partial Correlations (Controlling for Age) Between Imagining the Improbable and Knowledge Attributed to Ms. Smart 
Knowledge 
Know 
Total 
 
Past  Present 
 
Future 
 Personal  
Events  
 Personal  
Actions 
 
Personal  
Thought 
 
Personal  
Prefs. 
 
Within 
Expert 
Domain 
 
3 - 4.5 years 
     
 
 
 
 
         
   Seen Improbable .37 
†
 .26  .37 
†
 .37  .27  .14  .25  .32  .14 
 
   Imagine Improbable .06  .01  -.06  -.09  .03  .28  .12  -.05  -.05 
 
4.5 - 6.5 years 
 
    
 
 
 
 
         
   Seen Improbable -.07  -.12  -.05  -.24  -.17  .14  -.03  .09  -.10  
   Imagine Improbable .14  -.12  .05  .22  .15  .28  .09  .13  .01 
 
6.5 - 11 years 
 
    
 
 
 
 
         
   Seen Improbable .23  .22  .08  .26  .19  .11  .26  .24  -.17 
 
   Imagine Improbable .50 
** 
.24  .63 
***
 .46 
*
 .47 
*
 .55 
**
 .38 
*
 .41 
*
 -.22 
 
Adults 
     
 
 
 
 
         
   Seen Improbable .22  .19  .10  .22  .17  .22  .23  .21  -.02 
 
   Imagine Improbable --  --  -- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
--
  
--
  
--
  
--
  
Note. ―Know total‖ was computed by summing across all seven categories of knowledge in the breadth-of-knowledge task. All adults earned 
the maximum score (4) on the imagining-the-improbable task, and thus no correlations could be computed.  
†
p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 3-8 
Study 3B: Partial Correlations (Controlling for Age) Between Religious Exposure and Knowledge Attributed to Ms. Smart 
Knowledge 
Know 
Total 
 
Past  Present 
 
Future 
 Personal  
Events  
 Personal  
Actions 
 
Personal  
Thought 
 
Personal 
Prefs. 
 
Within 
Expert 
Domain 
 
3 - 4.5 years    
 
 
 
 
           
   God Media .16  .38  -.22  .31  -.02  .17  .12  .17  .07 
 
   Place of Worship .12  .32  -.21  .27  -.04  .15  .11  .06  .05 
 
4.5 - 6.5 years 
   
 
 
 
 
           
   God Media .43 
† .37  .43 † .32  .43 † .38  .27  .20  .08 
 
   Place of Worship .55 
*
 .60 
**
 .54 
*
 .36  .56 
*
 .23  .44 
 
.21  .19 
 
6.5 - 11 years    
 
 
 
 
           
   God Media -.27  -.29  -.45 
*
 -.14  -.31  -.27  -.02  -.27  .16 
 
   Place of Worship -.25  -.13  -.23  -.17  -.32  -.31  -.10  -.25  .27 
 
Adults 
   
 
 
 
 
           
   God Media -.03  .11  -.11  -.04  -.20  .07  -.05  -.06  -.10 
 
   Place of Worship -.08  .08  -.22  -.04  -.20  -.04  -.16  -.04  -.10 
 
Note. ―Know total‖ was computed by summing across all seven categories of knowledge in the breadth-of-knowledge task. 3-4.5 years, 
n = 23;  4.5-6.5 years, n = 19;  6.5-11 years, n = 25;  adults, n = 34  
†
p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01
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APPENDIX A 
Studies 1 and 2: Agent Images and Introductions 
 
 
        Girl 
 
 
 
 
         Let‘s talk about Mary. [Show picture of Mary] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Mom 
 
 
 
 
   Let‘s talk about your mom [show picture of mom]. It‘s not really a picture of       
   your mom, but let‘s say it is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cat 
 
 
 
This is a kitty cat [show picture of cat]. This kitty cat has special eyes that let 
him see in the dark. 
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Heroman 
 
[Show picture of Heroman and say:]  
This is Heroman. Heroman has super powers. He can fly very fast so that 
he can help lots of people all over the world.  He also has eyes that let 
him see the insides of things, he can even see through walls.  
[Show child a pen] Can you see this pen? [Place pen out-of-sight, behind 
paper]  
Now can you see the pen? [Place picture of Heroman on child‘s side of 
the paper]  
Well, Heroman can still see the pen. He can see through the paper and 
see the pen on the other side. 
Remember, Heroman can fly very fast and can see right through things 
 
 
 
Mr. Smart 
[Show picture of Mr. Smart, facing the child (away from the box) and 
say: ] 
This is Mr. Smart. Mr. Smart has special powers. He knows 
everything. 
[Show child closed opaque container that has a ball inside].  
Do you know what‘s inside here? [Child responds: ―No‖].  
Well, this is the first time that I‘ve played with this, so I don‘t know 
what‘s inside either. Mr. Smart also hasn‘t played with this before. But 
because he‘s so smart he still knows what‘s inside. We would have to 
look inside, but he wouldn‘t even need to look.  
Mr. Smart, what do you think is in here? [Lean next to Mr. Smart]   
Mr. Smart thinks that there is a ball inside. Let‘s see. [Open container 
and show child the ball] 
Mr. Smart was right! Wow, he knows everything! 
Remember, Mr. Smart is very smart. He knows everything. 
[Place Mr. Smart face-down, away from box] 
 
 
 
 
God 
 
 
 
Let‘s talk about God [show picture]. It‘s not really a picture of God, but 
let‘s say it is. 
 
 
Note. Picture representing God (and language alluding to God‘s physical 
presence) was only presented to half of the sample. 
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APPENDIX B 
Studies 3A and 3B: Expert Images (version for girls) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a mechanic. A mechanic is a person who fixes people‘s 
cars when there is something wrong, and makes sure cars run 
well. 
 
This is a chef. A chef is a person who cooks food that people 
want to eat. 
 
This is a pilot. A pilot is a person who flies planes, and helps 
people travel from one place to another. 
This is a doctor. A doctor is a person who helps people when 
they are sick or hurt and makes sure that people are healthy.  
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APPENDIX C 
Studies 3A and 3B: Questions Comparing Experts’ and Ms. Smart’s Knowledge 
 
Pool of questions within experts‘ domains of knowledge, used for tasks in which experts 
are compared to one another, and in which experts are compared to Ms. Smart: 
 
Doctor 
 Who knows more about why you get a runny nose?           
 Who knows more about what medicine you should take if you‘re sick?    
 Who knows more about why you get a tummy ache?               
 Who knows more about what food is healthy for you?            
 Who knows more about being healthy? (only for Study 3B)  
 
Mechanic 
 Who knows more about why your car won't start?                            
 Who knows more about the best type of tires for your car?               
 Who knows more about why some cars go very fast?            
 Who knows more about what cars are made of?      
 Who knows more about cars? (only for Study 3B) 
 
Chef 
 Who knows more about how much time it takes to cook eggs?            
 Who knows more about which apples are sweet and which are sour?            
 Who knows more about how different types of fruit taste?                     
 Who knows more about what ingredients go into different kinds of cakes?   
 Who knows more about food? (only for Study 3B)   
 
Pilot 
 Who knows more about how wings on a plane work?                          
 Who knows more about how high different types of planes can go?    
 Who knows more about which kinds of planes can flip?                      
 Who knows more about how fast a plane goes before it can lift off?          
 Who knows more about planes? (only for Study 3B) 
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Pool of questions outside of experts‘ domains of knowledge, used for tasks in which 
experts are compared to Ms. Smart only: 
 
 Who knows more about how trees grow?                          
 Who knows more about why some animals lay eggs?            
 Who knows more about how a TV works?                               
 Who knows more about where germs come from?                 
 Who knows more about how rainbows are made?                                  
 Who knows more about how phones work?                                            
 Who knows more about why some people need glasses to see well?       
 Who knows more about why giraffes have long necks?                       
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APPENDIX D 
Study 3A: Introduction to Ms. Smart (version for girls) 
 
This is Ms. Smart. Ms. Smart has special powers. She knows everything about everything 
[spread arms]. 
[Show child closed opaque container that has a ball inside].  
Do you know what‘s inside here? [Child responds: ―No‖]. Well, 
this is the first time that I‘ve played with this, so I don‘t know 
what‘s inside either. Ms. Smart also hasn‘t played with this 
before. But because she‘s so smart she still knows what‘s inside. 
We would have to look inside, but she doesn‘t even need to look.  
Let‘s ask Ms. Smart what‘s inside. Ms. Smart, what do you think 
is in here?  
Ms. Smart says: ―I know there‘s a stapler inside.‖  
Let‘s see. [Open container and show child the stapler]. Ms. Smart 
was right!  
Remember, Ms. Smart knows everything about everything, not just everything about boxes. 
Let me tell you about some other things Ms. Smart knows… 
       Do you know where this stapler was made?  
       Ms. Smart says: ―I know it was made in Canada.‖  
      Let‘s take a look. [Look at bottom of stapler] Yep, it says ―Canada.‖  
       Do you know how many staplers are made in Canada each year? Me neither. But Ms. Smart 
does, because remember she knows everything about everything [spread arms]—about boxes, 
about staplers, about Canada, everything. 
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APPENDIX E 
Study 3B: Introduction to Ms. Smart (version for girls) 
 
This is Ms. Smart. Ms. Smart was born with a very, very special brain. She knows everything 
about everything [spread arms]. 
 [Show child closed opaque container that has a ball inside].  
Do you know what‘s inside here? [Child responds: ―No‖]. 
Well, this is the first time that I‘ve played with this, so I 
don‘t know what‘s inside either. Ms. Smart also hasn‘t 
played with this before. But because she‘s so smart she still 
knows what‘s inside. We would have to look inside, but she 
doesn‘t even need to look.  
Let‘s ask Ms. Smart what‘s inside. Ms. Smart, what do you 
think is in here?  
Ms. Smart says: ―I know there‘s a stapler inside.‖  
Let‘s see. [Open container and show child the stapler]. Ms. 
Smart was right!  
 
Remember, Ms. Smart knows everything about everything, not just everything about boxes. 
Let me tell you about some other things Ms. Smart knows… 
       Do you know where this stapler was made?  
       Ms. Smart says: ―I know it was made in Canada.‖  
      Let‘s take a look. [Look at bottom of stapler] Yep, it says ―Canada.‖  
       Do you know how many staplers are made in Canada each year? Me neither. But Ms. Smart 
does, because remember she knows everything about everything [spread arms]—about boxes, 
about staplers, about Canada, everything.
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APPENDIX F 
Study 3B: Questions about Ms. Smart’s and Mom’s Knowledge 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know what the very first dog looked like long ago? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know where to find the tallest tree in the world? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know when your dad‘s birthday is? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know what your favorite food is? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know what your dad is thinking right now? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know how hot the weather will be next summer? 
If your friend did something naughty at school, and nobody saw, would [Ms. Smart/your 
mom] know your friend did it? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know how many people will live on Earth next year? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know what you‘re thinking right now? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know what the very first plane sounded like long ago? 
If you did something naughty at school, and nobody saw, would [Ms. Smart/your mom] 
know you did it? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know where to find the longest river in the world? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know when your birthday is? 
Does [Ms. Smart/your mom] know what your dad‘s favorite food is? 
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APPENDIX G 
Study 3B: Imagining-the-Improbable Task Questions 
Have you ever seen a person who has a lion for a pet?                        
  Could a person have a lion for a pet in real life?                                
  Can you close your eyes and think about a person with a pet lion?    
Have you ever seen someone drink onion juice?                                  
  Could a person drink onion juice in real life?                                    
  Can you close your eyes and think about someone drinking onion juice?     
Have you ever seen someone paint polka dots on an airplane?            
  Could a person paint polka dots on an airplane in real life?               
  Can you close your eyes & think about someone painting polka dots on an airplane?    
Have you ever seen someone make purple applesauce?       
  Could a person make purple applesauce in real life?        
  Can you close your eyes and think about someone making purple applesauce?  
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